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Abstract 
This project investigated the relationship between Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public 
sector by addressing four questions: ‘to what extent is the Chinese civil service a distinctive 
organisational environment?’, ‘how do Chinese civil servants utilise different Guanxi types in their 
work?’, ‘how do perceptions of Chinese civil servants push our understanding of the motives and 
circumstances surrounding corrupt organisational behaviour?’, and ‘to what extent do known 
theories explain the complex relationship between Guanxi and corruption and how do Chinese 
civil servants perceive it?’. In order to investigate these questions, an inductive research approach 
and a qualitative research strategy were adopted, with 31 semi-structured interviews with Chinese 
civil servants.  
 
Firstly, the findings indicated that the Chinese civil service is a distinctive organisational 
environment which challenges the suitability of theories developed in different organisational 
environments -such as social capital and social exchange theories. Secondly, for Chinese civil 
servants, Guanxi is an invisible capital that brings significant competitive advantage at work, an 
intangible and safe currency of transactions and a way to fulfil traditional responsibility, but also 
an unbearable burden. Then, corruption is illegal behaviour that can be clearly identified and can 
find its roots in distinctive uses of Guanxi at work as well as in specific peculiarities of the 
organisational environment. Finally, in terms of the relationship between Guanxi and corruption, 
the findings point to evidence that one does not inevitably lead to the other but that corrupt 
behaviour in the Cinese civil service can be explained better from the theoretical lenses of Guanxi 
than from those of social capital and social exchange theory, most commonly utilised in Western 
studies on corrupt behaviour.  
 
The findings of this study confirmed some previous studies in the literature, such as the concept 
that low wages can trigger corrupt behaviour. But it also unravelled new findings, such as the ‘grey 
space’ between regular ‘reciprocity’ and ‘corruption’, and the context specificity of a ‘clan culture’ 
aiming for ‘the doctrine of the mean’ in the Chinese civil service. Overall, this project contributed 
to the academic fields of general management (investigating management theories emerged 
primarily from Western cultural contexts) and organisational behaviour (investigating Chinese 
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civil service behaviour). The theoretical contribution of the findings is the conceptual juxtaposition 
of Guanxi, social capital and social exchange theories, recommending Guanxi as the appropriate 
theoretical framing for Chinese organisational settings. Guanxi as a Chinese-based concept seems 
to involve some characteristics of both social capital and social exchange concepts, but with some 
important differences. For instance, Guanxi involves no the features of ‘linking’ social capital and 
other types of social exchange but ‘reciprocal’ exchange. Likewise, social capital and social 
exchange are probably the ‘choice’ for individuals in organisations to engage in reciprocity within 
social networks in Western organisations, but this research’s findings suggest that there is 
significantly less scope for ‘choice’ for Chinese civil servants, due to  traditional culture and to the 
specific organisational environment in which they work. The findings also offer opportunities for 
both future research and managerial practice in Chinese public sector settings. 
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Chapter 1.0 Introduction 
In 2019, China had the largest population volume of 1,435 million, or 18.59% of the total world 
population (Worldometers, 2019).  The forecast predicts that the population of China will remain 
at a similar percentage of the world population until 2030 (ibid). In recent decades, China has 
transformed from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy and kept an average of 10% 
economic growth (The World Bank, 2019). China overtook Japan as the second-largest economy 
in the world (BBC, 2011), and scholars believe that China will become the largest economy 
between 2026-2030 (Bloomberg, 2016). Within 40 years, China has been transformed from a poor 
and undeveloped country to one of the top economies of the world, and successfully lifted more 
than 800 million people out of poverty (The World Bank, 2019). 
 
Despite the country’s ‘economic miracle’, corruption has continued to be a serious problem in 
China. According to Transparency International (2019), China is ranked 87th out of 180 most 
corrupt countries (where rank 1 stands for least corrupt), also it scored 39 out of 100 (where a score 
of 100 indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption is very clean). In recent years, a 
considerable number of official corruption cases have been uncovered, these cases were not only 
conducted by middle or lower-level civil servants but also conducted by those who had higher-
level positions in the Chinese public sector, such as China’s former Parliamentary Advisory Body 
vice-chairman Su Rong (BBC, 2014), who allegedly accepted “huge amounts of bribes” and sold 
promotions in public for personal benefits (Fox News, 2015); former Politburo Standing 
Committee member and security chief Zhou Yongkang, who took more than £8.5 billion assets for 
his family (BBC, 2015); and China’s former Central Military Commission vice-chairman Guo 
Boxiong, who received bribes for approximately £8.6 million (BBC, 2016). According to a report 
by The Economist (2014), “The Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection, the party’s 
watchdog, says that 182,000 officials were punished for disciplinary violations in 2013, an increase 
of more than 20,000 over 2012, and of nearly 40,000 over 2011.” Therefore, corruption has not 
reduced alongside China’s recent rapid economic development. On the contrary, there is a 
tendency towards rising corruption in the Chinese public sector. 
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In the field of research on corruption, the negative effects of public sector corruption on national 
economic development have been debated for many years. Many studies indicate that corruption 
may inevitably damage national economy (Mendoza et al., 2015), which can “sand the economic 
wheel” (Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Dutta & Sobel, 2016). For example, corruption damages FDI 
(foreign direct investment) (Voyer & Beamish, 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Javorcik & Wei, 
2009); GDP growth (Aidt et al., 2008; Swaleheen, 2011; Agbiboa, 2012); public income (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999; Li et al., 2000; Welsch, 2004); social trust and life satisfaction (Rothstein, 2014); 
and government expenditure (Mauro, 1998).  
 
However, some other studies show that corruption can, in some cases, “grease the economic 
wheel” (Nye, 1967; Huntington, 1968; Méon & Weill, 2010; Dreher & Gassebner, 2013). This is 
because corruption could enable a slow governmental institution to be more efficient (Leff, 1964), 
by offering opportunities for actors valuing time or with access to limited resources more than 
others are prepared to pay (Lui, 1985), then virtually introducing competition into a monopolistic 
market in the end (Heidenheimer et al., 1988). Similarly, corruption brings competition for scarce 
political and economic resources, which leads to more efficient government service (Aidt, 2003). 
It encourages private entrepreneurial activities considerably because it reduces the negative effect 
of rules and norms on entrepreneurship (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013). Also, corruption stimulates 
economic efficiency by allowing actors to sidestep bureaucratic civil servants or public institutions 
(ibid).  
 
‘Sanding the wheels’ or ‘greasing the wheels’ are two completely opposite perspectives which 
focus on the different developmental stages of countries. ‘Greasing the wheels’ may only work in 
relatively undeveloped or developing countries where the government is poor (Méon & Weill, 
2010). In contrast, ‘sanding the wheels’ could occur in developed countries where the system is 
effective, and that can support and promote economic development (Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Dutta 
& Sobel, 2016). In such cases, corruption can undermine the national economy from various 
aspects such as reducing FDI and GDP growth. 
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From this, two interesting points about China can be identified. At first, according to the 
perspective of ‘sanding the wheels’, China’s economic growth should be influenced significantly 
by the high-level corruption in the public sector. In other words, China is unlikely to reach an 
average 10% growth in 10 years, such a high growth rate in comparison with the major Western 
countries such as the UK (approximately 2% between 2005-2015) and the US (approximately 1.5% 
between 2005-2015) (The World Bank, 2019). However, China, in fact, has experienced rapid 
economic growth and serious rising of corruption concurrently, which contradicts the ‘sanding the 
wheels’ perspective in which corruption significantly damages a national economy. Hence, a 
‘greasing the wheels’ perspective could explain this case as China virtually belongs to developing 
countries, which is another interesting point. Based on the perspective, it is rational to infer that 
China’s governance is poor, which provide rooms to actors for bypassing burdensome regulations, 
rules and civil servants via corruption to ‘grease the economic wheel.’ However, the institutional 
framework in China has significantly improved since 1978, and the improving trend is most likely 
to continue (Kang et al., 2008). China’s central government has the power to ensure the regulations 
and rules can serve economic development or, at least, that China’s institutional system and 
framework are not weak. This also contradicts the ‘greasing the wheels’ perspective which only 
works in weak institutional countries. Therefore, China appears to be a unique country where 
neither ‘sanding the wheels’ nor ‘greasing the wheels’ perspectives apply. 
 
These two interesting points emerging in China’s reality are worth to be investigated. There must 
be certain factors that make corruption a serious public sector issue in a country where 
governmental systems and frameworks are not that weak. One of the potential explanations is 
Guanxi. Guanxi refers to “the system of social networks and influential relationships which 
facilitate business and other dealings in China” (Oxford Dictionary, 2019), which shows that 
people normally perceive Guanxi based on its benefits seeking term. For instance, Guanxi is a kind 
of social bond (Walder, 1986), and implicitly based on mutual interests and benefits (Yang, 1994). 
Furthermore, Guanxi refers to a relationship between a person with needs and another person who 
has the ability to satisfy those needs (Osland, 1990). Also, Guanxi can be seen as a kind of 
friendship supporting the persistent exchange of favours such as preferential treatment in business, 
preferential access to limited resources, etc. (Pye, 1992). 
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Therefore, Guanxi seems to have certain inherent links with social capital theory. Social capital 
can be described as the sum of intangible but actual resources, which serve an individual or a group 
who own a durable network of special relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Through having social capital, the owner can therefore obtain 
resources in private networks from other members (Ellison et al., 2007), such as valuable 
information or personal relationships, etc. (Paxton, 1999). Based on the comparison between 
Guanxi and social capital, both of them allow the owner to gain private benefits such as access to 
limited resources or special treatment. Therefore, Guanxi could be another name for social capital 
in a Chinese context, or at least certain parts of Guanxi shares features with social capital. Overall, 
Guanxi can be regarded as a sort of Chinese particular interpersonal relationship that allows the 
owner to gain personal benefits, just like social capital. However, social capital has three different 
types, which are bonding, bridging and linking social capital (Putnam, 2000). If Guanxi is 
completely similar to all of these three social capital types, or merely similar to one or two of them, 
this research may provide reliable answers.  
 
In addition, Social exchange theory entails the exchange between actors with some forms of 
agreement such as an unspecified obligation of reciprocation (Blau, 1964; Adler & Kwon, 2002; 
Chen & Choi, 2005). A common example is that when a very precious gift is accepted, it is 
extremely difficult for the person who has resource allocation power to refuse any payback of a 
resource in the future (Hwang, 1987). In short, social exchange theory emphasises the ‘exchange’, 
in different dimensions. From this point, Guanxi concept is similar to social exchange theory 
because they all work on the base of ‘exchange’. Nevertheless, social exchange theory also has 
different types, which are (a) negotiated exchange; (b) reciprocal exchange; (c) generalised 
exchange; and (d) co-productive exchange (Berger et al., 1972; Ekeh, 1974; Rosenberg & Turner, 
1981; Cook et al., 1995; Molm et al., 1999).  If Guanxi is completely similar to all of these social 
exchange types, or merely similar to one or two of them, this research may also provide answers. 
Concerning the relationships between Guanxi and corruption, debates have been ongoing for years. 
The literature widely believes that Guanxi has fuelled the rampant corruption in China (Snell et 
al., 2010; Bedford, 2011; Zhan, 2012; Qi, 2013; Nie & Lämsä, 2015; Barbalet, 2017; Karhunen et 
al., 2018). For instance, the process of building and keeping Guanxi is synonymous with 
corruption as gift-sending, a typical way of Guanxi establishment and maintenance (Smeltzer & 
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Jennings, 1998; Lovett et al., 1999; Yao, 1999). As Guanxi is mainly transactional and plays a link 
between money and power that results in corruption (Fan, 2002b), it means that Guanxi is strongly 
linked with illegal or corrupt behaviours (Ip, 2008). Also, as Guanxi is mainly cultivated by the 
exchange of favours such as help or gifts (Su & Littlefield, 2001), individual government officials 
thus tend to charge ‘economic rent’ in the case of using their Guanxi networks, which results in 
widespread bureaucratic corruption (Hwang & Staley, 2005; Pederson & Wu, 2006). Moreover, 
Guanxi is particularistic that people use it to avoid formal rules and regulations, or even 
occasionally, laws, which is linked to potential corruption (Barbalet, 2017). 
 
More specifically, there seem to be three pathways of Guanxi to facilitate corruption (Wang, 2016). 
Firstly, Guanxi plays a role in the communication of corruption cases. Actors involved in 
corruption usually apply Guanxi as the bridge to communicate and share information (Zhan, 2012). 
Secondly, Guanxi acts as an exchange role in corruption. This is because corrupt transactions are 
not likely to be completed without the support of credible Guanxi relationships (Wang, 2016). 
Lastly, neutralisation is another role undertaken by Guanxi. On account of the mutual trust 
followed by the Guanxi establishment (Burt et al., 2018), the moral and cognitive difficulties can 
be overcame due to Guanxi’s essential feature of reciprocity (Li, 2011). 
 
Additionally, four characteristics of Guanxi are suggested to clarify how Guanxi brings about 
corruption (Park & Luo, 2001). Firstly, reciprocity is one of the determinants of a Guanxi 
relationship because it concerns Guanxi’s maintenance and development (Su & Littlefield, 2001). 
However, this characteristic potentially risks corruption because if government officials accept 
benefits, such as gifts or financial interests from entrepreneurs, but their income cannot cover the 
repayment, they may apply public power as an equivalent to repay to avoid a negative reputation. 
Secondly, Guanxi is utilitarian because the establishment and maintenance of it generally operate 
according to favour exchange (Yan, 1996). During Guanxi’s favour exchange process, ‘renqing’ 
is the moral foundation that takes effect in all Guanxi relationships as an unavoidable precondition 
(Luo, 2007). As ‘renqing’ refers to the rewarding obligation (Lee et al., 2001), thus ‘renqing’ 
probably applies gifts or cash to exchange, towards a risk of increasing corruption (Yang, 1994). 
Then, Guanxi is transferable, which means corruption participants can use Guanxi’s transferability 
to introduce and attract more corrupt partners, to extend corrupt Guanxi to newcomers following 
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an expansion of their corrupt network, which could generate more potential corruption. Lastly, 
Guanxi is intangible. Depending on invisible and unwritten social norms such as reciprocity and 
‘renqing’, Guanxi parties are tied closely (Park & Luo, 2001). Thus, as long as Guanxi actors fulfil 
the necessary commitments, they are supposed to be good players in Guanxi relationships. 
However, the way in which favours are exchanged relies on the actors, and sometimes they may 
apply money or equivalents, which could also increase corruption.  
 
Although studies widely accept the negative influence of Guanxi towards the generation of 
corruption, some studies claim there are no links between Guanxi and corruption. Namely, Guanxi 
is not itself a determinant of corruption, it usually works as a mechanism in corruption behaviours 
(Qi, 2013). Typically, the Guanxi between entrepreneurs and governmental officials is a potential 
pathway bypassing laws and rules via private connections (Braendle et al., 2005), but “Guanxi is 
no more equivalent to corruption than social drinking is to drunkenness” (Tsang, 1998). Guanxi 
certainly plays a significant role in promoting corrupt activities, such as unethical favour exchange, 
but, accordingly, stating that Guanxi automatically equates to corruption is wrong (Wang, 2014). 
Indeed, there are nine differences between Guanxi and corruption (Luo, 2002), which are: (1) 
Guanxi is a part of social norm, but corruption is not; (2) Guanxi is legal, but corruption is not; (3) 
Guanxi exchanges favours, but corruption exchanges money or equivalents; (4) Guanxi is tacit 
reciprocity, but corruption is an explicit transaction; (5) Guanxi has no lawful risks, but corruption 
has; (6) Guanxi is long-term, but corruption is short-term; (7) Guanxi has no time limit, but 
corruption has; (8) Guanxi relies on trust, but corruption depends on commodity; (9) Guanxi can 
be transferred, but corruption cannot. 
 
In short, the debate concerning Guanxi and corruption has existed for years, which means more 
empirical evidence is needed to conclude this debate. Also, the literature indicates a research gap 
that the majority of studies about Guanxi and corruption are based on private sector investigation. 
In other words, research from data collected from the Chinese public sector is worth undertaking. 
 
Accordingly, this project is trying to fill this gap, to terminate the existent debate about the link 
between Guanxi and corruption, while bringing a contribution to both the literature on corruption 
and to that of Guanxi in organisations, particularly in the public sector. Specifically, as there is 
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strong evidence from the literature indicating that Guanxi may have certain links with the concept 
of social capital, which means Guanxi could be another name of social capital in the Chinese 
context. Hence, this project tries to offer a further perception of Guanxi - the significant part of 
Chinese traditional culture, and to investigate if Guanxi is related to corruption from the 
perspective of social capital. 
 
In order to achieve this purpose, this project tries to clarify four sub-questions:  
1. To what extent is the Chinese civil service a distinctive organisational environment? 
2. How do Chinese civil servants utilise different Guanxi types in their work? 
3. How do perceptions of Chinese civil servants push our understanding of the motives and 
circumstances surrounding corrupt organisational behaviour? 
4. To what extent do known theories explain the complex relationship between Guanxi 
corruption and how do Chinese civil servants perceive it? 
 
Concerning research methodology, this project applies inductive approach because the research 
target is to explore the relationships between Guanxi and corruption instead of demonstrating 
proposed relationships based on hypothesises. Also, numerical data used by quantitative research 
is not appropriate here because they cannot answer ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2015). Therefore, qualitative research strategy is adopted because qualitative research 
applies classification techniques to analyse collected non-numerical data (Saunders et al., 2012). 
In addition, this project uses semi-structured interview as data collection method as it offers a more 
flexible and structured way for the researcher to gain reliable data (ibid). Moreover, purposive 
sampling and snowball sampling are both applied in order to ensure the interviewees selected are 
the ‘right’ ones that increase data credibility and to reach the intended number of interviewees. 
Finally, the collected data will be analysed inductively by thematic analysis approach. 
 
The thesis comprises eight main chapters, which are (1) Introduction, (2) Literature Review, (3) 
Methodology, (4) Findings, (5) Discussion, (6) Conclusion, (7) Bibliography, and (8) Appendix. 
The first chapter, Introduction, tries to build a whole picture for the thesis. Research background, 
related theories, research aims and research questions are introduced. Then, the Literature Review 
chapter reviews associated theories and concepts based on the literature in order to find out existent 
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gaps that could be fulfilled. The themes concern: (2.1) Corruption, (2.2) Guanxi, (2.3) Guanxi & 
corruption, and (2.4) Research Gaps and Questions. Afterwards, the Methodology chapter explains 
research philosophy, research strategy, research methods, data collection and data analysis 
approaches applied in this project. Additionally, the Findings chapter presents the findings based 
on the collected data, which consists of 4 main themes: (4.1) Organisational environment in the 
Chinese public sector, (4.2) Guanxi in the Chinese public sector, (4.3) Corruption in the Chinese 
public sector, and (4.4) Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector. Next, Discussion 
chapter answers the three research sub-questions, and compares the findings and the literature, to 
find out what existent theories or concepts can be confirmed via the findings and what new points 
reflected by the findings that are probably neglected by the literature. After that, a summary of the 
thesis is made in the Conclusion chapter, which aims for indicating the contribution and limitation 
in terms of this project. Lastly, the chapters of Bibliography and Appendix present the references 
used in the thesis and the questions applied for the interview of data collection. 
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Chapter 2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Corruption 
Corruption, as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon with various forms, has been discussed 
for many years by researchers. The literature shows corruption may generate significant effects on 
both organisational and national levels, which is caused by numerous antecedents. Normally, 
corruption includes such actions as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgement of a person in 
a position of trust), nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationships rather 
than merit), and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding 
uses) (Nye, 1967). 
 
 
2.1.1 Definition of corruption 
Scholars have different understandings concerning the fundamental paradigms of corruption. In 
academic fields, historians describe corruption as a long-running historical phenomenon, which is 
divisible into discernible epochs since 3,000 B.C. (Ryan, 2000). Socialists consider the roots of 
corruption are social and cultural, where corruption blocks social development and reduces 
national wealth (Husted, 1999). Economists maintain that corruption hinders economic growth and 
decreases FDI (foreign direct investment) (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006); and political scientists hold 
that corruption leads to non-transparent institutions and decision-making processes as well as 
closed and under-performing market mechanisms (Luo, 2005). 
 
The World Bank (2017) has defined corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain; 
Transparency International (2019) refers to corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for private 
benefits; the European Commission (2019) also states that corruption is the abuse of power for 
private gain. According to these corruption definitions offered by institutions, two keywords can 
be identified, which are ‘power abuse’ and ‘private gain’. In short, contemporary concepts in terms 
of corruption concentrate on the kinds of behaviours that misuse power for personal interests. In 
the public sector, it means the misuse of public power by civil servants, and in the private sector, 
it relates to organisational power misuse by superiors. 
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The literature also displays a number of similar understandings towards corruption. One of the 
widely accepted definition analyses: “corruption is the behaviour which deviates from the formal 
duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence” (Nye, 1967). Nye takes the perspective that corruption is those in power refusing to 
fulfil their positional responsibilities or violating regulations and rules, depending on private 
interpersonal links for obtaining personal benefits.  
 
In addition, based on a behavioural perspective, corruption concerns ‘misuse of public power’ and 
‘moral decay’ (Andvig et al., 2001), that ranges from a political and economic issue in structural 
to a cultural and individual issue in moral. Corruption is about carrying out unethical behaviours 
and applying illegal standards (Seleim & Bontis, 2009), which refers to powerful actors violating 
regulations or laws to satisfy private interests. Also, corruption is a combination of illegal practices, 
such as bribery activities between individuals or organisations and public officials in order to gain 
privileges (Anand et al., 2005), as well as a phenomenon involving achieving goals through 
personal social networking and illegal favour exchange (Rothstein, 2014). Overall, the literature 
shows a similar perspective about corruption in association with the two keywords: ‘power abuse’ 
and ‘private gain’, which explains corruption as the actions of managers seeking personal benefits 
by utilising public or organisational authority and power in violation of prescribed regulations of 
institutions (Wederman, 2004; Palmer & Maher, 2006; Agbiboa, 2012; Teachout, 2016). 
 
More specifically, the nature of corruption can be summarised into seven points (Luo, 2005), 
which may offer a more in-depth perception of corruption in this project. At first, corruption is 
‘context-based’, which means different things to different people in different contexts such as 
ideology, culture or others. Then, corruption is ‘norm-deviated’. This is because a significant 
feature of corruption is violating legal codes or institutional regulations in a given political context. 
Otherwise, it cannot be differentiated from normal gift-exchange or interpersonal ties. Next, 
corruption is ‘power-related’, where a corruptor must be in a position of power produced either by 
discretionary authority or market imperfections. Corruption can be ‘virtually covert’, where the 
corrupt activities between parties have no formal written contract, and it is based on verbal 
exchange to avoid the existence of written evidence. At the same time, the incompleteness of the 
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formal system also offers opportunities for corruptors to bring their corruption activities 
underground where they can remain secret and flourish on the dark side of the formal system. 
Additionally, corruption can be ‘intentional’. Private gain is the principal motivator for corruption 
actors, but illegal misconduct may not be corruption without this purposive motivation, it could 
instead be a careless maladministration behaviour. Moreover, corruption is ‘ex-post opportunistic’. 
This is because there is no written contract or document delivered between the briber and bribee, 
which means the entire corruption process is not protected by any legal system. As corruption 
payment is a form of investment, whether the payer will complete the payment and the receiver 
will repay or not is uncertain. Therefore, corruption is opportunism. Finally, corruption is 
‘perceptional’. It is perceived by public and political authorities. The perceived corruption 
practices can be further distinguished by moral implications as ‘white’, ‘black’ or ‘grey’. The 
‘white’ corruption can be tolerated by public in some cases such as a certain type of misconduct, 
the ‘black’ corruption is definitely condemned, and the ‘grey’ corruption is often ambiguous.  
 
To sum up, according to Luo’s concept, corruption depends on the specific context. Different 
parties in different contexts may have different perceptions of corruption. Also, corruption 
normally violates given regulations or laws, which significantly relates to power misuse. Then, 
corruption is covert, which is subjectively hidden by the parties involved and objectively covered 
by an imperfect supervision mechanism. In addition, corruption is motivated by private intention, 
such as to gain personal benefits. Finally, corruption comprises of three levels which are acceptable, 
ambiguous and unacceptable. Therefore, these points about the nature of corruption help the 
researcher to comprehend corruption deeply and further contribute to this project. 
 
Moreover, in a public sector condition, some studies identify differences between corruption and 
misconduct. This point is valuable because it could narrow down corruption behaviours and 
separate them from similar, but essentially different activities. In terms of an economic perspective, 
misconduct has no economy-related gains involving power misuse, such as torture and individual 
misbehaviour such as absenteeism, yet corruption supports the gain of private economic benefits, 
including bribery by usurping public power (Mauro, 1995). In other words, the key difference is 
if the behaviours are related to economic interests. Official behaviours, without gaining economic 
benefits, belong to misconduct, whereas those obtaining economic benefits are corruption. 
21 
 
Furthermore, there are four detailed differences between corruption and misconduct in the public 
sector (Wedeman, 2004). At first, officials violate their service roles of the public sector when they 
misuse public authority, however officials not only violate their service roles but also try to get 
personal benefits by utilising the violation when they conduct corruption activities. Secondly, 
misconduct leads to decay of the state, but corruption results in the privatisation of public power. 
Thirdly, misconduct is probably conducive to the arbitrary actions of public power, but corruption 
contributes to both arbitrary and predatory actions of public power. Lastly, misconduct can 
influence the state’s integrity and viability, yet corruption can influence social economy. In short, 
the negative effect of corruption is much deeper than misconduct at both organisational and state 
level. Hence, the literature provides evidence that shows corruption and misconduct in the public 
sector is significantly different, which needs to be considered while identifying civil servants’ 
behaviours in this project. 
 
In summary, corruption as a widespread issue in the world has been studied sufficiently in the 
academic field. Scholars in different areas have different perspectives in terms of corruption, and 
they define corruption from many aspects such as history, sociology, economics and politics. Even 
so, corruption as a kind of moral decay behaviour that comprises distinct natures like ‘context-
based’, ‘norm-deviated’ and ‘power-related’, etc., which aims for private gain by misusing power 
is widely accepted. Indeed, there are distinctions between corruption and misconduct that mainly 
concentrate on if the actor obtains economic benefits as well as the behaviour’s negative influence 
level and scope. 
 
 
2.1.2 Typology of corruption 
Previous studies of corruption typically distinguish between individual and collective (Brief et al., 
2001; Palmer & Maher, 2006; Palmer, 2008); corporate and governmental (Finney & Lesieur, 
1982); corporate and occupational (Clinard & Quinney, 1973; Timofeyev, 2015); intentional and 
accidental (Baucus, 1994); active and passive (Daboub et al., 1995; Argandona, 2003); pervasive 
and arbitrary (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006); “primary beneficiary” and 
“collusion among organisational members” (Pinto et al., 2008); first-order and second-order 
(Zyglidopoulos, 2015). 
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Among these classifications, one of the most significant study is individual and collective 
corruption. Studies especially try to answer why individuals engage in corruption, and how 
corruption spreads like a virus in an organisation (Jones, 1991; Reynolds, 2006a; Reynolds, 2006b; 
Sonenshein, 2007). For example, an important feature of individual corruption is that it has only 
one primary beneficiary, but collective corruption, as a collusion behaviour, has more than one 
beneficiary (Lange, 2008). Also, the effect of individual corruption is limited to the whole 
organisation, however if corrupt individual behaviours are unchecked, they can spread between 
organisational members like a viral infection, as well as magnify in scope and audacity,  that 
eventually are embedded in the culture of the organisation (Ashforth et al., 2008). Such a collective 
corruption can drive the organisation into a completely corrupt environment that produces much 
more damage to it (ibid). For instance, innocent entrants can be transformed from bystanders to 
accessories by the corrupt environment, and sometimes they may even have no awareness of this 
process (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, corruption can be differentiated by “primary beneficiary” and “collusion among 
organisational members” (Pinto et al., 2008), which is based on the criteria to do with “whether 
the violator acts strictly for private benefits or whether the beneficiary includes the organisation 
itself” (Finney & Lesieur, 1982). The former situation is when the corruptor obtains direct and 
primary gains from corruption activities, whereas the latter is an essential feature of organisational 
corruption, but not of corruption for private benefits. Here, this paper makes a valuable 
contribution in that two new concepts in organisational level corruption are proposed: OCI (an 
organisation of corrupt individuals) and CO (a corrupt organisation). OCI means the corrupt 
actions in an organisation are primarily to serve private gains, while CO refers to a group 
undertaking corrupt actions for the gain of the organisation. Indeed, this paper distinguishes 
corruption by the actor’s principal intention, instead of simply differentiated corruption through 
the corruptor’s individual or collective behaviour pattern. 
 
In addition, corruption also can be classified according to the actor’s intention. For example, 
corruption can be intentional or accidental (Baucus, 1994). The former refers to the actor who 
commits illegal or unethical behaviours, such as stealing business secrets intentionally, and the 
latter means the actor commits the same behaviours but unintentionally, such as failing to fulfil 
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responsibilities by accident (ibid). Similarly, corruption comprises both active and passive 
behaviours (Argandona, 2003). Active corruption can be defined as the actor undertaking illegal 
or unethical behaviours actively and intentionally, and passive corruption describes the actor 
undertaking the same but passively and unintentionally (ibid). Overall, these classifications 
concentrate on the actor’s subject willingness to engage in corruption from an internal perspective, 
in comparison with those focusing on the actor’s behaviour pattern from an external perspective. 
 
Moreover, a related but original perspective is suggested, which makes a distinction among 
corruption activities relying on their effects to the entire organisation (Zyglidopoulos, 2015). This 
perspective classifies corruption into first-order (where corruption actors misuse their power or 
authority for illegal gains in a normal system of existing regulations or norms) and second-order 
(where corruption actors misuse power for personal benefits via transforming existing regulations 
or norms). The first-order corruption is less significant because it can only influence the parties 
involved and their relatives as well as generate relatively limited effects to the organisation (ibid). 
In other words, such corruption activities are controlled by regulations and norms; while the 
supervisory mechanism is enhanced, they can be avoided. In contrast, the second-order corruption 
is more important and serious, which can result in more negative effects to the organisation.  Since 
these kind of corruption activities are not evident, therefore, they are difficult to be identified, and 
they damage both the organisation and society in the long-term (ibid). Corruption like this is 
uncontrolled by regulations and norms, as corruptors can change the regulations and norms to 
serve their corruption. In the long-term, the whole organisation could be corrupted. That is, second-
order corruption plays a transformational role between individual wrongdoings and collective 
corruption.  
 
A similar example is the Enron case. Corrupt executives constituted corrupt regulations and norms 
for personal or organisational gains although it was obvious that their actions were illegal, whilst 
such rules enforced the employees to pursue unethical activities that turned them into accomplices 
(Time, 2002). Overall, the literature displays many corruption typologies depending on different 
criteria: the number of parties involved such as individual and collective corruption; if the benefits 
obtained strictly by individual members or the organisation itself is included, such as OCI (an 
organisation of corrupt individuals) and CO (a corrupt organisation); the actor’s intention such as 
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intentional and accidental corruption as well as active and passive corruption; and the impact of 
corruption (merely to those parties or to the entire organisation) such as first-order and second-
order corruption. Reviewing corruption typology can help the researcher to build a more in-depth 
understanding of corruption in this project. 
 
 
2.1.3 Outcomes of corruption 
The outcomes of corruption have been generally discussed in the literature, the majority of the 
literature concentrates on corruption’s negative effects in terms of two levels: national and 
organisational. At the national level, corruption negatively influences FDI (foreign direct 
investment) (Wei, 2000; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Davis & Ruhe, 2003; Zhao et al., 2003; Voyer 
& Beamish, 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Javorcik & Wei, 2009); GDP growth (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993; Mauro, 1995; Husted, 1999; Mo, 2001; Aidt et al., 2008; Swaleheen, 2011; Agbiboa, 2012); 
public income (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Li et al., 2000; Welsch, 2004); social trust and life 
satisfaction (Rothstein, 2014); government expenditure (Mauro, 1998); and foreign aid (Alesina 
& Weder, 1999); etc. At the organisational level, corruption causes profound and enduring harm 
to the organisation, which is highly difficult to compensate, such as hurting employee morale 
(Ashforth et al., 2008), reducing corporate transparency (Luo, 2002), and producing high 
organisational losses (Luo, 2005), etc. 
 
More specifically, based on an analysis of FDI from 12 developed countries to 45 emerging 
countries, seriously corrupt environments in destination countries lowers foreign investors’ 
confidence and intention (Wei, 2000). Also, through investigating the data from 29,546 Japanese 
investments in 59 countries, corruption serves to reduce FDI from Japan in emerging countries 
where there is a lack of effective legal and regulatory frameworks (Voyer & Beamish, 2004). In 
addition, there are data concerning 54 selected countries that indicate a: “1% increase in the 
corruption level reduces the economic growth rate by about 0.72%” (Mo, 2001). Likewise, 
corruption has a direct negative influence on economic growth, and its indirect effects are 
generated via investment and other channels (Swaleheen, 2011). 
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However, although these studies provided important evidence that corruption may lead to the 
reduction of national FDI and GDP growth, which hampers economic development, other research 
seems to hold an opposite perspective. For instance, corruption damages economic development 
in a country with a high-quality political framework, but there is no damage produced to economic 
development by corruption in the country with a low-quality political framework (Aidt et al., 2008). 
This is probably because countries with high-quality political frameworks are more efficient in 
governance, and the emergence of corruption may significantly reduce efficiency. Conversely, 
those countries with a low-quality political framework may not experience this consequence as 
their governance is essentially inefficient. In some extreme cases, corruption could even promote 
economic development, which relates to the theory of ‘greasing the wheels’. 
 
‘Sanding the wheels’ versus ‘greasing the wheels’ is a widely debated point in terms of whether 
corruption can ‘sand’ or ‘grease’ the wheels of economic development. The former, i.e. ‘sanding 
the wheels’ can be described as corruption which is able to damage the national economy 
inevitably (Mendoza et al., 2015).On the other hand, the latter implies that corruption could 
stimulate economic efficiency by allowing actors to sidestep bureaucratic civil servants or public 
institutions (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013). According to the literature, the majority of scholars 
support the theory of ‘sanding the wheels’, they argue this hypothesis directly (Méon & Sekkat, 
2005; Dutta & Sobel, 2016) to contradict the ‘greasing the wheels’ and indirectly (the studies 
reviewed previously about FDI and GDP growth). 
 
In contrast, the hypothesis of ‘greasing the wheels’ also holds an important position in the literature. 
The evidence can be found in various early studies. For example, corruption could enable a slow 
government institution to be more efficient (Leff, 1964). In a similar vein, corruption has the role 
of a catalyst during the modernisation process in an undemocratic and closed country (Nye, 1967), 
and is seen as speeding up procedures of investment transactions (Huntington, 1968). In this case, 
a corruption model named ‘queue model’ is proposed to suggest that corruption is an opportunity 
for actors valuing time or access of limited resources more than others will pay, which is beneficial 
to free markets (Lui, 1985). This is consistent with the study which considers corruption is an 
effective option to introduce competition into a monopolistic market (Heidenheimer et al., 1988). 
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More recently, corruption brings competition for scarce political and economic resources that leads 
to a more efficient government service (Aidt, 2003). Also, public corruption encourages private 
entrepreneurial activities considerably because it reduces the negative effect of rules and norms on 
entrepreneurship (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013). Then, corruption promotes commerce of SMEs in 
Philippines, especially in the regions where there is a lack of a perfect business environment 
(Mendoza et al., 2015). In addition, corruption can result in convenience for entrepreneurs to 
escape burdensome regulations and laws when institutional quality is poor in Brazil (Bologna & 
Ross, 2015). Moreover, corruption facilitates employment and sales growth, which generates more 
jobs in Kazakhstan (Kalyuzhnova & Belitski, 2019). 
  
Overall, based on the studies reviewed above, the hypothesis of ‘greasing the wheels’ generally 
concentrates on the perspective that corruption can help compensate imperfect governance. Here, 
two features can be identified. At first, this hypothesis may only be effective in relatively 
undeveloped or developing countries where the governmental system is poor (Méon & Weill, 
2010), such as Philippines, Brazil and Kazakhstan. Secondly, the common way of corruption to 
grease economic development is probably to bypass burdensome regulations or laws (Aidt et al., 
2008), which can virtually produce convenience for economic development. 
 
Therefore, the hypotheses of ‘sanding the wheels’ and ‘greasing the wheels’ seem to focus on 
different developmental stages. Corruption may grease economic ‘wheels’ in undeveloped or 
developing countries but not in developed ones. This is because the governmental system including 
regulations and laws in undeveloped and developing countries is defective, which can damage 
economic development. Corruption thus provides an approach to avoid such imperfections, 
business can be proceeded smoothly, although unethically, without unnecessary expenditures and 
inconvenience. At least in a short-term and direct perspective, this pattern is beneficial.  
 
However, long-term and indirect effects may not be considered by the ‘greasing the wheels’ 
hypothesis, because it neglects the negative influence of corruption towards the overall economic 
vitality (Dutta & Sobel, 2016). While the system that can support and promote economic 
development becomes effective, such as in developed countries, corruption then conversely 
hinders the development, as it indeed undermines national economy from various aspects such as 
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FDI and GDP growth. In other words, in the countries where the burdensome institutions bring 
more harm than corruption, corruption could be a temporary solution. Yet, in the countries where 
corruption leads to more harm than the institutions, it is not. 
 
In summary, the effects of corruption have been discussed deeply in the literature, and the 
argument between its positive and negative outcomes is continuing. In terms of this project, the 
‘greasing the wheels’ hypothesis could explain why China experienced rapid economic 
development in the past decades, whilst suffering a considerable corruption level in the public 
sector. 
 
 
2.1.4 Antecedents of corruption 
Corruption is an action in which public officials abuse power for private gains by the manner of 
violating game rules (Jain, 2001). A number of potential factors have been identified by studies in 
the literature, which may contribute to such public officials’ violation. In general, corruption needs 
three necessary requirements to emerge: ‘discretionary power’, ‘economic rents’ and ‘weak 
institutions’ (Aidt, 2003). The first one, ‘discretionary power’, refers to the unlimited authority of 
public officials towards the institution and administration of regulations and policies (ibid). The 
second one, ‘economic rents’, can be defined as the rents such as private financial benefits which 
can be extracted or created by public officials via misusing the unlimited public power (ibid). The 
last one, ‘weak institutions’, means the incentives embodied in institutions such as the absence of 
authority supervision systems and the deficiency of regulation enforcement capacity which 
encourages public officials to exploit their unlimited power for private benefits extraction or 
creation (ibid). In short, the requirements include three components, which are unlimited power 
on hands allowing civil servants to misuse public authority without limits, predictable benefits 
which are obtained by misusing public power, and a defective supervision mechanism that is 
unable to prevent the misuse. Based on Aidt’s argument, if the public sector has these features, 
corruption could be inevitable. 
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In addition, there are several characteristics of political institution concerning the efficiency of 
government systems that strongly relate to corruption (Gerring & Thacker, 2004). At first, the 
availability and accessibility of relevant information of policies such as the process of policy 
institution and implementation, which is ‘openness and transparency’, may affect corruption (ibid). 
This is because greater transparency can result in more supervision (legal, administrative or 
electoral) and reduce public officials’ motivation to participate in corruption. Secondly, ‘decision 
rules’, that refers to the decision-making procedure of governments (ibid). Decentralisation 
produces veto points in local government, thus building a barrier for decision-making and 
implementation of corrupt legislation. Nevertheless, this also may provide opportunities to those 
corrupt public officials to hinder anti-corruption efforts. Then, ‘public administration’, which is 
explained as the public scouting of the bureaucratic system (ibid). In most cases, public officials 
who are appointed by the bureaucratic system have more opportunities than those who are elected 
by the electorate to engage in corruption. To sum up, these characteristics argue three dimensions 
of political institution: transparency, decentralisation and supervision that could strongly influence 
the emergence of corruption. 
 
The ideas of Aidt (2003) and Gerring & Thacker (2004) are similar to some extent. Aidt (2003) 
first considers that civil servants’ ‘discretionary power’ enables them to misuse public power, then 
to participate in corruption. Gerring & Thacker (2004) argues the same perspective of ‘decision 
rules’ which concerns decentralisation. Due to the absence of decentralisation, public power 
concentrates on civil servants’ hands which makes them have the ability to gain private interests 
without limitation by applying public power (ibid). Additionally, Aidt (2003) states that ‘economic 
rents’ that refers to the considerable financial benefits through misusing public power, motivate 
civil servants to be involved in corruption. Gerring & Thacker (2004) also express this point by 
‘openness and transparency’. The non-transparent political decision-making process provides 
opportunities for civil servants to obtain benefits in secret (ibid). Lastly, Aidt (2003) indicates 
‘weak institutions’: defective supervision mechanisms cannot prevent civil servants’ unethical 
activities, which promotes corruption. Gerring & Thacker (2004) likewise notes: ‘public 
administration’ can significantly reduce corruption, those appointed civil servants have a lack of 
sufficient supervision from the public, hence they are more likely to become corrupt. In summary, 
the ideas of Aidt (2003) and Gerring & Thacker (2004) all focus on the three main antecedents 
29 
 
that may produce corruption in the public sector: unlimited decision-making power, non-
transparent decision-making process, and insufficient internal, as well as external, supervision 
mechanisms. 
 
Moreover, there is a debate in the literature as to whether or not government regulations can 
facilitate corruption. Some studies hold the viewpoint that the existence of government regulations 
enables civil servants to proceed with corrupt activities, such as bribery, because more regulations 
mean more power in their hands. Therefore, a good way to reduce corruption is to diminish 
governmental regulations, such as “if you want to cut corruption, then cut government” (Becker 
& Becker, 1997). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that there is a considerable increase in 
corruption linked with the rapid growth of government economic policies and activities in some 
countries, whilst in other countries corruption is reduced mainly when governments work to 
diminish their effects on the economy (Tanzi, 2000). Then, higher levels of governmental 
regulation bring higher levels of corruption, based on research concerning FDI inflows in 55 
countries (Mudambi et al., 2012). Also, more government regulations invite more corruption as 
they offer opportunities for government officials to be paid off by providing illegal and unethical 
favours to the public, such as businessmen who seek access to limited resources (Holcombe & 
Boudreaux, 2015). 
 
Although there is strong evidence indicating that government regulations may have positive 
relationships with the emergence of corruption, some studies believe this argument can be 
improved. They firstly agree with the link between regulations and corruption, but they think a 
country’s development levels and political mechanisms as determinants need to be considered. For 
example, in those corrupt developing countries where there is a lack of transparent and accessible 
implementation of regulations, the public has to spend an enormous amount of time dealing with 
officials in order to obtain permits, and it is probably the intention of corrupt officials to extract 
bribes (Tanzi, 2000). However, there seem to be no similar findings in those developed countries 
(ibid). In addition, regulations are not equivalent to corruption in rich countries as evidence shows 
that the absence of government intervention, such as financial restraints, result in the involvement 
of political leaders or public officials in corruption (Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003). Nevertheless, 
government regulations in poor countries mean little due to the deficiency of enforcement capacity, 
30 
 
thus corruption works as an informal agency (ibid). Furthermore, there are positive ties between 
government regulations and corruption, the causes of corruption have no relation to the quantity 
of regulations but depend on the efficiency of the judiciary system and enforcement mechanisms 
(Mellahi et al., 2012). 
 
Overall, the results of the research shows that government regulations can mitigate corruption in 
certain countries where they have positive implementation mechanisms, but probably produce 
corrupt conditions in highly corrupt countries where they are short of political transparency and 
accessibility. This is because of particular regulations, such as those offering government officials 
more power and opportunities to authorise activities to encourage the public, who may not have 
such power, to meet the legal requirement by bribes. In countries with positive implementation 
mechanisms, decision-making processes and supervision systems are transparent and efficient, 
risks like this can therefore be prevented. In contrast, it cannot be guaranteed that government 
regulations will be applied in the right way in highly corrupt countries due to their defective 
implementation mechanisms. A weak government may have insufficient power to control the 
public sector, thereby allowing civil servants to engage in corrupt activities (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993). 
 
Another factor, low government wages, also has been widely discussed in the literature as a 
potential antecedent of civil servants’ corruption. Civil servants with a higher wage are relatively 
unlikely to participate in corruption, because higher wages can satisfy their financial needs, such 
as raising a family, which may prevent their involvement with corruption (Dimant & Tosato, 
2018). Empirical evidence shows that an increase in government wages can indeed reduce 
officials’ intention to engage in corruption, at least in developing countries (Rijckeghem & Weder, 
1997). This finding is given further support by indicating a significant relationship between wage 
growth and corruption reduction in the public sector (Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001). Although it is 
mentioned additionally, the growth needs to be rather large in order to eradicate corruption (ibid), 
further evidence seems to be absent. Again, increasing government wages can effectively mitigate 
corruption, which was confirmed with an experimental analysis (Azfar & Nelson, 2007).  
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Moreover, a further study (An & Kweon, 2017) provided sufficient evidence to support the point 
that wage growth needs to be significant in order to eradicate corruption (Rijckeghem & Weder, 
2001). Although wage growth has been proved to be an effective way of reducing public sector 
corruption, solely applying wage growth to prevent corruption is costly (An & Kweon, 2017). In 
order to achieve the corruption level in OECD countries, non-OECD countries have to increase 
their government wages by approximately seven times (ibid). Indeed, these studies consider higher 
government wages can lead to lower corruption levels, in other words, lower wages may result in 
more corruption. The reason why developing countries have higher corruption levels than 
developed countries is that the former have much lower government wages than the latter. 
 
More recent studies continue to support this argument. For example, wages and regulations are 
described as ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, giving more ‘carrots’ is effective in reducing corruption while 
government wages remain low (Chen & Liu, 2018). Yet, once enough ‘carrots’ have been given 
‘sticks’ are needed to deter corruption (ibid). Similarly, sufficient government wages seem to be a 
prerequisite but an inadequate condition of preventing corruption (Gans-Morse et al., 2018). 
Namely, civil servants are more likely to participate in corruption if their legal income cannot 
satisfy their needs, but adequate wages cannot further mitigate corruption solely, more approaches 
like governmental regulations need to be applied. Therefore, the low government wages factor is 
probably not the only antecedent of corruption, particularly when it reaches a certain level. 
 
Indeed, the opposite argument can be found in the literature. Just as growing wages cannot 
decrease civil servants’ corrupt activities, in contrast it has a positive influence, because higher 
wages may advance civil servants’ self-interests, then eventually stimulate them to accept bribes 
(Navot et al., 2016). This perspective not only contradicts the link between low government wages 
and corruption but also attributes the cause of corruption to the increased wages. However, this is 
a minority viewpoint in existing studies. 
 
Moreover, other than the general and specific antecedents that may result in corruption, which 
were reviewed previously, many studies in the literature are likewise concerned with the 
relationship between culture and corruption. Many of them think certain cultural aspects are 
strongly related to the emergence of corruption. One of the most well-known theories about culture 
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is Hofstede’s cultural dimensions which divides culture into six dimensions: power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, masculinity vs. femininity, individualism vs. collectivism, long-term 
orientation vs. short-term orientation, and indulgence vs. restrained (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede, 
1991; Hofstede et al., 2010). Amongst these dimensions, power distance and collectivism are 
generally argued as potential causes of corruption. 
 
According to Hofstede (1980), power distance refers to the acceptance level of less powerful social 
members to the unequal power distribution. Its positive link with corruption has been indicated by 
many studies. For example, research shows that a higher-level perceived corruption in countries 
with a higher power distance degree, which depends on examining the functions of cultural 
variables on perceived corruption by using the data of 1996 Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index (Husted, 1999). Then, power distance is strongly associated with corruption, 
based on a study which aims to demonstrate the relevant socioeconomic factors of corruption (Getz 
& Volkema, 2001). Furthermore, in countries such as Mexico, India and Poland, where power 
distance is high, subordinates accept superiors’ authority; they normally obey commands without 
any doubt and treat the superior position as inaccessible (Weaver, 2001). 
 
Consequently, power distance enables a centralised hierarchy system to come into the 
organisational environment, which becomes a prelude of corrupt activities (Davis & Ruhe, 2003). 
Those people in the position of superiors may not need to worry about any resistance from 
subordinates when they behave unethically, as their subordinates are unable to challenge orders. 
Even when subordinates have questions, they are most likely to keep silent because of the superiors’ 
hold power. In contrast, superiors and subordinates have relatively equal power with more 
harmony and cooperation in countries showing a low degree of power distance (Francesco & Gold, 
1998). Their titles and status are less important, which means superiors’ unethical actions are more 
likely to induce questions of subordinates that probably leads to less corruption (ibid). To sum up, 
power distance can facilitate corruption. 
 
Likewise, collectivism as another cultural dimension is related to corruption based on a number of 
studies in the literature. Individualism vs. collectivism is defined as the relationship between the 
group and the individuals involved (Hofstede, 1980). Individualistic societies emphasise ‘I’ – the 
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existence of the individual such as private rights, one person one vote, etc., while collectivist 
societies emphasise ‘we’ – the importance of the group, such as classifying people by in-group 
and out-group, with an emphasis on belonging, and shaming those who violate group norms, etc. 
(ibid).  
 
In terms of collectivism, empirical evidence indicates people in a high degree collectivist national 
culture have more propensity to bribe, according to a correlational study focusing on how 
collectivism promotes bribery that is based on cross-national data and a laboratory experiment 
(Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011). Research data, with a sample of 3835 firms from 38 countries aiming 
to investigate corruption in the banking industry (Zheng et al., 2013), provides more evidence that 
firms have a higher level of corruption in collectivist countries than individualist countries and the 
effects of collectivism are greater than other cultural dimensions towards corruption. 
 
Different rules and rights are applied to different groups of collectivist societies (Hofstede, 1991), 
which usually explains why collectivism probably results in more corruption. In other words, there 
are multiple standards existing in one society, which may imply higher perceptions of corruption 
(Seleim & Bontis, 2009). Similarly, as group loyalty is valued significantly in collectivist cultures, 
people tend to violate written laws or regulations without any hesitation if those laws or regulations 
conflict with their group norms, whether in the public or private sector (LaPalombara, 1994). 
Accordingly, if the members of a corrupt organisation treat the organisational norms as a higher 
priority than social norms, they are most likely to engage in corruption by ignoring social ethics. 
 
Furthermore, people within collectivist cultures are more oriented to create strong interpersonal 
relationships, thus in order to exchange favours with other members of public officials’ own social 
group, they are more likely to act corruptly (Getz & Volkema, 2001). Collectivist members value 
the links with others, which probably makes them apply unethical ways to build and keep such 
links. Overall, although opposite perspectives can be found, the values of collectivism are 
associated with low corruption, whereas individualism increases corruption (Kimbro, 2002); 
collectivism decreases corruption (Martin et al., 2007), the literature seems to support 
collectivism’s potential tendency of producing corruption in most cases.  
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In summary, the literature shows a number of potential causes of corruption including both general 
aspect (unlimited decision-making power, non-transparent decision-making process and 
insufficient supervision mechanism) and specific aspect (governmental regulations, low 
government wages, as well as power distance and collectivism cultural dimensions). These factors 
are helpful to this project in order to identify the antecedents of corruption in the real case of China. 
 
 
 
2.2 Guanxi 
China is one of the four major early civilisations with a long history, which has a distinctive culture 
of Confucianism faith. Generally, Guanxi is identified as a significant component of Confucianism 
that widely exists in almost every realm of Chinese life (Gold et al., 2002), including Chinese 
organisations (Han et al., 2011), and plays a fundamental role in social relationships in Chinese 
society (Song et al., 2012). Regarding the literal understanding in the Chinese language of Guanxi, 
this phrase consists of two characters that are “guanxi” and “xi”. The “guanxi” in Chinese means 
a gate or a hurdle, and “xi” in Chinese means a connection or a tie, therefore Guanxi literally refers 
to establishing connection after passing the gate (Lee & Dawes, 2005). Indeed, Guanxi can bring 
the owner exclusive access to special treatment and limited resources (Pye, 1992). Thereby, 
Guanxi, to some extent, can be regarded as a kind of intangible resources or capital. Similarly, 
social capital refers to the sum of intangible but actual resources, which serves an individual or a 
group who own a durable network of special relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Accordingly, there seems to have certain links between Guanxi 
and the concept of social capital.  
 
 
2.2.1 Definition and typology  
In recent decades, Guanxi has attracted an intensive academic research focus (Pye, 1982; 
Butterfield, 1983; Osland, 1990; Davies et al., 1995; Tsang, 1998; Abramson, 1999; Zhang et al., 
2015). The literature mainly concentrates on two terms to define Guanxi: sociological and benefits 
seeking. Regarding the sociological term, Guanxi as personal non-work-related ties is reflected in 
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an indigenous Chinese concept that displays fundamental and personalised influence networks 
(Zhang et al., 2015). Concerning the expression of benefits seeking, Guanxi is “utilitarian instead 
of emotional” and “completely favour exchange based rather than an emotional attachment” (Park 
& Luo, 2001). 
 
The Oxford Dictionary (2019) describes Guanxi as “the system of social networks and influential 
relationships which facilitate business and other dealings in China”, which shows that a common 
perception towards Guanxi is associated with its benefits seeking term. In academic fields, studies 
hold a similar perspective. For instance, Guanxi is a kind of social bond (Walder, 1986), and 
implicitly based on mutual interests and benefits (Yang, 1994). In this case, Guanxi refers to a 
relationship between a person with needs and another person who has the ability to satisfy those 
needs (Osland, 1990). Also, Guanxi can be seen as a kind of friendship comprising the implications 
of a persistent exchange of favours, such as preferential treatment in business, preferential access 
to limited resources, etc. (Pye, 1992). Furthermore, Guanxi is an informal connection between 
parties without any written contract, which enables the parties involved to gain access to almost 
everything in China (Tsang, 1998). 
 
In order to understand Guanxi further, a number of representative typologies of Guanxi argued in 
the literature are worth reviewing. At first, Guanxi can be classified by three types of tie: 
‘expressive tie’, ‘instrumental tie’ and ‘mixed tie’ (Hwang, 1987) (see Figure 1). ‘Expressive tie’ 
refers to a kind of egalitarian, permanent, stable, personalised and limited in scope relationship, 
which generally occurs between family members and close friends through exchanging individual 
feeling of affection, safety and attachment. At the same time, parties involved are expected to use 
these ties as an instrument to gain access to desired resources or materials. Then, ‘instrumental tie’ 
means the relationship created between people with others outside their family or circle of close 
friends in daily life. Such a Guanxi type is unstable, impersonal, utilitarian, based on equitable 
norms, and basically temporary as it merely serves as an instrument for other goals. Examples 
could comprise the relationships between sellers and customers, employers and employees, etc. 
Additionally, ‘mixed tie’ is different from both ‘expressive’ and ‘instrumental’, which is stable to 
some extent, but not permanent, that chiefly occurs between relatives, neighbours, classmates and 
colleagues, etc. 
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Figure 1: Three types of Guanxi tie (Hwang, 1987) 
 
In other words, this classification tries to divide Guanxi according to the relationship’s basis, 
including long-term emotional-based, short-term emotional-based and benefits-seeking-based (see 
Figure 2). ‘Expressive tie’ is long-term emotional-based as it occurs between family members and 
close friends, who mainly exchange emotions such as affection and attachment. Conversely, 
‘instrumental tie’ seems to have an absence of emotions but is merely based on reciprocity, because 
it is impersonal and utilitarian, which means benefits-seeking-based. In addition, ‘mixed tie’ can 
be regarded as a balance between ‘expressive tie’ and ‘instrumental tie’. It shows certain points 
which are similar to ‘expressive tie’ such as comprising the exchange of emotions to some extent, 
but the emotional exchange may be unstable. Also, ‘mixed tie’ consists of parts of ‘instrumental 
tie’ because there are probably individual goals involved. Hence, this Guanxi type is short-term 
emotional-based, like the relationships between neighbours and classmates that could be easily 
influenced by external activities and conditions such as house moving and school transfer. 
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Figure 2: Paraphrase of Hwang’s typology 
 
However, this typology neglects some typical cases, for example, corrupt Guanxi between family 
members or close friends. Such Guanxi holds an emotional part and an instrumental part at the 
same time, which is different from ‘expressive tie’ or ‘instrumental tie’. Furthermore, it is not like 
‘mixed tie’ because of being more permanent and stable on the basis of blood or friendship. 
Therefore, this classification scheme needs to be improved. 
 
Also, Guanxi can be divided into three major categories, which are ‘jia-ren’ Guanxi, ‘shou-ren’ 
Guanxi and ‘sheng-ren’ Guanxi (Yang, 1993) (see Figure 3). ‘Jia-ren’ Guanxi can be defined as 
the relationships between family members based on immediate blood or obligation, such as filial 
piety and adoption duty. This includes the relationships with parents, children, brothers and sisters, 
etc. Next, ‘shou-ren’ Guanxi is about people who have relatively close relations but who are not 
family members such as relatives, friends, teachers, students, colleagues and neighbours, etc. It 
reflects a more familiar relationship than that with strangers. Lastly, ‘sheng-ren’ Guanxi means the 
relationships with strangers, such as a man met on the street, one-time purchasing customers, etc. 
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Figure 3: Three types of Guanxi (Yang, 1993) 
 
Therefore, this classification distinguishes Guanxi by the distance of relationships (see Figure 4). 
The closest relationships are between family members that are called ‘jia-ren’ Guanxi because 
such relationships are based on blood, they are stable, permanent and unlikely to be changed. In 
other words, this Guanxi type can be understood as uncommonly close Guanxi. Then the less close 
relationships are between relatives, friends or neighbours that are called ‘shou-ren’ Guanxi. This 
kind of Guanxi is not as close as ‘jia-ren’ Guanxi but closer than ‘sheng-ren’ Guanxi and based on 
particular links such as friendship. Thus, it can be described as common Guanxi, in comparison 
with ‘jia-ren’ Guanxi, that is uncommon. Moreover, the most distant relationships are between 
strangers that are called ‘sheng-ren’ Guanxi. This type can be referred to as ‘no Guanxi’ because 
strangers share nothing mutually thus there are no relationships existing between them. 
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Figure 4: Paraphrase of Yang’s typology 
 
Nevertheless, classification measurements like this could be limited as they are excessively simple 
and it seems there is a lack of consideration of the practical dimensions of Guanxi. For instance, 
this typology combines all relationships apart from those between family members into ‘shou-ren’ 
Guanxi which is common Guanxi. The different kinds of relationships are therefore neglected, like 
the Guanxi between neighbours or friendships. These Guanxi have different bases and 
characteristics that are best identified separately. Accordingly, this typology also has room for 
improvement. 
 
In addition, Guanxi can be divided into ‘family’, ‘helper’ and ‘business’ (Fan, 2002a) (see Figure 
5). ‘Family’ Guanxi is a kind of strong and stable relationships that is mostly based on blood. It is 
shaped by Confucian values and is emotional (affectional) driven instead of benefits driven. While 
‘helper’ Guanxi is a particular product of contemporary society, which is utilitarian driven, 
according to the favour exchange link between actors. It is weak, unstable and even temporary, in 
most cases, because ‘helper’ Guanxi lacks a strong basis, such as blood in ‘family’ Guanxi and 
long-term cooperation in ‘business’ Guanxi. Lastly, ‘business’ Guanxi is purely utilitarian, which 
can be described as a process of seeking business solutions or obtaining limited resources or special 
treatment via personal connections. The stability of ‘business’ Guanxi depends on personal ties. 
For example, ‘business’ Guanxi for long-term personal ties may be stronger than short-term 
personal ties in the same way as a one-time commercial activity. 
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Figure 5: Three types of Guanxi (Fan, 2002a) 
 
In this typology, Guanxi seems to be differentiated depending on the relationships’ transactional 
extent (see Figure 6). At first, ‘family’ Guanxi is strong, stable and blood-based, which means this 
category has no transactional components included. Then, ‘helper’ Guanxi includes transactional 
aspects, because it is weak and unstable, relying on favour exchange instead of blood or 
cooperation. However, this category is probably not purely transactional as the favour exchange 
behaviours could be either benefits-based or emotional-based. In contrast, ‘business’ Guanxi is 
purely transactional, such as seeking limited resources or special treatments, and which 
concentrates on doing ‘business’ according to fairness. In addition, the stability of ‘business’ 
Guanxi depends on personal ties that means this purely transactional Guanxi is probably moving 
to ‘helper’ Guanxi in the event that the ‘business’ Guanxi is stable. This is because a stable 
‘business’ Guanxi shows that the parties involved have a strong personal tie and an emotional 
exchange, like trust, could be generated to some extent. 
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Figure 6: Paraphrase of Fan’s typology 
 
Yet, there are limitations to this classification. The links between ‘helper’ Guanxi and ‘business’ 
Guanxi look fuzzy. Both of them are dependent on favour exchange, according to the description, 
and they all could be weak, unstable, temporary and utilitarian. For example, the relationships 
between corrupt governmental officials and entrepreneurs are typically instrumental and utilitarian 
driven, they therefore belong to ‘helper’ Guanxi. However, at the same time, these relationships 
are applied to gain economic benefits for officials and to access limited governmental resources 
for entrepreneurs on the basis of fairness, which also can be defined by ‘business’ Guanxi. 
Accordingly, the main difference between ‘helper’ Guanxi and ‘business’ Guanxi are unclear, as 
stated previously, ‘business’ Guanxi can move to ‘helper’ Guanxi in certain cases. 
 
Moreover, the ‘two forms’ typology of Guanxi argues that Guanxi is classified by a ‘weak’ form 
and a ‘strong’ form (Luo, 2008) (see Figure 7). This is associated with the classification (Yang, 
1993) reviewed previously that divided Guanxi into ‘jia-ren’ (uncommon Guanxi), ‘shou-ren’ 
(common Guanxi) and ‘sheng-ren’ (no Guanxi). The ‘weak’ form of Guanxi is similar to ‘jia-ren’ 
Guanxi, which refers to an emotional favour exchange and is based on immediate blood or family 
obligation. This form of Guanxi is the core element of Confucius philosophies that centres around 
the family circle, such as relationships between parents and children, old and young, brothers, etc., 
which reflects the most closed Guanxi. On the other hand, the ‘strong’ form can be described as a 
notional collection of ‘shou-ren’ and ‘sheng-ren’ Guanxi. This form of Guanxi consists of the 
relationships with people outside the family circle, such as supervisors and subordinates, or any 
other relationships outside of family members. The nature of the ‘strong’ form of Guanxi usually 
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exists through the patterns of providing help to exchange benefits or providing benefits to 
exchange help. Indeed, this is typically a part of corrupt activities. Moreover, a basic difference 
between the two forms of Guanxi is that the ‘strong’ form Guanxi can be established manually, 
which is not like the ‘weak’ form Guanxi basing on blood obligation that is inherent in most cases. 
 
 
Figure 7: Two forms of Guanxi (Luo, 2008) 
 
Consequently, Guanxi is probably divided depending on whether the relationships occur between 
family members in this typology, and whether the relationships can be established manually in 
other words. In short, these two forms of Guanxi can be described as family Guanxi and non-
family Guanxi. Indeed, this classification seems too general by applying merely two forms to 
define Guanxi, which is such a complex and complicated concept. 
 
In more recent research, through combining previous Guanxi typologies, Guanxi is presented 
through four contrasting dimensions: ‘family’ vs. ‘non-family’ Guanxi, ‘affective’ vs. 
‘instrumental’ Guanxi, ‘personal/informal’ vs. ‘impersonal/contractual’ Guanxi, and ‘mixed’ 
Guanxi (Chen et al., 2013) (see Figure 8). At first, whether the relationships occur inside or outside 
of the family circle is the key to differentiate ‘family’ Guanxi and ‘non-family’ Guanxi. For 
example, the relationships between parents and children or brother and sister are ‘family’ Guanxi, 
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while the relationships between close friends or neighbours are ‘non-family’ Guanxi, as the parties 
involved have no family links. Then, ‘affective’ Guanxi is mainly emotional, expressive and love-
oriented social interactions such as family, love and friendship, which is motivated by the 
maintenance of attraction and commitment. In contrast, ‘instrumental’ Guanxi is based on 
exchange relationships that are motivated by achieving desired goals like rewards and benefits. In 
addition, ‘personal/informal’ Guanxi refers to relationships with features of affection, obligation 
and informality, such as family ties and friendship ties. ‘Impersonal/contractual’ Guanxi comprises 
relationships which have features of impersonality, legality and formality such as the supervisor-
subordinate relationship. Lastly, ‘mixed’ Guanxi is stable to some extent, but not permanently, and 
which mainly takes place amongst relatives, neighbours, classmates and colleagues, etc., which is 
comparable with the ‘mixed tie’ (Hwang, 1987) reviewed before. 
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Figure 8: Four dimensions of Guanxi (Chen et al., 2013) 
 
This typology displays four differentiation measurements concerning Guanxi based on former 
studies, which, in most cases, could satisfy the practical scenarios of Guanxi. The ‘family’ vs. 
‘non-family’ division focuses on the family circle, the ‘affective’ vs. ‘instrumental’ division 
concentrates on what is being exchanged, and the ‘personal/informal’ vs. ‘impersonal/contractual’ 
division emphasises both emotions and forms. Indeed, the other complex and complicated 
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relationships which are difficult to be introduced in the former three Guanxi divisions, are included 
under ‘mixed’ Guanxi. Therefore, this is a valuable perspective regarding Guanxi typology, which 
is helpful to this project to separate and clarify different Guanxi types from various dimensions. 
 
In summary, the literature shows a number of Guanxi typologies, but there have been many 
limitations identified. This part has therefore reviewed some typical Guanxi classifications and 
made an argument for a new Guanxi typology based on the review, which is more relevant to this 
project. 
 
 
 
2.3 Guanxi & Corruption 
The links between Guanxi and corruption have been attracted much attention in the past decades. 
The majority of scholars in this field consider that Guanxi is positively related to the emergence 
of corruption based on their research. In general, Guanxi serves to corruption through three roles: 
communication, exchange and neutralisation. In addition, ‘renqing’ as Guanxi’s basic component 
is probably associated with corruption risks, and same with Guanxi’s essence - ambiguity, which 
allows corruption actors to rationalise unethical activities. Also, there are four characteristics of 
Guanxi that can induce corruption, which are reciprocity, utilitarianism, transferability and 
intangibility. Lastly, as a typical way to proceed Guanxi, gift-sending can also enable Guanxi to 
promote corruption. However, some other scholars hold an opposite perspective, they claim that 
although it could be utilised by corruption actors, Guanxi is not itself a determinant of corruption. 
Hence, stating Guanxi automatically equates to corruption is wrong. In fact, there are nice 
differences between Guanxi and corruption. For instance, Guanxi is a part of social norm, but 
corruption is the violation; Guanxi is legal, but corruption is illegal; and Guanxi essentially 
exchanges emotional and affective favours, but corruption mostly exchanges monetary favours; 
etc. 
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2.3.1 Guanxi causes corruption 
The literature widely believes that Guanxi has fuelled the rampant corruption in China (Gold, 1985; 
Bian, 1994; Yang, 1994; Yan, 1996; Luo, 1997; Smeltzer & Jennings, 1998; Lovett et al., 1999; 
Yao, 1999; Lee, et al., 2001; Su & Littlefield, 2001; Fan, 2002a; Fan, 2002b; Hwang & Staley, 
2005; Pederson & Wu, 2006; Ip, 2008; Luo, 2008; Yu, 2008; Snell et al., 2010; Bedford, 2011; 
Zhan, 2012; Qi, 2013; Nie & Lämsä, 2015; Barbalet, 2017; Karhunen et al., 2018). In early studies, 
Guanxi is considered to be a significant factor that positively stimulates the emergence of 
corruption (Gold, 1985). The process of building and keeping Guanxi is synonymous with 
corruption as gift-sending, a typical way of establishing and maintaining Guanxi (Smeltzer & 
Jennings, 1998; Lovett et al., 1999; Yao, 1999). Empirical evidence is suggested in a report by the 
Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption that a large number of Chinese firms 
expend 3%-5% of their operating costs, on average, to bribe and send gifts in order to build close 
Guanxi relationships with government officials (Su & Littlefield, 2001). Also, Guanxi is mainly 
transactional, and there is a link between money and power that results in corruption (Fan, 2002b), 
which means Guanxi is strongly linked with illegal or corrupt behaviours (Ip, 2008). As Guanxi is 
mainly cultivated by the exchange of favours, such as help or gifts (Su & Littlefield, 2001), 
individual government officials thus tend to charge ‘economic rent’ when using their Guanxi 
networks, which results in widespread bureaucratic corruption (Hwang & Staley, 2005; Pederson 
& Wu, 2006). Likewise, the environment in China makes both local and foreign companies 
participate in corruption in order to build good Guanxi with government officials (Pederson & Wu, 
2006), allowing them to obtain preferential treatment, such as accessing limited resources or 
information which could be the root of corruption (Yu, 2008). Similar favour exchange behaviours 
between managers and regulatory authorities in civil law countries are forbidden as such 
behaviours destroy the foundation of public authorities’ independence and potentially encourage 
future corruption (Braendle et al., 2005), but as Guanxi is a part of the Chinese way of life it cannot 
be forbidden in China (Gold et al., 2002; Han et al., 2011; Song et al., 2012). In other words, 
Guanxi is inherently corrupt, thereby corruption is likely to be unavoidable.  
 
More recently, empirical evidence is provided from interviews with 101 company employees in 
mainland China: the majority of the participants considered Guanxi brought corruption and ethical 
dilemmas (Snell et al., 2010). Also, the process of social exchange in Guanxi is associated with 
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particular goals, and there is often a ‘backdoor approach’ to any negotiations, which consists of 
corrupt or unethical components (Bedford, 2011). As a Guanxi owner can gain exclusive access 
to resources, such as special treatment or limited information, as well as working on the basis of 
private relations instead of formal rules and regulations, it seems to have an inevitable link with 
corrupt activities (Qi, 2013). Further evidence is argued that Guanxi’s unethical essence and 
nepotism like features probably lead to ethical challenges in leadership in terms of doing business 
in China for Western managers (Nie & Lämsä, 2015). Again, Guanxi is particularly used by people 
in order to avoid formal rules and regulations or even, occasionally, laws, which is linked with 
potential corruption (Barbalet, 2017). 
 
However, although these studies mainly believe there is a positive link between Guanxi and 
corruption, there seem to have insufficient consideration about the different types of Guanxi. 
According to the new Guanxi typology argued in the previous section, Guanxi can be ‘relative’ 
(emotional and expressive interpersonal relationships), ‘benefits’ (unstable, even temporary, 
benefits-oriented interpersonal relationships) and ‘mixed’ (a special type having the features of 
both ‘relative’ and ‘benefits’ Guanxi). Among these types, only ‘benefits’ and ‘mixed’ Guanxi can 
have an essence of corruption as they are benefits-oriented. Alternatively, ‘relative’ Guanxi has no 
such essence as it is pure and based on family or friendship. In this project, Guanxi’s typology is 
fully considered. ‘Benefits’ and ‘mixed’ Guanxi are the main focus, due to their close ties with 
corruption. 
 
In terms of how Guanxi leads to corruption, the literature indicates a number of perspectives. 
Generally, there are three pathways of Guanxi which facilitate corruption, according to an 
investigation in terms of the buying and selling behaviours of military positions (Wang, 2016). 
Firstly, Guanxi plays a communication role in corruption cases. Indeed, corruption participants 
need a bridge to exchange ulterior information, this bridge must be secure and reliable, and must 
not bring any risk of exposure (Zhan, 2012). Therefore, corruption actors usually apply Guanxi as 
the bridge to communicate and share information (ibid), because Guanxi displays a kind of strong 
link that is based on interpersonal trust (Lee & Dawes, 2005). Secondly, Guanxi acts as an 
exchange role in corruption. Empirical data shows Guanxi is one of the determinants of corruption 
and that corrupt transactions are not likely to be completed without the support of credible Guanxi 
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relationships (Wang, 2016). Likewise, closer Guanxi can offer the owner a higher priority in 
gaining benefits from the interest distribution of corruption (Zhan, 2012). Accordingly, the 
exchange process cannot proceed in the event that Guanxi is absent. Specifically, Guanxi 
exchanges benefits in corruption cases. Lastly, neutralisation is another role undertaken by Guanxi. 
On account of the mutual trust followed by the Guanxi establishment (Burt et al., 2018), the moral 
and cognitive difficulties can be overcome due to Guanxi’s essential feature of reciprocity (Li, 
2011). Hence, the parties involved tend to care more about Guanxi, with providing favours being 
the highest priority, rather than observing formal rules and regulations while there is a conflict 
between Guanxi and social norms (ibid). In other words, Guanxi can neutralise the actors’ ethical 
dilemmas and reduce their emotional barriers to engage in corruption. To sum up, Guanxi serves 
corruption mainly through the roles of communication, exchange and neutralisation. 
 
Another way in which Guanxi causes corruption concerns Guanxi’s basic component, ‘renqing’, 
which is based on the traditional favour exchanges of Confucian morals. ‘Renqing’ refers to a kind 
of rewarding obligation to both parties in a Guanxi relationship, which means one actor involved 
is obligated to pay for the favour offered by another through an equivalent or similar favour (Lee 
et al., 2001). For example, a favour seeker has two choices while asking for specific help from 
those having the ability to offer help, to ask a favour provider for repaying a ‘renqing’ if the favour 
provider owes one, or to ask an intermediary that the favour seeker knows, who has ‘renqing’ 
owned by someone else who has the same ability (Su & Littlefield, 2001). When the exchange 
process is complete, that means the help has been provided, which would result in two 
consequences. If the favour seeker asks for a ‘renqing’ back directly without an intermediary, then 
the ‘renqing’ debt between the favour seeker and the favour provider is compensated (Chen & 
Chen, 2004). If the favour seeker asks for a ‘renqing’ through an intermediary, then the favour 
seeker owes a ‘renqing’ to the intermediary, also the ‘renqing’ debt between the intermediary and 
the favour provider is compensated (ibid). Indeed, the intermediary tends to have strong direct ties 
with both the favour seeker and the favour provider, and the favour seeker builds an indirect tie 
with the favour provider. Namely, the three parties involved are included into a shared Guanxi 
network (Bian, 1997).  
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Basically, the process of ‘renqing’ exchange is a type of obligation-based favour exchange that 
seems to be the determinant of Guanxi’s maintenance, which is similar to a typical business 
relationship where a seller provides goods and a buyer provides currency (Wang et al., 2008). As 
the favour (‘renqing’) repaid during the process usually applies to gifts or cash, this has a risk of 
stepping on an unethical bottom line or even corruption (Yang, 1994; Yan, 1996). Here, ‘renqing’ 
seems to be a sort of intangible currency. Although this currency is not guaranteed by a powerful 
institution such as a central government, its payment and repayment are ensured through tacit 
social norms. People can save ‘renqing’ for future use, just like investment and return. Indeed, 
‘renqing’ may be a part of traditional Chinese culture, which is not corrupt inherently, but it is an 
effective tool for corruption participants to exchange unethical favours. Therefore, Guanxi can 
cause corruption because its ‘renqing’ component is probably related to corruption risks. 
 
In addition, Guanxi can result in corruption by ambiguity. As Guanxi is normally established and 
maintained according to gift or favour exchange (Yan, 1996), the difference between proper 
Guanxi and corrupt Guanxi is therefore relatively difficult to identify, which can result in a blurred 
space for transactions (Nie & Lämsä, 2015). Indeed, this is the essence of Guanxi relationships: 
ambiguity (Verhezen, 2008). Through emphasising the ‘art of Guanxi’, ambiguity allows the actors 
to participate in unethical activities under ethical names, such as fulfilling obligation and 
reciprocity (Yang, 1989). Accordingly, Guanxi resembles a kind of moral vaccine that means the 
owner is more likely to accept unethical moral standards, as well as to cover their corrupt 
behaviours as a disguise. When corruption is uncovered, those participants can attribute their 
corrupt reality to proper reciprocity, which is the advantage brought about by Guanxi’s ambiguity; 
to comfort their guilty feelings and to conceal their behaviours from others.  
 
Based on the review above, there are four characteristics of Guanxi which can induce corruption, 
which are reciprocity, utilitarianism, transferability and intangibility (Park & Luo, 2001). Firstly, 
reciprocity is one of the determinants of a Guanxi relationship because it concerns Guanxi’s 
maintenance and development (Su & Littlefield, 2001). If the reciprocity tie is broken, which 
means a favour receiver refuses to repay a similar one or an equivalent to the favour provider, then 
the favour receiver would be blamed and labelled as untrustworthy, as this person has violated the 
unwritten principle of reciprocity (Alston, 1989; Wang, 2014). Hence, reciprocity probably means 
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a Guanxi relationship has a kind of mandatory feature that forces the parties involved to observe a 
principle of equal exchange. Indeed, this Guanxi characteristic, reciprocity, has a potential risk of 
corruption. For example, if government officials accept benefits, such as gifts or financial interests 
from entrepreneurs, but their incomes cannot cover the repayment, they may apply public power 
as an equivalent in order to avoid damage to their reputation.  
 
Secondly, Guanxi is mainly utilitarian because establishment and maintenance are generally 
undertaken according to favour exchange (Yan, 1996). During Guanxi’s favour exchange process, 
‘renqing’ is the moral foundation that takes effect in all Guanxi relationships as an unavoidable 
precondition (Luo, 2007). As ‘renqing’ refers to the rewarding obligation (Lee et al., 2001), this 
means Guanxi is similar to a typical business relationship (Wang et al., 2008). Here, ‘renqing’ 
could be regarded as an intangible currency used for exchange on the base of social norms. For 
instance, entrepreneurs can send gifts or financial benefits to government officials in order to build 
Guanxi and accumulate ‘renqing’, later they can ask the officials to offer help for returning the 
‘renqing’. Likewise, government officials can accumulate ‘renqing’ from colleagues by offering 
help via public power, later they can also reclaim the ‘renqing’. Therefore, Guanxi owners can 
invest ‘renqing’ for future use (Shi et al., 2011). Accordingly, Guanxi relationships are utilitarian 
as the actors can obtain mutual benefits depending on ‘renqing’ exchange. In some cases, this point 
can also lead to corruption, as ‘renqing’ probably applies gifts or cash to exchange, so there may 
be a risk of moving towards corruption (Yang, 1994). 
 
Additionally, transferability is another Guanxi characteristic, which means Guanxi can be 
transferred from the owner to other members of the same network (Luo, 2007). For example, 
person A has Guanxi with person B and also with person C, so person A can introduce person B 
to person C, or vice versa, to help them build Guanxi (ibid). In this case, person A plays the role 
of intermediary, the Guanxi between person A and person B, as well as between person A and 
person C, transfers to between person B and person C. Although there is no existent Guanxi 
between person B and person C, it can be established through the recommendation of person A. 
Therefore, Guanxi is transferable. Nevertheless, such characteristics are a convenient way of 
spreading corrupt activities. Corruption participants can use Guanxi’s transferability to introduce 
and attract more corrupt partners, to extend corrupt Guanxi to newcomers following an expansion 
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of their corrupt network, which could generate more potential corruption. In other words, Guanxi 
relates to corruption as its transferability provides a way of viral transmission to corruption.  
 
Finally, Guanxi is intangible. Depending on invisible and unwritten social norms such as 
reciprocity and ‘renqing’, Guanxi parties are closely tied (Park & Luo, 2001). Unlike those 
contractual relationships, Guanxi has no formal terms to induct the participants in terms of the way 
and frequency of exchanging favours. The only code is interpersonal commitment; people failing 
to fulfil the commitment may damage their reputations (Wang, 2014). Thus, as long as Guanxi 
actors fulfil necessary commitments, they are supposed to be good players in Guanxi relationships. 
However, how to exchange favours relies on all the actors. If entrepreneurs apply unethical 
approaches, such as sending gifts of too high value or financial benefits to exchange public power, 
or government officials abuse public power to exchange illegitimate interests, their behaviours 
may not be limited by Guanxi norms, as there are no written norms. Accordingly, Guanxi can be 
described as intangible, which is inherently linked to corruption. 
 
In short, Guanxi is understood to support corruption due to the four characteristics. It is not 
inevitable that these characteristics would result in corruption, but their existence may result in the 
potential for corruption. Again, the different types of Guanxi need to be considered here. 
According to the argument of the new Guanxi typology in the previous section, Guanxi is divided 
into ‘relative’ (focuses on emotional exchange), ‘benefits’ (focuses on benefits exchange) and 
‘mixed’ Guanxi (includes both features of the former two) in this project. Therefore, only 
‘benefits’ and ‘mixed’ Guanxi but ‘relative’ Guanxi have links with corruption. This is because 
‘relative’ Guanxi is mainly based on emotion and affection rather than benefits, thus ‘relative’ 
Guanxi is not utilitarian, it is emotional and affective in contrast. Likewise, unlike the benefits-
based relationship in ‘benefits’ and ‘mixed’ Guanxi, ‘relative’ Guanxi is not transferable as its 
emotional and affective basis is inherent, stable or sustained, such as kinship and friendship. To 
sum up, ‘benefits’ and ‘mixed’ Guanxi can be considered to have connection with corruption, but 
‘relative’ Guanxi is not leading to corruption as a pure essence of emotion and affection. 
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Moreover, gift-sending as a typical way of proceeding reciprocity in Guanxi relationships can 
effectively demonstrate how Guanxi works in association with corruption. Indeed, there are three 
steps for sending gifts, which are choosing a ‘gift’, addressing a ‘gift’ and acceptance of a ‘gift’ 
(Li, 2011). The first step, choosing a ‘gift’, emphasises making a balance. In terms of the briber, 
one thing which needs to be addressed is the value of the gift. A gift which is too expensive or too 
cheap would be unacceptable. This is because too expensive a gift may bring a higher loss if the 
bribee accepts the gift but cannot satisfy the briber’s expectation. Similarly, a too cheap gift may 
be refused as the bribee probably thinks the gift’s value is not enough for the briber’s expectation. 
Hence, a rule for selecting gifts is to focus on the value of the favour asked, which means making 
a balance between too expensive and too cheap (ibid). For example, if the briber asks for a big 
favour, such as job transfer, then the gift must be equally valuable. Conversely, if the favour asked 
is not that big, such as a small business permission, then the gift can be relatively cheaper. 
 
Basically, in this step, the process of gift selection looks like a typical process of bargaining that 
is apparently benefits-oriented instead of emotional based, otherwise the gift’s value may not be 
focused as it merely serves to express emotion and affection rather than transaction, which is not 
an important point to consider here. This shows how the participants involved in Guanxi always 
seek to maximise the benefits they obtained, as well as trying to keep business losses to a minimum. 
Therefore, relationships established depending on such selection of gifts for transactions can be a 
prelude to corruption.  
 
The second step, addressing a ‘gift’, concerns how to deliver gifts. Sometimes the bribee may 
reject the gift in order to keep ‘clean’ and avoid the behaviours in the name of corruption if the 
briber chooses the wrong way to send gifts (Li, 2011). Thus, the briber and the bribee never use 
particular or explicit terms to describe their bribery activities, meaning they have no common 
labels to indicate and denigrate themselves (Noonan, 1984). Accordingly, certain applicable 
techniques need to be utilised for ensuring the gift can be successfully delivered, such as addressing 
gift-sending as ‘a little expression’, although this behaviour is virtually bribery (Li, 2011). In other 
words, bribery activities are always covered by euphemisms. This point seems to be a kind of self-
deception in which everyone knows the gift is a part of transaction, but nobody wants to point it 
out. Therefore, corruption is proceeded tacitly in this manner. Here, euphemisms of corrupt 
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activities such as ‘a little expression’ used for bribery are applied to comfort the bribee’s moral 
dilemma, which means the participants look for excuses to legitimise corrupt behaviours. 
 
Finally, acceptance of a ‘gift’ is the third step during a gift-sending process. In some cases, the 
bribee takes gifts the first time, but euphemisms may not be enough to make them accept the gift, 
hence further pretexts are probably needed (Li, 2011). Typically, the briber chooses to deliver gifts 
at traditional holidays such as Chinese New Year or Mid-Autumn Festival intentionally in order 
to reduce the bribee’s discomfort of any ethics violation (ibid). Through this pattern, transactional 
gift-sending is carried out under the guise of normal etiquette, such as expressing gratitude for a 
superior’s assistance in a year or to commemorate a long-lost reunion. In short, all of these excuses 
support the sending of gifts, but can also be classified as bribery. Accordingly, this step is a further 
gift-sending technique that normalises corruption and effectively ensures the gift can be 
successfully delivered.  
 
To sum up, sending gifts as a typical way of proceeding reciprocity in Guanxi relationships is 
closely linked with corruption. One the one hand, Guanxi reflects an essence of corruption 
depending on the transactional feature during the process of gift selection. On the other hand, 
corruption actors utilise excuses to legitimise and rationalise unethical behaviours such as bribery, 
turning corrupt reciprocity into normal behaviour. Corruption takes place under the name of 
Guanxi. Thus, the three steps of gift-sending show that Guanxi’s establishment and maintenance 
may generate corruption, or at least there is a risk of corruption involved. 
 
In summary, in recent decades, a number of studies in the literature argue the positive links 
between Guanxi and corruption. The way of Guanxi leading to corruption concerns Guanxi’s roles 
played in corruption cases, such as communication, exchange and neutralisation. Then, Guanxi’s 
components could be related to corruption, such as ‘renqing’ and ambiguity. In addition, 
corruption can also be caused by the characteristics of Guanxi, like reciprocity, utilitarianism, 
transferability and intangibility. Moreover, gift-sending, which is used to build and maintain 
Guanxi, can indeed generate corruption. 
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2.3.2 Guanxi equates no corruption 
There is another viewpoint which considers that Guanxi is unable to cause corruption in necessary, 
although some behaviours based on Guanxi are corrupt in some cases. From this perspective, 
Guanxi is not itself a determinant of corruption, it usually works as a mechanism in corruption 
behaviours (Qi, 2013). Typically, the Guanxi between entrepreneurs and governmental officials is 
a potential pathway to bypass laws and rules via private connections (Braendle et al., 2005), but 
“Guanxi is no more equivalent to corruption than social drinking is to drunkenness” (Tsang, 1998). 
In fact, it is pointed out that the difference between Guanxi and corruption is that the former 
focuses on interpersonal relationships, but the latter conversely concentrates on obtaining benefits 
by unethical ways, such as misusing Guanxi (Yang, 1994).  
 
Likewise, Guanxi certainly plays a significant role in promoting corrupt activities, such as 
unethical favour exchange, but accordingly stating that Guanxi automatically equates to corruption 
is wrong (Wang, 2014). Similarly, Guanxi is described as evil, probably because participants in 
corruption always apply Guanxi to avoid rules and regulations, or even laws, which associate it 
with corruption (Barbalet, 2017). However, it can only be argued that those participants achieve 
corrupt targets through Guanxi (ibid). Moreover, Guanxi describes a process or procedure of the 
establishment and maintenance of relationships, which, essentially, has no moral or ethical 
concerns (Guo et al., 2018). Empirical evidence suggests that Guanxi is neutral in nature, neither 
good nor bad, although previous studies sometimes indicate Guanxi is another form of corruption 
that encourages nepotism (ibid). Therefore, some studies, as reviewed above, maintain the opposite 
perspective concerning Guanxi as the determinant to facilitate corruption in China. The authors of 
these studies believe that Guanxi is likely to be important in corruption cases, but that Guanxi, in 
itself, has no essence of corruption. 
 
More specifically, nine differences between Guanxi and corruption have been identified according 
to research carried out on corruption in the organisational management systems of Asian countries 
(Luo, 2002). Firstly, “Guanxi is an ingredient of social norm, whereas corruption deviates from 
social norm” (ibid). That is, Guanxi includes an essence of favour exchange (Yan, 1996), which is 
a part of social reciprocity that reflects a significant component of Asian culture. In certain cases, 
for example, Guanxi is applied to bypass burdensome regulations and rules, here Guanxi plays a 
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role of compensation in terms of the vacancy and weakness of local law, to some extent, and 
encourages social and economic exchange (Luo, 2002). In contrast, corruption is misuse 
comprising of unethical behaviours and applying illegal standards in order to obtain private 
benefits (Seleim & Bontis, 2009). In other words, corruption violates the normal responsibilities 
of a public role and is unacceptable by society, as it damages both organisational and national level 
(Ashforth et al., 2008; Agbiboa, 2012). Overall, Guanxi acts like an ingredient of social norm, but 
corruption is a deviation. 
 
Secondly, “Guanxi is legal, whereas corruption is illegal” (Luo, 2002). Although Guanxi has a 
feature of gift-sending (Smeltzer & Jennings, 1998), as well as corruption in China (Graycar & 
Jancsics, 2017), the main difference between them is the legality. Guanxi is a part of Chinese 
traditional culture – Confucianism, which widely exists in almost every realm of Chinese life (Gold 
et al., 2002). Therefore, Guanxi, for its own sake, is not concerned with being legitimate or 
illegitimate, it is a component of society. Conversely, corruption refers to the misuse of entrusted 
power for private benefits (Transparency International, 2019). Hence, corruption reflects the 
unethical behaviours that violate regulations, laws or social norms, which is widely unacceptable. 
Although Guanxi indeed may be used to avoid certain regulations or laws (Aidt et al., 2008), 
Guanxi and corruption differ essentially in judiciary implication, just like legal tax avoidance and 
illegal tax evasion (Luo, 2002). 
 
Thirdly, “Guanxi essentially builds on favour exchange, whereas corruption mostly involves 
monetary exchange” (Luo, 2002). In this point, the ‘favour’ exchanged in Guanxi seems to be only 
emotional or affective but transactional. Guanxi participants exchange favours to build and keep 
Guanxi generating webs of social obligations concurrently, which also provides the foundation of 
social reciprocity (ibid). However, corruption primarily applies to money and equivalents as 
exchange instruments (Argandona, 2003). In other words, Guanxi focuses on the relationships of 
exchange such as reciprocity, which may comprise both emotional and transactional favours, but 
corruption only emphasises transactional favours. 
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Then, “Guanxi involves implicit, social reciprocity, whereas corruption pertains to explicit, 
transactional reciprocity” (Luo, 2002). As a consequence of social obligation accumulation, 
Guanxi is embedded in interpersonal exchanges and reciprocal commitments (ibid). That Guanxi 
parties receiving favours must return the same or similar ones are unwritten commitments (Alston, 
1989). However, observing the commitments is not compulsory for Guanxi parties. The reciprocity 
is therefore implicit, if one side refuses to do so, the Guanxi relationship can still continue because 
of the generosity of the other side. On the other hand, it is compulsory, to some extent, that the 
parties involved in corruption are asked to observe the rules of reciprocity. The rules are also 
unwritten but explicit because corruption is purely transactional (Nye, 1967). This is similar to 
doing business, the seller provides goods, and the buyer must pay for the goods. In a word, Guanxi 
has implicit rules, but corruption’s rules are explicit and transactional. 
 
Likewise, “Guanxi does not involve any lawful risks if it fails, whereas corruption is linked to high 
legal risks and uncertainties” (Luo, 2002). Indeed, Guanxi is not concerned with legitimacy or 
illegitimacy because it is a part of Chinese life (Song et al., 2012). So, establishing or maintaining 
Guanxi carries no risk. The participants, at most, lose the Guanxi when it fails but nothing more. 
Namely, while a Guanxi relationship breaks, the only consequence is personal. In contrast, 
corruption is a kind of high-risk behaviour because it violates rules and regulations as well as laws. 
For company employees, the exposure of corruption may lead to unemployment and legal liability. 
For government officials, this can result in prison. Thus, the consequence of corruption is much 
more serious than Guanxi, because it is not only a personal concern, but it can cause a negative 
influence at the organisational or national level. 
 
In addition, “Guanxi builds on a long-term orientation, whereas corruption deals with a short-term 
transaction” (Luo, 2002). Guanxi reflects long-term interpersonal relationships on the basis of 
reciprocity (Su & Littlefield, 2001), which is built and reinforced via association and interaction. 
That is, Guanxi is accumulative. Through accumulation over time, Guanxi can become closer, 
stronger and more stable. For instance, strangers originally have no Guanxi, but along with 
increasing levels of contact, their Guanxi can be developed and eventually turns into friendship. 
Nevertheless, corruption is usually short-term, depending on one-off specific business or political 
goals (Luo, 2002). Although some corruption participants may have a long collaborative 
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relationship, such relationships are essentially transactional, meaning they are unstable and 
temporary. To sum up, Guanxi is long-term-oriented, but corruption is the opposite. 
 
Moreover, “Guanxi does not specify a time limit, whereas corruption often requires timeliness” 
(Luo, 2002). As Guanxi is a reciprocally committed relationship, the favour exchange involved 
has no particular time period requirement to ensure the favour must be returned. Also, Guanxi can 
exist permanently. For example, the Guanxi between family members is based on blood, which 
means it cannot be removed over time. Corruption, conversely, has a feature of timeliness. At the 
beginning of a corruption case, when the bribee has accepted certain benefits from the briber, then 
the bribee must make a response in a limited time period which depends on the briber’s offer. This 
is a repayment obligation. Additionally, unlike Guanxi relationships which can remain in place 
permanently, corruption usually terminates after one-time transactions, because corruption has no 
permanent foundation such as blood. Overall, corruption needs to be completed in a timely manner, 
in comparison with Guanxi. 
 
Furthermore, “Guanxi builds on trust, whereas corruption is based on commodity” (Luo, 2002). In 
terms of Guanxi, trust is significant for its establishment and maintenance in order to avoid 
opportunistic behaviours (Burt et al., 2018), and honesty, as well as integrity, play key roles in 
Guanxi relationships (Luo, 2002). Therefore, Guanxi is supported by positive manners like 
interpersonal trust, honesty and integrity. Yet, corruption is different, which is similar to business 
activities. In a typical corruption case, for the briber, power is the commodity that is exchanged by 
paying money or equivalents. For the bribee, money or equivalents are the commodities that are 
exchanged by offering power. In short, corruption is a sort of purely transactional behaviour 
depending on the commodity, but Guanxi relies on trust. 
 
Lastly, “Guanxi is transferable, whereas corruption is not” (Luo, 2002). Guanxi relationships can 
be transferred in the same Guanxi network, which allows a Guanxi owner to build giant and 
efficient personal networks (ibid). For instance, Guanxi can be introduced from a friend A to 
another friend C via a credible intermediary B (Su & Littlefield, 2001). The credible intermediary 
B is usually played by someone who knows both A and C. They can trust each other because they 
all trust the intermediary B. Then, a new Guanxi between A and C is established, the original two 
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separate Guanxi, A & B and B & C, now turn into a combination: A & B & C. Accordingly, 
Guanxi is transferable in this case. However, corruption is not transferable. As corruption implies 
secret and risky activities essentially (Nye, 1967), corrupt connections are hence unlikely to be 
introduced from one party to another. In most cases, corruption may emerge in small groups in 
order to conceal unethical behaviours (Bicchieri &Rovelli, 1995). Thus, Guanxi relationships can 
be transferred, but relationships based on corruption cannot. 
 
Indeed, the nine differences between Guanxi and corruption reviewed above show certain 
limitations. At first, a clear typology of Guanxi lacks. Different Guanxi types need to be considered. 
Although ‘relative’ Guanxi (focuses on emotional exchange) may have no links with corruption, 
‘benefits’ (focuses on benefits exchange) and ‘mixed’ Guanxi (includes both features of the former 
two) can relate to corruption because they consist of transactional components. Then, “Guanxi 
builds on a long-term orientation, whereas corruption deals with a short-term transaction” (Luo, 
2002). Concerning this point, although Guanxi is long-term and established on the basis of trust, 
corruption may be not inevitable and only depends on the short-term transaction and commodity. 
After a successful collaboration of corruption, further and future collaboration may emerge 
between the parties involved because the previous experience in success probably strengthens their 
connection. Namely, a long-term collaborative corruption relationship could be built. In addition, 
“Guanxi does not specify a time limit, whereas corruption often requires timeliness” (Luo, 2002). 
Here, Guanxi may likewise require timeliness, just like corruption. Although some Guanxi 
relationships can continue without a timely response such as blood-based Guanxi between family 
members, others cannot. For example, if one side of the friendship refuses to offer affection in the 
same way as the other side, the friendship may break. Therefore, both Guanxi and corruption 
probably need timeliness. Moreover, “Guanxi builds on trust, whereas corruption is based on 
commodity” (Luo, 2002). In terms of this point, trust can also be an important element in 
corruption cases. As corruption reflects a sort of secret and high-risk activity (Nye, 1967), the 
participants thus normally tend to reduce the risk of exposure by greatest effort. That is, trust can 
be significant to the participants, the existence of trust between them could be a precondition to 
identify reliable corrupt partners, which may come from former successful collaboration 
experience or a credible intermediary. Hence, trust is likely to be a determinant of both Guanxi 
and corruption. Finally, “Guanxi is transferable, whereas corruption is not” (Luo, 2002). Here, 
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corruption can likewise be transferable. This is because corruption can spread in organisations 
between corrupt actors and innocent new entrants (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008). In short, the 
nine differences between Guanxi and corruption indicate Guanxi is probably not equal to 
corruption, although there are a number of limitations included. 
 
In summary, evidence from the literature displays that Guanxi is unable to result in corruption 
inevitably, many scholars show support to this perspective in their studies. Indeed, there are a 
number of different characteristics existing between Guanxi and corruption. For example, Guanxi 
is a part of social norm, but corruption is the violation; establishing and maintaining Guanxi is 
legal, but participating in corruption is illegal; and Guanxi essentially exchanges emotional and 
affective favours, but corruption mostly exchanges monetary favours; etc. Therefore, although 
Guanxi may be utilised by unethical actors to proceed corrupt activities, depending on this, stating 
Guanxi automatically equates to corruption is wrong. 
 
 
 
2.4 Theoretical Underpinnings 
2.4.1 Guanxi and social capital 
Social capital is one of the most successful theoretical ‘exports’ from sociology to other research 
fields. In the early study, social capital was defined as social obligations or connections, which 
reflects the interpersonal relations in specific groups (Bourdieu, 1986). Then, social capital was 
developed into “the structure of positive relations between actors and among actors” (Coleman, 
1988). Later, Coleman (1990) described social capital from a social structure dimension: it 
functionally displays certain norms of social structure, which enables the individuals inside the 
social structure can promote their actions and activities. In addition, Putnam (1993) referred social 
capital to the characteristics of social organisation, including trust, norms, or networks. Namely, 
there are two aspects of social capital that can be identified: structural and cultural (Deth, 2003). 
The structural aspect consists of connections and networks, and the cultural aspect involves trust 
and values, as well as obligations or social norms (ibid).  
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Deth (2003) is in broad agreement with Petty and Ward (2001) who identified four dimensions to 
social capital: trust, exchanges, norms and connections. Firstly, social capital comprises relations 
of trust, its function to facilitate cooperation between individuals is because the trust involved in 
the interpersonal relationships can lubricate cooperation (ibid). Secondly, social capital means 
reciprocity and exchanges (Pretty & Ward, 2001). Such reciprocity and exchange process can also 
promote trust between the actors (ibid). There are two kinds of reciprocity: specific reciprocity 
(refers to the exchange behaviours that are proceeded at the same time and in an equal value) and 
diffuse reciprocity (refers to a continuing relationship of exchange that the repayment is not 
completed one-time but being repaid and balanced over time) (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993). 
Afterwards, social capital depends on common rules, norms and sanctions (Pretty & Ward, 2001). 
This point reflects behavioural norms representing the interest of a specific group or category of 
individuals, such groups or category interest is far more important than the individuals’ (ibid). 
Once there are parties of social capital relationships that break or violate the collective rules, they 
would be punished (Coleman, 1990). Therefore, social capital implies a balance made by 
individuals between their personal rights and responsibilities in groups (Etzioni, 1995). Lastly, 
connectedness, networks and groups are the essential components of social capital (Pretty & Ward, 
2001). Such connection consists of many different types, for instance: the exchange of limited 
information; favours and helps between individuals; or buying and paying activities in business 
(ibid).  
 
A different typology of social capital comes from Putnam (2000), and it gained ground very 
quickly, through its ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ patterns (Putnam, 2000). The former is related to 
‘weak ties’ that can be described as a kind of weak connection between parties, which have the 
ability to provide benefits, such as useful information or new perspectives, but typically are neither 
emotional nor affective support (Granovetter, 1983). Conversely, bonding social capital exists 
between parties which are ‘tightly-knit’, a type of close relationship based on emotion and 
affection that generally occurs between family members and close friends, etc. (ibid). Additionally, 
as both ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ social capital focus on horizontal relationships, ‘linking’ social 
capital - a vertical aspect of the social capital concept- was argued to exist. This is a closely relevant 
notion with ‘bridging’ social capital but more complex, which shows the relationships between 
individuals and groups belonging to different social strata (Cote & Healy, 2001). 
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Furthermore, the application of social capital was discussed widely in the literature. For example, 
social capital shows the relationships and the combination of potential resources that can affect 
collective behaviours (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Then, social capital comprises the usage of 
three dimensions which are (1) a potential source that can be used for social control, (2) beneficial 
resources among close family relationships, and (3) resources depending on non-family networks 
(Portes, 1998). The third usage exemplifies private links, relationships, connections and networks 
in social life, which can promote access to limited resources such as job opportunities, market tips, 
or low-interest loans (Portes, 2000). In addition, social capital is an informal and unwritten social 
norm that can facilitate cooperation between individuals because the costs of working together can 
be reduced (Fukuyama, 2001), it reflects intangible resources that are related to interpersonal 
relationships (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Having such resources can indeed positively influence the 
performance of diverse forms in the organisational level, such as groups or categories (ibid). In 
the concept of social capital, ‘goodwill’ involving a kind, helpful, or friendly feeling and attitude 
plays a key role, which is engendered by the fabric of social relations and can occur for individuals 
and within groups (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Accordingly, for individuals, social capital allows a 
person to gain resources in private networks from other members (Ellison et al., 2007). These 
resources consist of valuable information or personal relationships, etc. (Paxton, 1999). 
 
According to the review above, two main points concerning social capital can be identified. Firstly, 
social capital can bring benefits to individuals, such as exclusive access to limited resources. 
Secondly, social capital is based on favour exchange. Indeed, through the establishment of social 
capital, the benefits created are intangible until the reciprocity cycle closes. Only then the benefits, 
like the access to valuable information or personal links, become tangible. For a person, to build 
social capital, giving favours is key. For example, an entrepreneur wants to build a special 
relationship with a specific governmental official because the official has authority over the 
entrepreneur’s business. This sort of relationship is the entrepreneur’s social capital, once 
established. Initially, the entrepreneur may provide certain favours to the official. Then the official 
may payback with resources that are needed by the entrepreneur. After the first ‘collaboration’ is 
successfully completed, a special tie like this may continue and transform into social capital for 
both the entrepreneur and the official. 
 
62 
 
In terms of the concept of Guanxi, it is associated with social capital theory. As Butterfield (1983) 
describes it: Guanxi is a form of social investment or social capital, an important personal resource 
while the owner needs help or support. Indeed, ‘goodwill’ has a key role to play in social capital, 
which consists of a kind, helpful, or friendly feeling or attitude (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Social 
capital looks like a kind of intangible personal resource that allows the owner to obtain special 
benefits, like resources, that are limited to others and special relationships that are private to others. 
Similarly, Guanxi has the same characteristics. From a practical perspective, Guanxi can bring a 
number of tangible and intangible benefits to the actor, such as preferential treatment in business 
and preferential access to limited resources (Pye, 1992). According to the review and argument in 
the last section, in ‘relative’ Guanxi, the strong connection between relatives are affection and 
friendship (see section 2.2.1). In other words, there is trust existing between the parties (Burt et al., 
2018), which means ‘goodwill’. If one of the relatives has government power or can provide 
favours to other relatives, for the Guanxi owner, this relative has intangible social capital. Here, 
‘goodwill’ is probably the determinant. In addition, concerning ‘benefits’ Guanxi, beneficial 
favour exchange is the foundation (see section 2.2.1). During the exchange process, a high level 
of trust can be established between the parties (Molm et al., 2000). Once such a ‘goodwill’ is 
generated, the ‘benefits’ Guanxi can also be regarded as social capital for the parties involved, just 
like the ‘relative’ Guanxi. Finally, ‘mixed’ Guanxi comprises both ‘relative’ and ‘benefits’ Guanxi 
(see section 2.2.1), which means both the parts can provide ‘goodwill’ to the actors. For instance, 
in a corrupt Guanxi between family members, ‘goodwill’ concurrently exists from the perspective 
of affection and emotion, also from the perspective of benefits exchange. This is because the 
Guanxi includes affective and beneficial parts at the same time. Therefore, ‘mixed’ Guanxi can 
also be defined as social capital. 
 
To sum up, according to a comparison of the concept of Guanxi and social capital theory, it is clear 
that Guanxi generally holds the characteristics of social capital. The keywords involve trust, 
reciprocity and exchange, norms and sanctions, and connections. Alternatively, at least some parts 
of Guanxi as private resources allows the owner to obtain extra benefits just as with social capital. 
Hence, Guanxi could be a variant form of social capital in the Chinese context. 
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Additionally, based on the earlier review, Guanxi is about a continual exchange process, where 
trust is key for both parties to proceed and maintain a willingness to repeat such exchanges. This 
is because Guanxi, as a strong interpersonal link is known in China, is differentiated through a 
high level of trust (Burt et al., 2018). From this perspective, Guanxi’s substance is related to social 
exchange theory.  
 
 
2.4.2 Guanxi and social exchange theory 
Social exchange theory entails the exchange between actors with some forms of agreement such 
as an unspecified obligation of reciprocation (Blau, 1964; Adler & Kwon, 2002; Chen & Choi, 
2005). A common example is that when a very precious gift is accepted, it is extremely difficult 
for the person who has resource allocation power to refuse any payback of a resource in the future 
(Hwang, 1987). In addition, there are six types of resources which can be exchanged during the 
process: love, status, information, money, goods and services (Foa & Foa, 1974; Gergen et al., 
1980). 
 
Synthesising the literature, social exchange mainly comprises of four kinds of structure (Berger et 
al., 1972; Ekeh, 1974; Rosenberg & Turner, 1981; Cook et al., 1995; Molm et al., 1999): (a) 
negotiated exchange (based on explicitly contractual agreements or terms); (b) reciprocal exchange 
(sequential offering of favours across time); (c) generalised exchange (providing favours to a group 
or network member while obtaining favours from the other members); and (d) co-productive 
exchange (combining efforts or resources in order to produce a joint good). More specifically, 
these four structure types imply different emotional effects (Lawler, 2001). Firstly, in negotiated 
exchange, as the exchange depends on agreements or terms, one party may feel satisfaction 
towards the giving from the other party but at the same time may feel dissatisfaction in the event 
that giving ceases. Secondly, the contribution of each party in reciprocal exchange is sequential 
and separable, which means the payback responsibility of this exchange is relatively weak. 
Thirdly, generalised exchange reflects a high-level of group trust among members that discharge 
their obligation to enrich the entire group instead of working towards individual interest. Lastly, 
co-productive exchange refers to a deeper interdependence than other types of exchange and 
probably generates greater shared responsibility, more pleasantness in success and less 
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unpleasantness in failure. In short, social exchange theory emphasises the ‘exchange’, in different 
dimensions. 
 
The new Guanxi typology argued in the previous section: ‘relative’, ‘benefits’ and ‘mixed’ Guanxi, 
are underpinned by the concept of favour exchange. ‘Relative’ Guanxi refers to a type of stable, 
permanent, and close interpersonal relationships such as the ties between family members and 
intimate friends. Emotion and affection are the favours that are exchanged between parties which 
are key to maintaining such relationships. Then, ‘benefits’ Guanxi covers those relationships 
without ‘real’ affection but which only depend on favour exchange processes, such as the 
relationships between briber and bribee. The substance of this Guanxi type is benefits exchange 
(another kind of favour exchange), which can be a large scope of favours such as money, gifts, 
limited resources, special treatment, etc. Moreover, ‘mixed’ Guanxi displays the relationships 
having the features of both ‘relative’ and ‘benefits’ Guanxi. In other words, this Guanxi synthesises 
the favours exchanged in the former two Guanxi types in which both affective and benefits 
components are involved. Therefore, Guanxi is a form of interpersonal favour exchange (Barbalet, 
2018), which is similar to the exchange characteristics of social exchange theory. 
 
Also, reciprocity rules and negotiated rules are the ‘guidelines’ of social exchange theory 
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Guanxi, however, has no negotiated rules because there is no 
explicit contractual agreement between the parties; rather, this is unwritten, unclear and 
psychological in most cases. Conversely, Guanxi has reciprocity rules. This is because reciprocity 
plays a fundamental role in the Guanxi relationship, which relates to a strong moral force which 
makes it difficult for the actors to refuse repaying the favours received (Ledeneva, 2008). 
Additionally, Guanxi also comprises a sequential feature, just as in social exchange theory. Indeed, 
Guanxi reflects a reciprocal long-term sequential exchange process that requires a certain kind of 
loyalty (Lee, 2010). Guanxi parties’ contribution is separable and distinguishable, and time can 
elapse between giving and receiving, instead of taking place immediately. Once the reciprocity 
breaks, Guanxi could be terminated in consequence. 
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Overall, the characteristics of Guanxi shows a relationship with social exchange theory. Although 
social exchange includes a number of different structures such as negotiated, reciprocal, 
generalised and co-productive exchange, which Guanxi is not entirely conforming with, at least 
Guanxi can be considered as a reciprocal exchange component, in general. 
 
 
*** 
Indeed, according to the literature review in previous sections, social capital concept can be a way 
to explain corruption. This is because, firstly, social capital can bring benefits to individuals, such 
as exclusive access to limited resources (Portes, 1998; Portes, 2000; Ellison et al., 2007). People 
may be therefore motivated to build and keep social capital in order to gain private benefits, 
corruption can be generated for this purpose. For example, a subordinate can send valuable gifts 
to establish social capital with the superior, then the superior may provide a special treatment of 
promotion for the subordinate as the social capital. Secondly, social capital depends on favour 
exchange on the base of informal and unwritten social norm (Fukuyama, 2001; Pretty & Ward, 
2001). After receiving the gifts from the subordinates, the superior has to repay these gifts as an 
exchange because of the informal and unwritten social norm. In the public sector, the superior may 
apply public power to repay, such as offering special treatment of promotion. In this process, 
corruption is resulted. Hence, social capital helps to explain corruption in this way. 
 
Also, social exchange theory could be another way to explain corruption. Social exchange reflects 
the exchange between actors with some forms of agreement such as an unspecified obligation of 
reciprocation (Blau, 1964; Adler & Kwon, 2002; Chen & Choi, 2005). A common example is that 
when a very precious gift is accepted, it is extremely difficult for the person who has resource 
allocation power to refuse any payback of a resource in the future (Hwang, 1987). Therefore, social 
exchange emphasises the balance between payment and repayment. Similar to the explanation 
above, if the superior received gifts from the subordinate, which means the superior is unlikely to 
refuse allocating more resources to the subordinate as repayment. In other words, corruption can 
be generated during the process of repayment. Thus, social exchange theory can also help to 
explain corruption. 
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Moreover, in the Chinese context, Guanxi can be a new way to explain the corruption happened 
in the public sector. According to the previous studies in this field, Guanxi can serve to corruption 
via a number of pathways such as playing the roles of communication, exchange and neutralisation 
(Wang, 2016), which is because of the features of Guanxi: reciprocity, utilitarianism, 
transferability and intangibility (Park & Luo, 2001). A typical theoretical study was conducted by 
Luo (2008), who firstly categorised Guanxi into ‘weak form’ (the relationship between family 
members) and ‘strong form’ (the relationship between non-family members). Then, depending on 
the risk of engaging public power abuse, four cells were presented involving the ‘normal’ cell 
(where family members form Guanxi, and there is the low risk to abuse public power, such as pure 
family relationships), the ‘cancer’ cell (where non-family members form Guanxi, and there is a 
high risk to abuse public power, such as corrupt bureaucrats receive bribery from entrepreneurs), 
the ‘virus’ cell (where non-family members form Guanxi, and there is a low risk to abuse public 
power, such as officials in highly ranked schools receive ‘red pocket’) and the ‘moth’ cell (where 
family members form Guanxi, and there is a high risk to abuse public power, such as family 
members collaborate to proceed corruption aiming to family interests). The cells of Luo (2008) is 
presented below as Figure 9: 
 
 
Figure 9: Taxonomy of intertwinement between guanxi and corruption (Luo, 2008) 
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Luo’s study indeed provided a perspective to investigate how Guanxi and corruption to be 
intertwined. However, this study made no contribution to why Guanxi is intertwined with 
corruption. The answer could be related to China’s distinct culture to some extent. Overall, 
although existing research concerning the field of Guanxi and corruption has made some 
contributions to how Guanxi can explain corruption, there still have rooms for improvement. 
Therefore, this project tries to push a further understanding of corruption generation and 
perpetuation in organisational settings in distinct cultural contexts like China, to offer a new 
perspective to explain corruption through the aspect of Guanxi. 
 
 
 
2.5 Research Gaps and Questions 
The literature has shown a large number of studies concerning Guanxi and corruption, they 
generally investigate if and how Guanxi can lead to corruption. However, there are two gaps which 
can be identified. Firstly, the majority of existent studies in this field are based on private sector 
data. These studies mainly concentrate on how Guanxi and corruption work in private 
organisations instead of in public organisations. Also, most studies focus on how Guanxi and 
corruption link together between entrepreneurs and civil servants, rather than exclusively 
investigate public civil servants. Therefore, empirical data from the Chinese public sector is 
probably absent. Guanxi and corruption among Chinese civil servants are therefore worth 
investigating as it is a research gap in the literature. Secondly, as there is evidence indicating that 
Guanxi may have similar features with the concept of social capital in the Western context, which 
means Guanxi could be another name of social capital in the Chinese context. Hence, investigating 
the links between Guanxi and social capital, and using a social capital perspective to explore 
Guanxi and corruption in the public sector could be a valuable research orientation. However, there 
seems no sufficient empirical evidence about this in the literature, which means this point is 
another research gap. 
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Accordingly, this project tries to provide empirical evidence for terminating the existent debate 
about the link between Guanxi and corruption, while bringing a contribution to both the literature 
on corruption and to that of Guanxi in organisations, particularly in the public sector. More 
specifically, this project is trying to fill the gaps identified above, to conduct a new research 
focusing on civil servants in the Chinese public sector, to offer a further perception of Guanxi, and 
to investigate if Guanxi is related to corruption from the perspective of social capital. In order to 
achieve the research purpose, four sub-questions are addressed: 
 
1. To what extent is the Chinese civil service a distinctive organisational environment? 
2. How do Chinese civil servants utilise different Guanxi types in their work? 
3. How do perceptions of Chinese civil servants push our understanding of the motives and 
circumstances surrounding corrupt organisational behaviour? 
4. To what extent do known theories explain the complex relationship between Guanxi and 
corruption and how do Chinese civil servants perceive it? 
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Chapter 3.0 Methodology 
This chapter introduces the research methodology and methods applied in this project in order to 
explore the relationship between Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector. The study 
employs a subjectivist ontology because people’s perception of the relationship between Guanxi 
and corruption may be subjectively influenced by their life experience. It also employs an 
interpretivist epistemology because it needs to consider the specific context of the Chinese public 
sector. In addition, inductive research approach is used because this project tries to interrogate the 
relationship between Guanxi and corruption, rather than to investigate if there are certain pre-
identified relationships. Finally, qualitative research strategy is adopted because it can build an in-
depth understanding in terms of the research through non-numerical data through semi-structured 
(flexible, yet controllable) interviews. Purposive and snowball samplings are both applied in order 
to increase the credibility of data by selecting the ‘right’ interviewees and to reach the intended 
interviewee volume. The interview data is transcribed and analysed thematically, generating the 
study’s main findings.   
 
 
 
3.1 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy relates to the development and the nature of knowledge in a specific field 
while embarking on research by the researcher (Saunders et al., 2012). In the field of business and 
management, research philosophy is important not only because it shows how the researcher views 
the world but also that it unravels how the researcher perceives what it is being studied (Bryman 
& Bell, 2011). Thus, it is significant to make a clear identification of research philosophy here. 
This will be done taking into account ontology, epistemology and axiology. 
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3.1.1 Ontology 
Subjectivism of ontology is employed in this project. There are two major ways of thinking about 
research philosophy: ontology and epistemology (Saunders et al., 2012). Ontology concerns the 
nature of reality and existence (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015), and embodies an understanding of 
what reality is (Gray, 2014). It refers to ‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism’ (Saunders et al., 2012). 
Objectivism assumes that the external reality is independent of social actors, while subjectivism 
assumes that the external reality is created by the perceptions and actions of social actors (ibid). A 
Chinese researcher’s position is inevitably influenced by the traditional culture of China. Indeed, 
objectivism is the mainstream culture in Chinese society (Yang, 2005). In general, the researcher’s 
preference therefore tends to be objectivism. However, in respect of this project of Guanxi and 
corruption, subjectivism is adopted for two reasons. 
 
Firstly, this project is being pursued mainly because of the researcher’s personal interest in the 
fields of both Guanxi and corruption, and the researcher considers that the two variables may have 
some links, regardless of whether the links are positive or negative. The researcher’s consideration 
is based on past experience and the environment in which I was raised, although the researcher has 
no direct experience in corruption. Therefore, the original research idea is subjective. In addition, 
the perception of Guanxi tends to be personal instead of universal, which is created on the basis of 
individual experience and the way in which Guanxi and corruption are perceived. In other words, 
people having no such life experience or the environment in which they were raised might not 
have the same perception of the relationships between Guanxi and corruption in comparison with 
the researcher. Those people may believe Guanxi is merely a normal interpersonal relationship 
that is not associated with corruption. Alternatively, they probably believe Guanxi is evil and that 
it inevitably leads to corruption. Accordingly, the relationship between Guanxi and corruption 
exists subjectively rather than objectively, which relies on personal perspective and background. 
 
Secondly, subjectivism is adopted in this project because of the debate in the literature. There are 
a large number of studies which indicate a strong tie between Guanxi and corruption, they think 
Guanxi may inevitably lead to corruption due to its corrupt nature, such as favour exchange and 
gift-giving. However, some other studies show that corruption may not be an unavoidable 
consequence of Guanxi. The debate shows that there seems to be not enough strong empirical 
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evidence to prove the relationships between Guanxi and corruption at present, particularly in the 
Chinese public sector. Hence, claiming the objective existence of such relationships is probably 
insufficient. In short, based on the analysis above, subjectivism is employed. 
 
 
3.1.2 Epistemology 
Interpretivism of epistemology is applied in this project. Epistemology refers to what constitutes 
acceptable knowledge in a research field (Saunders et al., 2012). In terms of natural sciences, a 
central epistemological issue is to consider if social reality can be investigated by the same 
principles and procedures (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Epistemology mainly consists of positivism, 
realism and interpretivism (Saunders et al., 2012). Positivism assumes that social reality is external 
and can be investigated via an objective pathway instead of being inferred subjectively by 
sensation or reflection (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). For those who take a positivist position, they 
are likely to prefer to do research by using data of observable reality or causal relationships, and 
they may develop hypotheses on the basis of existing theories (Gill & Johnson, 2010).   
 
Regarding realism, it includes two types which are empirical realism and critical realism. 
Empirical realism asserts that social reality can be understood directly by applying appropriate 
methods, which means what you see is what you get (Bhaskar, 1989). In contrast, critical realism 
can be described as social reality can only be understood while the social structures generating the 
reality being identified, which means social reality cannot be perceived veritably because the 
perceived reality by empirical realism is based on perceiver’s experience which is merely the 
images of the reality (ibid).  
 
Then, interpretivism advocates that the researcher must understand the differences between 
humans and between the objects of natural sciences, therefore, to grasp the subjective implication 
of social action (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Likewise, interpretivism tries to perceive social reality by 
“culturally derived and historically situated interpretations” (Crotty, 1998), and interprets the 
world through the classification schemas of the mind of the researcher (Williams & May, 1996). 
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In association with this project, the researcher’s epistemological assumption is interpretivism. At 
first, as mentioned above, an emphasis of interpretivism is to assert the distinctions between 
humans and objects. China is one of the four major early civilisations, unlike Western societies, it 
has a distinct culture system coming from its long history and Confucianism faith. Thus, in order 
to ensure the reliability and the objectivity of research concerning China, it is indispensable to 
consider the distinct social elements of China, such as people’s perception, management style and 
political environment, etc. during the research process.  
 
More specifically, as the research concerns a one-party country, the Chinese public sector has 
certain characteristics such as the absence of effective supervision by internal and external 
mechanisms, as well as low official salaries (Ramirez, 2014). These characteristics could result in 
particular influences on the promotion of corruption. Accordingly, the specific context of the 
Chinese public sector is significant and needs to be considered in this project. Moreover, Guanxi 
culture as a reciprocal obligation and mutual assurance between people is another distinctive part 
of China (Su & Littlefield, 2001). Although similar concepts may exist in Western societies and 
other countries, the difference between Guanxi and those concepts still can be found. Therefore, it 
is important to identify what exactly is Guanxi and its distinctions compared with similar Western 
concepts among this project. This is the process of “culturally derived and historically situated 
interpretations (Crotty, 1998)”. In summary, interpretivism is appropriate here because it allows 
the researcher to investigate the relationship between Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public 
sector with sufficient consideration of the specific Chinese context.  
 
 
3.1.3 Axiology 
Axiology studies the judgement about value (Saunders et al., 2012), which consists of the value 
that researchers hold about the dimensions of ethics and aesthetics. A more important role is played 
by value during research, and a more credible research outcome can be expected (ibid). Value 
perception is a rather significant reason of all human action, being able to articulate values is a 
pathway to demonstrate axiological skills by the researcher, which is a foundation to judge the 
identification and the quality of research (Heron, 1996). Overall, axiology reflects the importance 
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of research for individual researchers, and it determines the choice of research approaches and data 
collection techniques. In terms of this project, the researcher’s axiology concerns two dimensions.  
 
Firstly, China is a rapidly developing economy with 10% average GDP growth rate in past decades 
(The World Bank, 2019), but, perhaps paradoxically, the corruption situation is becoming more 
serious (Transparency International, 2019). The question of how this country achieves economic 
success, without having resolved the problem of corruption, is an attractive and valuable research 
target for the researcher. Developed countries experience a different situation: their economic 
development normally arrived with the development of government transparency and anti-
corruption achievements. Therefore, the distinctive Chinese Guanxi is worthy of being 
investigated as it could be one of the most likely potential reasons for producing this paradox. 
 
Secondly, Guanxi comes from China’s long history and Confucianism faith, which plays an 
important role in Chinese culture. This concept only exists in China, and there are no concepts 
which are completely the same in Western countries. Similar Western concepts such as social 
capital, social exchange and kinship share the feature of favour exchange with Guanxi. These 
Western concepts have been proved to be associated with corruption to some extent. Thus, figuring 
out if the same conclusion can be applied by Guanxi is valuable, if not, then it will be necessary to 
find out what the difference is. Through investigating this question, the differences towards 
interpersonal connections between China and Western countries can be identified, and the 
differences can relate to a management field that offers a reference to both researcher and 
practitioner. Hence, studying the relationship between Guanxi and corruption offers a valuable 
perspective.  
 
In addition, personally, the researcher considers Guanxi is influential towards the promotion of 
public sector corruption. Although a large amount of research about Guanxi and corruption has 
been conducted in academic fields, the debate of the relationship between Guanxi and corruption 
has been ongoing for decades. Therefore, the researcher has a strong intention to investigate more 
evidence to move the debate forward and offer some credible answers. Accordingly, investigating 
this topic is valuable for the researcher. 
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3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Research Approach 
Inductive research approach is applied here. Research approaches can be deductive or inductive. 
Deductive approaches try to deduce hypotheses depending on existing theories in a particular 
domain and then test them rigorously (Bryman & Bell, 2011). In other words, a deductive approach 
applies hypothesis testing, after which the criteria are confirmed, refuted or modified (Gray, 2014). 
In converse, inductive approaches help researchers to build a new conceptual theory via exploring 
a phenomenon (Saunders et al., 2012). Namely, an inductive approach binds principles, making 
rational inferences or conclusions based on data (Gray, 2014). 
 
This project adopts an inductive approach to the study of Guanxi and corruption, which is because 
the purpose of this project is to explore the relationship between Guanxi and corruption instead of 
demonstrating proposed relationships. The main point is to investigate what the relationship is, 
rather than if there are certain identified relationships. Hence, a deductive approach is not 
appropriate here because it is processed on the basis of hypotheses (certain identified 
relationships). At the same time, the main questions are, for example, how do Chinese civil 
servants utilise different Guanxi types in their work, which need to be answered in order to address 
the research purpose. Therefore, it is reasonable to apply an inductive approach as it allows the 
researcher to establish new concepts by exploring, which is appropriate for unidentified questions. 
 
 
3.2.2 Research Strategy 
Qualitative research is applied in this project. Unlike quantitative research which uses graphs or 
statistics to analyse collected numerical data, qualitative research applies classification techniques 
to analyse non-numerical data (Saunders et al., 2012). In other words, quantitative research usually 
emphasises quantification in data collection and analysis, by contrast, qualitative research usually 
emphasises words instead of quantification in data collection and analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
In order to explore the relationship between Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector, 
four main questions need to be answered: “To what extent is the Chinese civil service a distinctive 
organisational environment?”; “How do Chinese civil servants utilise different Guanxi types in 
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their work?”; “How do perceptions of Chinese civil servants push our understanding of the motives 
and circumstances surrounding corrupt organisational behaviour?” and “To what extent do known 
theories explain the complex relationship between Guanxi and corruption and how do Chinese 
civil servants perceive it?”. Numerical data used by quantitative research is therefore not 
appropriate here because they cannot answer ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2015).  
 
Conversely, qualitative research allows the researcher to access meaning and in-depth 
understanding of their studies (Saunders et al., 2012). In addition, the principal orientation of 
quantitative research is the testing of theory, but qualitative research mainly conducts theory 
generation (Gray, 2014). Answering ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions usually implies establishing new 
theories or conclusions via description and explanation. Thus, by using non-numerical data, 
qualitative research is suitable to answer such questions because it emphasises words. Moreover, 
typical non-numerical data consists of a wide range of non-standardised data such as interview 
records, observation notes, official documentary records, etc. These various data types can help 
the researcher to establish and explain an in-depth understanding of the relationship between 
Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector. Accordingly, a qualitative research strategy 
has been adopted. 
 
 
3.2.3 Sampling 
In terms of sampling, purposive sampling and snowball sampling are both employed here. At first, 
the reason for applying non-probability sampling instead of probability sampling is because the 
former depends on theoretical criteria, but the latter relies on statistical ones, therefore the latter is 
not applicable to qualitative research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In probability sampling, purposive 
sampling refers to a way of sampling research participants based on judging the relevance of 
participants towards specific research questions, rather than random sampling of participants 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). In other words, purposive sampling can ensure the interviewees selected 
are the ‘right’ persons to be interviewed, which can increase the credibility of data collected from 
them, hence it is used here. 
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In this project, the main purpose is to explore the relationships between Guanxi and corruption in 
the Chinese public sector. In order to select interviewees relevant to this purpose, certain sampling 
criteria can be identified. First of all, they must come from the Chinese public sector as civil 
servants, as the research purpose focuses on the public sector in China. In addition, as China has 
34 provinces, to cover all of the provinces by selecting interviewees is impracticable for a PhD 
researcher, thus three typical provinces are selected as sampling regions, which are Guangdong, 
Fujian and Jiangxi. The GDP of Guangdong was ranked 1st out of China’s 34 provinces in 2018, 
Fujian was 10th and Jiangxi was 16th (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019). They are 
picked as representative provinces as they cover China’s top-level developed, higher-level 
developed and middle-level developed regions, in order to minimise personal bias of local civil 
servants that could be influenced by different economic development levels in regions. Indeed, 
China has more less developed regions that are not covered here because the researcher personally 
has no resource access in those regions, this can be a limitation of sampling but could be improved 
in future research. 
 
Additionally, the civil servants in the Chinese public sector have different political levels. Three 
levels which cover higher, middle and lower political positions are therefore selected here to ensure 
the data collected can represent a general perception of Chinese civil servants. They are Bureau-
Director level, Division-Head level and Section-Head level. Likewise, the gender problem has 
been fully considered: male interviewees are about two times the number of female interviewees. 
Then, retired civil servants are probably more willing to talk about sensitive topics than in-service 
civil servants, hence some retired civil servants were invited to participate as interviewees. In 
general, in-service interviewees are also two times the number of retired ones. Again, there has 
been an attempt to balance the volume of interviewees between the three provinces, which are 
approximately 10 interviewees in each province. Overall, the sampling details are shown in Table 
1 below: 
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Table 1: Sampling details 
 Total In-service Retired Male Female Guangdong Fujian Jiangxi 
Bureau-
Director 
level 
11 8 3 8 3 4 3 4 
Division-
Head 
level 
10 8 2 7 3 3 3 4 
Section-
Head 
level 
10 8 2 7 3 4 3 3 
 
Snowball sampling is when researchers initially contact a small group of applicable participants to 
engage in research, then use these participants as intermediaries to make contact with more 
applicable participants (Bryman & Bell, 2011). This sampling technique is employed here because 
of the large number of the intended interviewee volume and the sensitivity of the research topic. 
The intended interviewee volume is 30, which is difficult to achieve for two reasons. The first 
reason is that the Chinese public sector is relatively ‘enclosed’ in comparison with the West, civil 
servants are not likely to accept an interview like this. The second reason is that those civil servants 
may be worried about the confidentiality of their interview record. In addition, the sensitivity of 
the research topic is another concern for them, as the topic is associated with corruption, which 
may be something they have experience of.  
 
Hence, by using snowball sampling, this project eventually obtained 31 interview acceptances 
from the public sector. Initially, the researcher contacted more than 20 potential interviews, half 
of them rejected the interview invitation. Then the researcher asked those 10 who displayed 
consent to suggest more possible interviewees via their personal connections. In this way, more 
interviewees were invited, and they felt much more willing to accept the invitation at the 
recommendation of the first 10 interviewees. 
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In short, purposive sampling and snowball sampling were both applied to ensure all of the 
interview participants satisfied the needs of addressing the research purpose: exploring the 
relationship between Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector. Also, the interviewee 
volume was therefore extended as much as possible to achieve the intended target. 
 
 
3.2.4 Data Collection 
This project used semi-structured interviews as the data collection method. The main reason for 
adopting this interview method is the sensitivity of this topic. A delicate point in this research, 
however, was to ensure the respondents provided real answers to the research questions. Allegedly, 
anonymous questionnaires cannot avoid this problem, respondents may be inclined to provide 
answers and opinions which are false, but more socially acceptable. Data collected under such 
circumstances is neither reliable nor credible. Another reason for choosing interviews is that they 
are flexible as they are face-to-face. Techniques such as observation and story-talking could be 
used in conjunction with interviews. At the same time, face-to-face communication provides a way 
to build trust with the respondents that avoids concealment.  
 
The third reason in support of adopting semi-structured interviews is the different research manner 
between unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews and structured interviews. In an 
unstructured interview, the interviewer may only ask a single question and then allow the 
interviewee to respond freely, with simple responses to potentially worthy points, in a similar way 
to a conversation (Bryman & Bell, 2011). By contrast, semi-structured interviews have a list of 
issues and questions to be covered, the quantity and order of questions are not followed rigorously, 
and it can be changed based on the actual direction of the interview (Gray, 2014). In addition, extra 
questions may be asked, which were unexpected at the start, but which relate to emerging new 
issues (ibid). Although both unstructured interviews and semi-structured interviews have 
flexibility, the semi-structured interview is more structured, this is important for exploring the 
relationship between Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector.  
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Before doing the interview, four main questions were already identified: “To what extent is the 
Chinese civil service a distinctive organisational environment?”; “How do Chinese civil servants 
utilise different Guanxi types in their work?”; “How do perceptions of Chinese civil servants push 
our understanding of the motives and circumstances surrounding corrupt organisational 
behaviour?” and “To what extent do known theories explain the complex relationship between 
Guanxi and corruption and how do Chinese civil servants perceive it?”. Therefore, the main 
purpose of the interview is to address these three questions. At the same time, anticipated sub-
questions were prepared in order to encourage the interviewees to show their views and opinions. 
For instance, “Can Guanxi help your personal goals such as promotion or special treatment in the 
workplace, and why?”; “How do you establish and maintain Guanxi with the people in the 
workplace, such as supervisors, subordinates and colleagues, and why?”; “What do you think 
corruption is and what kind of activities are involved? Would you be able to offer an example?”; 
“To what extent do you believe in a ‘Hai Rui’ style of a civil servant, and why?”; “Can you 
imagine, in which cases could normal Guanxi turn into corrupt Guanxi?”. 
 
Through a more structured interview like this, the interviewees’ responses can be limited in 
association with the research purpose, that increases the reliability and credibility of data, and 
provides opportunities for the researcher to find out when new issues arise. While it has something 
new, such as terms or cases used and mentioned by interviewees that are not expected by the 
planned question list, following up can be conducted immediately, and additional questions can be 
asked. For example, after asking the question “How do you establish and maintain Guanxi with 
the people in the workplace, such as supervisors, subordinates and colleagues, and why?”, certain 
interviewees responded: “I never actively build Guanxi with those people, but I know many of us 
in the public sector are doing this”. Then the researcher asked: “Why don’t we talk about the 
others?”. Also, some keywords are likely to draw the researcher’s attention from interviewees’ 
answers, such as regional cultural differences. For instance, ‘a Western perspective’ was 
mentioned frequently by interviewees. So, the researcher realised that there were systematic 
differences in defining corruption among Chinese civil servants in comparison with Western 
society, and indeed these civil servants clearly knew this point. Hence, such cultural differences 
were highlighted in the following interviews. 
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Accordingly, unlike the totally free communication of the unstructured interview, the semi-
structured interview provides a data collection method in a structured and flexible manner to this 
project. On the one hand, it offers clear interview guidance via a planned question list. On the other 
hand, it provides enough flexibility to encourage communication and expand the interviewees’ 
views and opinions, which is valuable for this project. Thus, semi-structured interviews are applied 
as the data collection method here. 
 
Regarding the planned sub-questions generated for the semi-structured interviews, they were 
produced on the base of three themes: Guanxi, corruption and Guanxi and corruption (for detailed 
questions see Appendix). In the first theme, the questions focus on investigating how the 
interviewees define Guanxi as a part of daily life (how do you differentiate between private Guanxi 
and working Guanxi?); what Guanxi exactly means to them (can Guanxi help your personal goals 
such as promotion or special treatment in the workplace?); and the ways or approaches that they 
used for dealing with Guanxi (how do you establish, maintain and fix Guanxi?). Also, the questions 
try to address potential unethical points relating to Guanxi (do you think Guanxi can present any 
ethical dilemmas for you in the workplace?).  
 
In the second theme, interviewees are asked questions on how they define corrupt behaviours in 
the public sector (what do you think corruption is, what kind of activities are involved?); their 
reaction while unethical behaviours emerge (if you know about someone’s unethical activities, to 
what extent do you think you would report them?); what do they think of ‘Hai Rui’ style (to what 
extent do you believe in a ‘Hai Rui’ style of a civil servant?); and how they do perceive corruption 
and cultural factors (to what extent do you think corruption is culturally determined in the Chinese 
public sector?). Here, ‘Hai Rui’ style, which refers to a kind of civil servants’ supreme moral and 
ethical benchmark from Chinese history, is asked to identify the interviewees’ perspective on an 
extremely positive civil servant style. 
 
Moreover, in the final theme, questions concentrated on the relationships between Guanxi and 
corruption through clarifying the potential links between these two variables (do you think there 
is any relationship between Guanxi and corrupt activities?); the role played by Guanxi in 
corruption if possible (how do you differentiate ‘normal’ Guanxi and ‘corrupt’ Guanxi?); if Guanxi 
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has a corrupt essence (some scholars consider Guanxi is normatively negative, what do you think 
about this perspective?); does Guanxi contribute to corruption (can you imagine under what 
circumstances could ‘normal’ Guanxi turn into ‘corrupt’ Guanxi). 
 
In short, these sub-questions are used to address the four main research questions: “To what extent 
is the Chinese civil service a distinctive organisational environment?”; “How do Chinese civil 
servants utilise different Guanxi types in their work?”; “How do perceptions of Chinese civil 
servants push our understanding of the motives and circumstances surrounding corrupt 
organisational behaviour?”; and “To what extent do known theories explain the complex 
relationship between Guanxi and corruption and how do Chinese civil servants perceive it?”. As 
mentioned previously, the sub-questions were generated to encourage the interviewees to show 
their views and opinions. Therefore, during the interview process, not every question was asked 
of interviewees. Normally, the researcher started from the first two or three questions of each 
theme, then some unanticipated questions depending on interviewees’ responses continued to 
progress the interview. After 15-20 minutes, the researcher would shift to the next theme by asking 
more planned questions in order to keep on time. 
 
Generally, the data collection phase of this project lasted for almost half a year. The first 4 months 
were used to contact potential interview participants, and to confirm their consent, as well to 
arrange the time of interviews. The final 2 months were used to undertake the interviews. There 
were 31 interviewees overall that eventually engaged with the research, details of which were 
provided in detail in the previous section. The interviews were conducted face to face in three 
kinds of locations in China: interviewees’ offices and homes and also in hotels for some of them. 
The time taken in each interview was usually between 40-50 minutes. In addition, every interview 
was audio recorded anonymously through participant codes from 1-31. 
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3.2.5 Data Analysis 
After data collection phase, data analysis was proceeded inductively, a thematic analysis approach 
which was given by Gioia et al. (2012) was adopted in order to narrow the huge amount of data 
into manageable. This process of data analysis involves three steps which are 1st order analysis 
and 2nd order analysis, as well as the generation of aggregate dimensions. First of all, the data 
collected were transcribed and translated into English, which was because the interviews were 
conducted in Chinese and recorded through audio files. Then, the 1st order analysis initially 
categorised the raw data basing on the interview records. Informant terms therefore were extracted 
(ibid). Afterwards, those data categories identified in the 1st order analysis were compared and 
summarised, the similarities and differences were carried out, which aimed to reduces the number 
of categories into an applicable level for further analysis. These extracted categories were labelled 
by themes thereafter to be the foundation of 2nd order analysis. In this step, the themes were 
considered and investigated by two questions: ‘if the emerging themes can help the researcher to 
describe and explain the targeted phenomena’ and ‘if the themes can be integrated into those 
emergent or further into aggregate dimensions’ (Gioia et al., 2012). Finally, a data structure was 
established according to the 1st order concepts, 2nd order themes and aggregate dimensions (see 
Figure 10 below). 
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Figure 10: Data structure: a sample of the coding process 
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The example of the detailed analysis process is provided here for illustration on the base of Figure 
10. At first, informant terms were identified for each participant quote as the step of 1st order 
analysis. For instance, a participant claimed that ‘the limitation of supervisory mechanism to the 
superior in the system often makes the superior likes a king’. Therefore, there were two informant 
terms identified for this quote, which were ‘the limitation of supervision’ and ‘the superior likes a 
king’. Also, another participant indicated: ‘if it is the requirement of your superior, no matter 
working or private, then it is the task of work, and it must be unconditionally obeyed’. Here, 
‘unconditionally obeyed’ was the informant term. Similarly, ‘the highest priority’ and ‘otherwise 
in trouble’ were identified according to the quote of ‘the tasks and requirements from the superior 
always and must have the highest priority, otherwise you are in trouble’. Then, the five informant 
terms: ‘the limitation of supervision’, ‘the superior likes a king’, ‘unconditionally obeyed’, the 
highest priority’ and ‘otherwise in trouble’ were categorised into one theme which was the top 
superior’s absolute power at the step of 2nd order analysis. This is because all of the emergent terms 
displayed the unlimited power owned by the top superior can bring serious influence to 
subordinates if they refuse to follow order in the highest priority. Accordingly, the 2nd order theme 
was labelled as ‘absolute power’.  
 
Likewise, through the same process, another 2nd order theme was categorised by ‘unethical risks’ 
that reflects the considerable power of the top superior may bring unethical risks for the 
organisation as there seems to have an absence of limitation to such power. Therefore, by 
combining the two themes: ‘absolute power’ and ‘unethical risks’, a new aggregate dimension was 
emerged, which was ‘the superior is the king’. This was because the feature of unlimited and 
considerable power, and the feature of the strong pressure to force subordinates to follow order 
can easily relate the top superior in the public organisation to the features of a king to some extent. 
Depending on the same way, a full set of data structure was established involving 1st, 2nd order 
themes and aggregate dimensions.  
 
After having the full data structure, the data was managed by two aspects. The first aspect was to 
investigate if these informant terms, themes and dimensions were different or similar to previous 
studies in the literature. If there were differences, then what the differences were and why it had 
such differences. Also, if similarities were carried out, then what the similarities were and why it 
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had such similarities, and if there were any differences in addition to the similarities. The second 
aspect was to investigate if the informant terms, themes and dimensions reflected new concepts 
that were neglected in the literature. In summary, the data collected in this project was sufficiently 
analysed in this way based on the thematic analysis approach of Gioia et al. (2012). 
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Chapter 4.0 Findings 
This chapter presents the analysis of the  31 interviews, organised into four main sections: 
‘organisational environment in the Chinese civil service; ‘Guanxi in the Chinese public sector’; 
‘corruption in the Chinese public sector’; and ‘Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector’. 
First, the Chinese civil service environment is introduced, which includes (1) a typical political 
and power hierarchy - how supervisors do dominate a public organisation; (2) civil servants’ 
common behavioural pattern such as ‘reciprocity’ and ‘ambiguity’; (3) some invisible norms and 
rules such as the ‘grey space’ and ‘renqing’ repayment; (4) traditional culture like the Chinese 
Doctrine of the Mean and the ‘clan culture’, which are reflected in the civil service organisational 
environment. Indeed, some of these display potential risks of generating corruption.  
 
In the second sub-section of this chapter, Guanxi in the public sector is presented. This section 
comprises (1) Guanxi’s characteristics involving its investment feature and transactional essence, 
as well as certain negative consequences of Guanxi that could be related to corruption; (2) three 
types of Guanxi at work; (3) what Guanxi means to civil servants: to achieve personal goals and 
to get special treatment.  
 
The third sub-section introduces corruption in the public sector, which concerns (1) how civil 
servants do define corruption, for instance, the abuse and the privatisation of public power; (2) a 
number of typical forms of corruption such as ‘petty’ and ‘non-traditional’ corruption; (3) potential 
causes of corruption in the public sector, like the absence of effective supervision mechanism and 
the corrupt organisational environment.  
 
Finally, the links between Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector are illustrated. There 
are three ways of Guanxi to promote corruption: (1) the importance of Guanxi could strongly 
motivate people to obtain through unethical ways; (2) Guanxi’s component of ‘reciprocity’ may 
be misused for corruption; (3) Guanxi plays a role of loophole to bypass norms or even laws. In 
addition, Guanxi can effectively reduce the risk of engaging in corruption, also those corruption 
parties are connected depending on Guanxi. However, some perspectives consider that there are 
no inevitable links between Guanxi and corruption.  
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4.1 Organisational environment in the Chinese civil service 
This section presents the general picture concerning the Chinese public sector based on the 
viewpoints of interview participants. The section has seven parts: the superior is the ‘king’ 
(indicates the considerable political power of the superior in the public sector); the ‘reciprocity’ 
action (suggests ‘reciprocity’ is an effective way to build and keep Guanxi, but most civil servants 
seem too fatigued to do it); the ‘grey space’ between ‘reciprocity’ and corruption (refers to an 
unwritten rule in the public sector to judge ‘reciprocity’ and corruption); the custom of ‘ambiguity’ 
(clarifies the negative impact of ‘ambiguity’ custom in the public sector); Chinese Doctrine of the 
Mean (shows the typical culture of ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ in relation to the case of ‘Hai Rui’ in 
the public sector); the custom of ‘clan culture’ (indicates civil servants are used to helping families 
and relatives, which may result in corruption); unavoidable ‘renqing’ (illustrates the importance 
of ‘renqing’ in the public sector, and a widely accepted responsibility to repay ‘renqing’ could 
generate stepping on the ‘red line’). 
 
 
4.1.1 The superior is the ‘king’ 
Numerous participants applied the term of ‘king’ to describe the superior in public organisations. 
The participants thought superiors normally have considerable authority in their power, they can 
easily make trouble for subordinates which ensure that subordinates’ comply and in order for them 
to reach personal goals. Accordingly, the subordinates may be strongly motivated to keep good 
Guanxi with the superior, even though they probably have to engage in or neglect the superior’s 
unethical activities, which is most likely to generate a negative impact to the entire public 
organisation in some cases. 
 
Participants 01 and 06 considered the power of the superior in a public organisation to be virtually 
unlimited: 
 
“The limitations of supervisory mechanisms by the superior in the system often 
makes the superior like a king.” (Participant 01). 
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“Nobody wants to challenge the superior, if you are not in there (the public 
sector), you cannot imagine how powerful they are in the organisation.” 
(Participant 06). 
 
In other words, the public sector seems to lack sufficient mechanisms to avoid the abuse of power 
by the superior. 
 
Then, in the public organisation, subordinates cannot doubt the decisions of their superior, and 
they must obey them, even if the decisions are unreasonable: 
 
“For the task of the superior, as a civil servant, you must first obey. If the task 
is not reasonable, you can make a ‘reminder’ to the superior, but before the 
superior has changed his mind, you still have to implement the task.” 
(Participant 02). 
 
“Any potential decisions in the organisation should ask the supervisor for 
consent. The supervisor always has authority to approve or to prevent the 
decisions. As a subordinate, the only thing you can do is to follow order or to 
gently ‘remind’.” (Participant 29). 
 
In case some subordinates want to find a way to express their different ideas, the only available 
way is probably to ‘remind’ the superior. Before receiving any different instructions, however, the 
former ones still need to be carried out. 
 
In addition, participants 03 and 21 indicated that the tasks from the superior could be regarded as 
an official order, which seems to be compulsory: 
 
“Since this is your superior, you must do your best to do the work assigned by 
him. You can't refuse to do it because you don't agree with certain issues. 
Although you may hold different views, you can keep them, but you have to 
perform the work.” (Participant 03). 
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“Sometimes when you clearly know the decision made by your supervisor is 
wrong, but if they are not going to accept your right suggestions, you would have 
to forget the wrong part and just focus on completing the decision.” (Participant 
21). 
 
There are no possible excuses to refuse to undertake the task, the subordinates must try their best 
to complete it, whether or not they are in agreement.   
 
Also, the superior may apply both organisational and personal requirements in the task. In other 
words, organisational and personal realms are not always distinct. Indeed, any requirement from 
the superior can be a part of the work, which must be obeyed: 
 
“If it is the requirement of your superior, no matter if working or private, then 
it is the task of work, and it must be unconditionally obeyed.” (Participant 07). 
 
“If you work as a driver for the supervisor, one day you get a task to pick the 
superior’s daughter from school. Will you treat this as a working task? Surely 
you will, because this is an order from your supervisor.” (Participant 11). 
 
Even when the superior makes a personal requirement, nevertheless, this needs to be regarded as 
a part of work and needs to be carried out as well as a work-related task. 
 
Moreover, participants 16 and 30 suggested the tasks of the superior probably must be the highest 
priority and must be unconditionally completed: 
 
“The tasks and requirements from the superior must always have the highest 
priority, otherwise you are in trouble.” (Participant 16). 
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“The supervisor has sufficient power to influence your personal life from many 
aspects, such as your work environment, promotion, annual bonus and holiday 
arrangement. Hence, you would better to implement the task quickly and 
unconditionally, to do your best to satisfy the superior.” (Participant 30). 
 
This is because of the superior’s power of creating trouble for the subordinates, such as denying 
their promotion, findings their faults, etc. Therefore, the subordinates normally fear a violation of 
the superior’s order.  
 
A small decision made by the superior may have a decisive impact on a subordinate’s career or 
even life (participants 24 and 27). Accordingly, if the subordinates are willing to carry out the 
order, or are forced to do so, they will still all have to engage in Guanxi with the superior: 
 
“For the requirements of the superior, many subordinates regard them as a 
decree, because the power of the top superior is too great, he can simply 
influence the trajectory of your life with a small decision. So, you have to 
compliment him, have to give gifts, have to build a good Guanxi with him. Then 
corrupt behaviours may occur.” (Participant 24). 
 
“How to build and keep a good Guanxi with your superior? There are two ways. 
At first, sending gifts by any excuses, and secondly, try your best to make the 
supervisor happy.” (Participant 27). 
 
In order to establish and maintain such a Guanxi, the subordinates may not refuse any requests 
from the superior although the requests, on occasion, violate laws or regulations. 
 
Conceivably, if the superior is engaged in certain unethical activities, some subordinates may 
actively participate, as a way to establish a good Guanxi with the superior: 
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“Sometimes, the top superior, or the colleagues around us, get involved in 
corruption, we are more likely to keep silent. Even some people choose to take 
the initiative to join the corruption.” (Participant 24). 
 
“If you are a very upright person, you may not participate in the superior’s 
unethical activities, and I think there seems nobody wants to report it. However, 
if you are in, the superior would surely like you.” (Participant 31). 
 
Even, the others may not be involved, but they are unlikely to report any unethical activities 
because of the superior’s great power over them. 
 
In short, the great power offers a decisive impact from the superior to the public organisation. This 
may because the power of the superior in the public organisation appears to be unlimited, they can 
make almost any decision in the organisation: 
 
“The power of the top superior is too strong. If the top superior is incorrupt, 
then the whole organisation would be relatively incorrupt. If the top superior is 
corrupt, then the whole organisation would also be prone to corruption, because 
the top superior has considerable power to make any decision in the 
organisation.” (Participant 28). 
 
“Corruption cases typically indicate that some corruption conspirators are 
forced or unconscious to be involved. They have no way to obey the superior’s 
corrupt order. Otherwise they could be excluded.” (Participant 31). 
 
The only thing they need is to find an acceptable excuse for the decision made. If the superior is 
involved in unethical activities, the whole organisation may be influenced negatively. 
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In summary, this part shows the ‘king’ feature of superiors in public organisations. Their 
considerable power can have a decisive impact on the organisation and its members, therefore 
subordinates are unlikely to violate superiors’ orders or to report their unethical activities, which 
results in risks of corruption. 
 
 
4.1.2 ‘Reciprocity’ 
The majority of the participants mentioned the importance of ‘reciprocity’ in the Chinese public 
sector. ‘Reciprocity’ is a kind of interpersonal activity on the basis of the exchange of favours (see 
below). On the one hand, it is a part of Chinese traditional culture that is normally used for 
establishing and maintaining Guanxi. On the other hand, although numerous public sector 
members are tired of doing ‘reciprocity’ because it costs too much time and money, they have to 
continue otherwise their future career could be negatively influenced. 
 
Participants 01 and 25 suggested that China is a society deeply marked by Guanxi, and the 
maintenance of Guanxi usually depends on ‘reciprocity’. It is a part of Chinese traditional culture, 
which advocates payment and repayment: 
 
“‘Reciprocity’ emphasises exchange. Essentially, I think it is a kind of equitable 
business. No matter the good you exchange are gifts, favours or even good 
relationships. The key concerns if you make a payment then you should receive 
a repayment. After doing this, you can have a good guanxi.” (Participant 01). 
 
“‘Reciprocity’ is a Chinese tradition and a part of Chinese culture. It 
encourages exchange, you must pay for the others’ repayment, and repay for the 
others’ pay. Then you can keep a good Guanxi with the others. This traditional 
‘propriety’ is in fact a very similar thing to the British ‘gentleman culture’, that 
both are a kind of etiquette.” (Participant 25). 
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In other words, ‘reciprocity’ asks people to carry out the exchange of favours in order to establish 
and maintain better interpersonal relationships. To some extent, the culture of ‘reciprocity’ may 
be similar to the culture of gentlemen in the UK, at least they are all encouraging etiquette. 
 
Then, the actual ‘reciprocity’ in the public sector does not concern an expensive gift or very big 
favour, but small gifts or help (participants 07 and 17). Although ‘reciprocity’ advocates exchange, 
this kind of exchange is of emotional, rather than of material nature: 
 
“You give me a little help at work, next time if you have difficulties, I also help 
you like this in order to appreciate. Alternatively, I bring you a small gift when 
I come back from a trip. This is ‘reciprocity’, it is typically emotional. We use 
this to appreciate and keep Guanxi.” (Participant 07). 
 
“The value of the gifts used for ‘reciprocity’ is not that important. The gift sender 
and the receiver only care about the meaning of the gifts but how much they are. 
For example, you may use a small souvenir as a gift, but it is meaningful as you 
specially bring it from a beautiful tourist attraction.” (Participant 17). 
 
The gift sent or the favour given is just a way to express feelings like kinship and friendship, to 
show appreciation for any help, or to keep a better interpersonal relationship. 
 
In addition, participants 08 and 25 pointed out that ‘reciprocity’ is based on the presumption that 
if someone offers another a favour or a gift, the other has to offer the same back. This is the 
etiquette, if anyone of the parties violates the rule, the other would be offended: 
 
“Equality is a significant part of ‘reciprocity’. The gifts or favours used for 
exchange must be equal. If someone gives you a gift, but you do not give back, 
that person would think you are impolite.” (Participant 08). 
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“Reciprocity’ means that you give me a gift, I also want to pay you a gift, so that 
we all get the satisfaction of etiquette. Otherwise the other side would think you 
are not reliable, you are giving offence to the etiquette. If so, you would have a 
new enemy.” (Participant 25). 
 
In the public sector, offending someone means making an adversary, this adversary is likely to 
result in big trouble to the actor in the future. 
 
Those who received favours but refuse to repay the favours would give out the message that they 
are selfish and ungrateful, according to participants 09 and 11. Their negative reputation would 
spread in their circle and working place: 
 
“If someone helped you, you should find an opportunity to return this favour. 
This is a kind of heartfelt gratitude, which is very normal in China. Otherwise 
your reputation would be badly influenced, nobody would make friends with you. 
You are losing help.” (Participant 09). 
 
“In the public sector, you need friends, as much as possible. The reason that why 
people always keep Guanxi carefully is because of this. If you only take but not 
pay here, people would know you are selfish, they would not make friends with 
you. To you, it is not a good news for sure.” (Participant 11). 
 
Such people are most likely to be excluded, which is the worst position to be in the public sector 
where you would not gain any help when in trouble. 
 
However, although ‘reciprocity’ is a way to establish and maintain Guanxi in the public sector, 
some civil servants are tired of it (participants 13 and 15), due to the cost of money, time and 
energy: 
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“Doing ‘reciprocity’ is costly and painstaking, nobody likes it, but everybody 
has to do it. You have to spend the majority of your salary to buy gifts and spend 
much time on thinking about the gifts, even on the ‘delivery’. You do not do 
‘reciprocity’, you do not have Guanxi. You do not have Guanxi in the system, 
you have nothing.” (Participant 13). 
 
“Sending gifts can be regarded as a China’s specific ‘technique’. You have to 
think a lot of things such as how much the gift will be, what kind of gift is most 
applicable, how and when to send the gift that can ensure the receiver to take it. 
You have to consider these points because the public sector is a sensitive sector.” 
(Participant 15). 
 
The gift-giver spends much on the gifts, which may generate financial pressure. Also, gift-giving 
in the working place is normally not a good idea, the gift-giver thus needs to go to the gift-taker’s 
home, which costs additional time. Lastly, the gift-giver needs to consider the value of gifts, not 
too cheap and not too expensive, which takes a lot of energy.  
 
Similarly, although the process of ‘reciprocity’ may cost too much, civil servants have to be 
involved as it is good for Guanxi (participants 17 and 21). This contradiction leads civil servants 
to a dilemma: 
 
“‘Reciprocity’ is positive for the establishment and maintenance of Guanxi. 
Although its function in our Guanxi society is very obvious, Chinese people are 
tired of it. Each holiday, you have to give gifts to the superior, to express your 
respect. The result is that both parties are tired, but you all have to do this 
because of Guanxi.” (Participant 17). 
 
“People in the public sector is forced to participate in ‘reciprocity’. Indeed, 
some seem born to good at it, and they inherently enjoy doing it. However, not 
everyone like ‘reciprocity’, but they cannot escape because otherwise they would 
have no Guanxi.” (Participant 21). 
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Subordinates are tired of giving gifts because they have to send them in every festival without fail. 
Superiors are likewise tired of taking gifts because they may receive too many gifts in festivals, 
which cannot be rejected. It seems that everyone in the public sector is made to participate, 
otherwise Guanxi could be negatively affected. 
 
Moreover, according to participants 13 and 19, the inevitable ‘reciprocity’ in the public sector is 
not only because of building Guanxi, but the hierarchy of power also forces organisational 
members to do ‘reciprocity’. Members at the bottom of a public organisation need to do 
‘reciprocity’ towards the middle. Likewise, those at the middle need to do ‘reciprocity’ to the top. 
Also, members at the top need to do ‘reciprocity’ to the top leader: 
 
“Everyone is pondering, you ponder your superior, and your superior is 
pondering his superior. No one really likes to do this, but everyone has to do it. 
You can board the chain of power only if you are involved as a component.” 
(Participant 13). 
 
“The public sector can be regarded as a pyramid with hundreds of levels which 
are connected by Guanxi chains. Each level should engage in ‘reciprocity’ to 
keep good Guanxi with the higher level, and even the lower level.” (Participant 
19). 
 
Indeed, there is no need for the top leader to do ‘reciprocity’ in this organisation, but the top leader 
may still need to do the same to those of the superior organisation. Therefore, working in the public 
sector, nobody can escape ‘reciprocity’, although nobody likes it. 
 
In summary, this part displays the importance of ‘reciprocity’ in the public sector. Although it is 
an effective way to build and keep Guanxi, civil servants are usually forced to be involved because 
of the high cost and the price of refusing to participate. 
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4.1.3 The ‘grey space’ between ‘reciprocity’ and corruption 
A number of participants referred to the ‘grey space’ between ‘reciprocity’ and corruption. The 
anti-corruption department in the public sector allows a certain amount of grey space between 
‘reciprocity’ and corruption as well as the difficulty in differentiating between them specifically. 
Such a concept exists in most regions of China, both developed and undeveloped.  
 
According to participants 27 and 28, ‘reciprocity’ belongs to a part of Chinese traditional culture, 
people use ‘reciprocity’ as a way to build and keep Guanxi. In general, ‘reciprocity’ originally 
means to exchange small gifts or favours for expressing emotions such as gratitude and friendship, 
which can be regarded as a common Chinese etiquette: 
 
“‘Reciprocity’ is our traditional culture, which is extremely difficult to 
substantially put an end to, both inside and outside the system.” (Participant 
27). 
 
“You can find nowhere in China that people do not participate in ‘reciprocity’. 
This is because it is the Confucian culture itself. A social etiquette which exists 
in Chinese daily life.” (Participant 28). 
 
Therefore, both civil servants in the public sector or ordinary people out of the public sector are 
participating in this. 
 
However, the difference between ‘reciprocity’ and corruption is probably hard to identify 
(participants 09 and 27). ‘Reciprocity’ and corruption all comprise a process of exchange, they use 
similar forms to perform, such as gift-giving and benefits exchange: 
 
“The main difficulty to identify ‘reciprocity’ and corruption is to investigate the 
actor’s intention. Although both of the behaviours include exchange, there is a 
difference between them. ‘Reciprocity’ essentially exchanges emotions, while 
corruption essentially exchanges benefits.” (Participant 09). 
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“In general, the difference between ‘reciprocity’ and corruption is often difficult 
to identify. In most cases, we consider what people’s intentions are from the 
outset. Although we all know that this is an effective and accurate way to judge 
corruption or not, as a law enforcer, you have no way to know the real ‘intention’ 
of the party involved.” (Participant 27). 
 
In terms of the anti-corruption department in the public sector, identifying the ‘intention’ 
could be an effective way to divide ‘reciprocity’ and corruption. Namely, if the activity 
is intended to serve private benefits by using public power, it is corruption, otherwise it 
is not. Nevertheless, identifying the real ‘intention’ can be impractical in most cases. 
 
In order to identify the difference, therefore the anti-corruption department has an allocated value 
range, calling the ‘grey space’ in the normal ‘reciprocity’, such as 1,000 Chinese Yuan: 
 
“For the party’s disciplinary commission, there is an unwritten rule that we 
allow a certain amount of ‘grey space’. Namely, you can send a gift of any kind, 
but its value cannot go beyond a certain amount. For instance, if the qualified 
amount is 1,000 Chinese Yuan, you are corrupt if your gift’s value is over 1,000 
Chinese Yuan, otherwise you are not.” (Participant 24). 
 
“I think they (the department of anti-corruption) have set a ‘grey space’ for the 
gift used for ‘reciprocity’. This is because if you cannot completely prohibit such 
activities, it is a good idea to legalise it under particular rules or regulations.” 
(Participant 25). 
 
In other words, the ‘reciprocity’ activities which cost below 1,000 Chinese Yuan are acceptable 
and legal, otherwise they could be identified as corruption. Here, the 1,000 Chinese Yuan is an 
unwritten ‘standard’ of ‘reciprocity’. 
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Moreover, according to participants 07 and 24, such a ‘grey space’ could exist in the public sector 
everywhere in China, not only in the developed regions but also in the undeveloped regions of this 
country. The difference is the range allowed: 
 
“The ‘grey space’ always come with ‘reciprocity’ in everywhere of China, unless 
one day the anti-corruption authority clearly defines ‘reciprocity’ as a kind of 
unethical behaviour and announce it is illegal.” (Participant 07). 
 
“Although the amount is not constant and different regions or even different 
superiors may have different definitions about the amount, there is a ‘grey space’ 
like this everywhere in China.” (Participant 24). 
 
The developed regions such as Shanghai and Beijing may have a higher range, but the undeveloped 
regions such as those provinces located at the middle and the west of China may have a lower 
range. This is because there is no way to illegalise ‘reciprocity’, so the authority has to set a 
‘standard’.  
 
In short, this part illustrates that a certain amount of grey space between ‘reciprocity’ and 
corruption is allowed in the public sector to differentiate them specifically. This exists in every 
region of China, the difference is that the developed region may set a higher among, but the 
undeveloped region may set a lower. 
 
 
4.1.4 The custom of ‘ambiguity’ 
The custom of ‘ambiguity’ in the public sector was pointed out by most of the participants. 
Ambiguity exists not only to be a kind of Chinese communication skill but also appears to be 
imperfect laws and regulations that offer opportunities for corrupt speculators. In addition, the 
‘ambiguous’ custom is likely to promote the emergence of a Guanxi focus and the issue of 
unfairness.  
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Being ‘indirect’ could be one of the most popular communication skills in the Chinese public 
sector. People in the public sector never express their real ideas directly, they prefer an indirect 
way, which is called ‘ambiguity’: 
 
“People in the public sector would never directly say, ‘If you want to do this, 
you must give me that’. They would be very ‘ambiguous’, just to let you to 
‘express’ your appreciation.” (Participant 07). 
 
“When you think some decisions made by your superior or colleagues are 
wrong, you can let them know. However, you have to be very careful. You cannot 
just tell them they are wrong, you have to be gentle, be ‘indirect’ and especially 
not to challenge them.” (Participant 10). 
 
For example, corrupt parties would not use the terms in association with corruption, they use more 
reasonable and acceptable words to disguise their activities, such as ‘express appreciation’. A same 
example can be found concerning how to provide suggestions to the superior or colleagues, the 
subordinates have to be careful and to avoid violation.  
 
In addition, according to participants 01 and 16, the ‘ambiguous’ custom is not only to do with 
Chinese communication skills, but it can also be found in official laws and regulations. Typically, 
this offers opportunities to those in power to interpret things in self-serving ways: 
 
“Examples can be found in many ‘documents’ that are given order by the higher-
level section: ‘strictly abide’, ‘large amount’ and ‘serious violation’. However, 
they barely give a benchmark to these terms.” (Participant 01). 
 
“There were a lot of ambiguous definitions in laws and regulations, such as 
‘serious violation of discipline’ and ‘large amount’. To what extent it is 
‘serious’, what amount is called ‘large’, there is no accurate definition. Some 
people think that tens of thousands are large, and some people think that tens of 
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millions are. This is the contradiction and vulnerability, which could be easily 
exploited.” (Participant 16). 
 
For example, some expressions in anti-corruption laws concerning the crime of financial 
corruption are like: ‘serious violation of discipline’ or ‘a large amount of money’. Nevertheless, 
the definition of ‘serious violation’ and ‘a large amount’ is not provided. Although this may offer 
certain judgemental freedom to the judge for judgement according to the actual conditions, this 
could also generate ambiguity and partial explanations. An unclear explanation may lead to 
different understandings, which, to some extent, could become loopholes. 
 
Therefore, participants 13 and 17 suggested such loopholes in Chinese laws and regulations may 
offer speculative opportunities. A typical example is the process of promotion. Promotion usually 
needs the permission of the superior. The ‘ambiguous’ nature of some promotion regulations 
means that management can promote the subordinate they prefer instead of fairly allocating such 
opportunities to candidates based on their abilities. Regulations require the candidate to be 
‘excellent’, but there is no clear definition of ‘excellence’ in the regulations. 
 
“The loopholes of laws and regulations provide space for speculators. For 
example, some regulations of promotion require the candidate to be ‘excellent’ 
enough, but there is no definition for ‘excellence’. So, in the end, it is all decided 
by those in power, which is typically exclusionary.” (Participant 13). 
 
“As the considerable power owned by the top superior of the organisation, your 
promotion, your bonus and any benefits you can get from your job rely on this 
person’s decision. In fact, whether you are truly excellent or not is not important 
here. The only matter is if this person thinks you are excellent.” (Participant 17). 
 
As a result, the superior has room to define ‘excellence’. They may consider that having strong 
work skills means ‘excellent’, but they can also consider having a good Guanxi with a subordinate 
makes the latter ‘excellent’. If the superior has a target candidate, they can just apply the definition 
to the target. In other words, if the target candidate has some advantages over competitors, then 
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the superior can consider having these advantages means ‘excellent’, which fulfils the requirement 
of promotion. In contrast, for those competitors having no such advantages, they are therefore 
losing the opportunity of promotion. 
 
Also, the ambiguity in laws and rules provides space to the emergence of Guanxi in the public 
sector (participants 13 and 19). If candidates can obtain the opportunity of promotion through their 
good Guanxi with the superior instead of through qualified work skills, they are most likely to try 
their best to engage in Guanxi: 
 
“Guanxi has the existence of foundation because of the ‘ambiguity’. You would 
have an ‘excellent’ judgement depending on good Guanxi with those in power, 
even if you are not ‘excellent’ in reality. On the other hand, you would never get 
the ‘excellent’ judgement no matter how good you are if you have bad Guanxi 
with those in power.” (Participant 13). 
 
“People in the public sector only focus on Guanxi because of ‘ambiguity’. 
Through Guanxi, they can be ‘excellent’. Such ‘excellence’ can surely help their 
promotion or many things in association with the benefits from their jobs.” 
(Participant 19). 
 
Namely, an actually excellent candidate can be even more ‘excellent’ because of the good Guanxi 
with the superior, an unqualified candidate can be ‘excellent’ likewise because of the good Guanxi. 
Conversely, a lack of good Guanxi with the superior can ‘downgrade’ an otherwise skilled 
candidate. 
 
Arguably, ambiguity appears to promote injustice. According to participant 28, to a person in 
power, certain things in the public sector can either be done or not done, both choices are unable 
to violate any rules or regulations. People having Guanxi can make the person in power to do 
something to achieve private targets, but the others, having no such Guanxi, cannot do the same 
thing. This is a typical injustice: 
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“Depending on our Guanxi, I can either do this for you or I can refuse to do it, 
both are fine as there is no violation of the rules in any case. For example, in 
order to obtain a place in a high-quality school, I can give it to you or to anyone 
else, as long as the person I give it to is qualified, I would not violate any of the 
laws or regulations. Although the allocation may rely on our Guanxi, this is 
certainly not corruption, at best this is an issue of unfairness.” (Participant 28). 
 
In this instance, a high-quality school for children only serves the members of a certain public 
organisation. Theoretically, all of the members can obtain a place when they need it. However, the 
quotas for each year are limited, which means some children can go to the school if their parents 
can obtain a place in this year, but the others have to wait till next year. There is a significant 
authority on the part of the allocator about whose child can go to the school this year or who 
cannot, therefore it is dependent on the allocator’s decision. No matter what decision the allocator 
makes, it is not violating any regulations or disciplines. Those having a good Guanxi with the 
allocator may inevitably have a higher priority in securing a place, which is unjust for those having 
no such good Guanxi. 
 
In summary, this demonstrates the custom of ‘ambiguity’ in the public sector. Such a custom may 
appear to be a loophole in the laws and regulations, which could be utilised by unethical civil 
servants that lead to corruption. Additionally, ‘ambiguity’ can promote unfair use of Guanxi.   
 
 
4.1.5 Chinese Doctrine of the Mean 
The interview asked the participants about their perspectives concerning ‘Hai Rui’. As a civil 
servant in history, ‘Hai Rui’ was famous for his extremely upright acting style. Most of the 
participants expressed their negative viewpoints in terms of ‘Hai Rui’ in the public sector. Firstly, 
‘Hai Rui’ appears to be unwelcome by colleagues including the superior and subordinates because 
of the ‘extremely upright’ and ‘direct’ acting style of ‘Hai Rui’ as opposed to the traditional 
Doctrine of the Mean. The most likely consequence of ‘Hai Rui’ is to be moved to a less visible 
position. Secondly, the public service environment is probably unable to promote the appearance 
104 
 
of ‘Hai Rui’ as the majority may choose to be involved in Guanxi to gain opportunities for personal 
career development. 
 
According to participants 03 and 09, people like ‘Hai Rui’ would not be welcome in the public 
sector. This is because of their extremely upright style, the others may exclude them, which means 
they are unlikely to make any friends: 
 
“Such people like ‘Hai Rui’ cannot live in the existing system. They are ‘beyond 
normal’, they are too upright. No one would like you, you would be marginalised 
and would not have any opportunities.” (Participant 03). 
 
“People in the public sector need friends much more than in the private sector. 
This is because in many cases such as promotion or job transfer, you will need 
helps. ‘Hai Rui’ is a good example in history, but there is no virtual value for 
reference, as such a person is not likely to have friends.” (Participant 09). 
 
This could be one of the worst positions to be in the public sector because having no friends means 
a significant disadvantage for civil servants, which is the absence of Guanxi. Although Guanxi 
may not be a decisive factor in most instances, it becomes important in certain cases when 
attractive opportunities appear, such as promotion. Without good Guanxi from their colleagues, 
‘Hai Rui’ could not take opportunities like this. 
 
Similarly, participants 06 and 12 suggested, whilst in the public sector, people like ‘Hai Rui’ are 
the minority and would appear to be unwelcome. The reason is that they do not participate in 
Guanxi: 
 
“No matter in what era, these people like ‘Hai Rui’ are the minority, because 
they are too extreme. It is difficult for the others to accept a person who has 
barely been involved in any Guanxi.” (Participant 06). 
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“One of the most significant features of ‘Hai Rui’ is the ‘extreme upright’. A 
personality like this is inherently away from good Guanxi with the others. 
Therefore, people like this are unwelcome in the public sector.” (Participant 12). 
 
In the public sector, ignoring Guanxi is unsociable and impersonal. The others may consider ‘Hai 
Rui’ is too extreme and unable to be accepted. 
 
Furthermore, participants 20 and 24 pointed out the case of Chinese Doctrine of the Mean in the 
public sector. A distinctive person in the group could be easily separated and marginalised: 
 
“If a member in the group is not as same as the others, the member could easily 
be excluded, separated, and marginalised. The environment of the system is not 
so upright, an upright and even extremely upright person would thus inevitably 
be excluded.” (Participant 20). 
 
“If the overall environment is not upright, then you cannot be upright. This could 
be a reflection of our collective culture. Otherwise the others may treat you as a 
freak, just like the bullying behaviours in the school.” (Participant 24). 
 
In general, the public service environment is not too upright, so extremely upright people like ‘Hai 
Rui’ could be regarded as eccentric ones that may be excluded by their colleagues inevitably. 
 
Also, acting like ‘Hai Rui’ in the public sector would lead to someone being unable to get support 
from the superior (participants 12 and 14). The style of ‘Hai Rui’ could be too ‘direct’ or ‘Western’ 
to some superiors: 
 
“Many superiors can accept a subordinate who goes against their decisions but 
not in the way of ‘Hai Rui’. That way is a Western style which goes straight 
without caring about Guanxi. The way may be accepted in the West but not in 
China as its incompatibility with traditional Chinese Doctrine of the Mean.” 
(Participant 12). 
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“In history, ‘Hai Rui’ was famous for his candid attitude to point out the 
superior’s mistakes. However, in the public sector today, a wise idea is to neglect 
or to ‘reminder’ your superior. In this event, you have fulfilled your 
responsibility, and your superior would be happy about the way you do.” 
(Participant 14). 
 
Normally, the ‘Hai Rui’ would directly point out the problems or mistakes made by the superior, 
but the great majority of the superior in the public sector dislike such a style as this is opposite to 
the traditional Chinese culture of ‘the Doctrine of the Mean’. The superior may think if someone, 
especially the subordinates, point out their mistakes directly but ambiguously, they are losing 
‘face’, which is because the action could lead to a negative impact to their leadership. 
 
In addition, participants 25 and 27 suggested that the style of ‘Hai Rui’ in the public sector is also 
unwelcome by subordinates. For those who work like ‘Hai Rui’ that lack of necessary attention on 
Guanxi, even if they are the superior, could lead to them being opposed by their subordinates: 
 
“Working in the system, if you are distinctive, unlike the others involved in 
Guanxi, you would be countered. You cannot hold the position if you are one of 
the superiors. Your superior and subordinates would work to collaboratively 
transfer you away from the management position and move you to a fringe 
department for old age.” (Participant 25). 
 
“As a supervisor, you cannot use ‘Hai Rui’ style to treat your subordinates. They 
would think you are overly harsh and captious. This can seriously weaken your 
leadership. On the other hand, the higher-level may think you are not the 
application to a supervisory position, and then you could be transferred.” 
(Participant 27). 
 
The subordinates are most likely to counter them, to refuse their orders, and to treat them as 
enemies. In the end, their subordinates and superiors may collaborate to move them to insignificant 
positions without any impact. 
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Similarly, participants 03 and 10 stated a similar perspective that the most likely result of ‘Hai 
Rui’ in the public sector is to be kicked out of significant positions. ‘Hai Rui’ may survive in the 
public sector, but they are probably unable to take significant jobs: 
 
 
“In the public sector, you must learn to untie the majority, otherwise you can do 
nothing, even though you have power. ‘Hai Rui’ apparently cannot satisfy this 
requirement, hence predictably, such a person is unable to get an important 
position.” (Participant 03). 
 
“People like ‘Hai Rui’ can survive in the system, but the job of such people 
should be adjusted. That is to say, their job should be adjusted from an important 
position to another, unimportant one.” (Participant 10). 
 
The significant jobs usually need collaboration from group members, but ‘Hai Rui’ has no support 
from colleagues. Therefore, if ‘Hai Rui’ hold significant positions in the public sector, they would 
probably be adjusted into less visible positions. 
 
Moreover, ‘Hai Rui’ in the public sector are fading because the public service environment is not 
friendly towards them (participants 10 and 19). The majority of people working in the public sector 
tend to engage in Guanxi as it is necessary in order to obtain benefits for their personal career. If 
the public service environment  is very upright, the members are more likely to pick the way of 
‘Hai Rui’. Conversely, if the public service environment is not upright, or even corrupt, the 
members then have to make a choice that leads to them being marginalised or promoted: 
 
 
“People have to make sacrifice for working in the public sector. A real ‘Hai Rui’ 
may have no such opportunity to become a civil servant. Therefore, those people 
working in the public sector, they are unlikely to be ‘Hai Rui’. Some of them 
could be, but they must be very good at disguise as the environment.” 
(Participant 10). 
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“Today, there is no ‘Hai Rui’ in the system, because nobody can become ‘Hai 
Rui’, such people would never be promoted. The big environment makes you very 
sleek as a civil servant. You cannot have your own personality, you cannot be 
‘straight’, or at least you have to hide your personality deeply before you can 
take the high position.” (Participant 19). 
 
In most cases, the majority may choose the promotion. In order to gain opportunities, people in 
the public sector have to be sleek and to hide everything in their mind, unlike the way of ‘Hai Rui’ 
which shows their upright purpose ‘directly’. 
 
Furthermore, every organisation has its distinctive organisational environment, and the members 
inside have to adapt to the environment. The public sector also has a specific way of doing things, 
which appears to oppose the way of ‘Hai Rui’: 
 
“Each organisation has a unique ‘ecology’, same as the public sector. The 
‘ecology’ in the system is substantially unsuitable for the survival of ‘Hai Rui’. 
Namely, people in such an ‘ecology’ cannot be ‘Hai Rui’. Everybody is doing 
this, but you want to be immune, then you would be inevitably excluded and 
marginalised. This is the reality.” (Participant 25). 
 
Accordingly, people like ‘Hai Rui’ do not basically belong to the public sector. Although some 
candidates have ambitions to be ‘Hai Rui’ before entering the public sector, they have to change 
their mind and adapt themselves to the environment after entry, otherwise they could be 
marginalised. Therefore, in such an environment, upright people cannot become ‘Hai Rui’. 
 
In short, this part displays the plight of ‘Hai Rui’ in the public sector, which relates to Chinese 
Doctrines of the Mean. In general, ‘Hai Rui’ are probably excluded by their colleagues, superiors 
and subordinates, this may be because of the negative public service environment. 
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4.1.6 The ‘clan culture’ 
Some participants talked about the custom of ‘clan culture’ reflected in the public sector. In short, 
it refers to a kind of collectively accepted action pattern that makes power-owners, either 
intentionally or forcedly, to fulfil the responsibility of providing help to families and relatives. 
Otherwise, the power-owners can be blamed by their families or be excluded from Guanxi 
networks by relatives. Also, the ‘clan culture’ may have certain relationships with the generation 
of corruption in the public sector. 
 
The atmosphere of Chinese society asks those in power to take care of their families and relatives 
(participants 15 and 20). This is a long historical custom. In the public sector, civil servants may 
suffer blame if they are unable to do so: 
 
“In China, if you have power but refuse to help relatives and friends, people 
would think that you are selfish and merciless. This has been the case for 
thousands of years.” (Participant 15). 
 
“When you get a powerful position in the public sector, of course you have ‘help’ 
the relatives. This is a tradition which lasts for thousands of years, an important 
component of Chinese culture, and a specific reflection of our responsibility to 
the family and the clan.” (Participant 20). 
 
Refusing to carry out such a responsibility of Chinese traditional culture may generate negative 
labels for civil servants’ personal reputation, such as selfishness. 
 
Similarly, participants 05 and 20 considered one of the most significant points of Guanxi in the 
public sector to be the interpersonal use between parties. In order to build and maintain Guanxi, to 
keep a position in a certain Guanxi network, the actor may have to provide reasonable help in 
response to the other Guanxi parties’ asking: 
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“In the public sector, those in power more or less have to provide ‘helps’ to their 
relatives or friends. This is because providing such helps is good for keeping 
Guanxi. Even though you have got a high position, you will need a good Guanxi 
with your relatives or friends sooner or later as they can help you more or less. 
You help more, you have more friends, and vice versa.” (Participant 05). 
 
“Your negative reputation would be spread if you usually refuse to respond to 
requests of those having good Guanxi with you. One of the basic rules of Guanxi 
is that the parties should be useful to each other. In this case, potential ‘friends’ 
would not make friends with you as they are concerned about your reliability of 
providing help. In the end, you would be excluded from this circle.” (Participant 
20). 
 
This action can raise the actor’s profile and can indicate a clear signal to the others that the actor 
has power and an intention to offer favours, which makes them valuable to make friends with and 
to be involved in this network. 
 
Accordingly, participants 16 and 27 summarised these as China’s ‘clan culture’. Those in power 
are normally expected to offer favours to relatives and friends, which could be a way to fulfil 
individual responsibility and to produce benefits to the entire ‘clan’: 
 
 “The Chinese people have a kind of ‘clan culture’. When you have power, you 
should promote your relatives and friends, otherwise you would be blamed 
seriously.” (Participant 16). 
 
“The Chinese people care about the ‘clan’. This could be a part of traditional 
collective action pattern. To provide ‘helps’ to the ‘clan’ is not only because of 
personal interest such as keeping Guanxi, but also concerns moral requirements 
in tradition.” (Participant 27). 
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For those who are unable to fulfil this responsibility, they are most likely to be blamed by the other 
members of the ‘clan’. In the public sector, this could become a kind of moral pressure to civil 
servants. 
 
Furthermore, this point reflects that the generation of corruption in the public sector may be as a 
result of the ‘clan culture’ (participants 01 and 29). Normally, civil servants in the public sector 
can have a relatively good life, which could reduce their motivation to engage in corruption for 
obtaining extra private benefits.  
 
“Some civil servants participate in corruption not because of their private 
benefits, but because of the other ‘clan’ members’ benefits. They hope the others 
can also get a better life like themselves.” (Participant 01). 
 
“In many cases, the civil servants’ participate in corruption not only for 
themselves but also for their children. This is because our concept of ‘clan’ is 
strong, we have responsibilities to the next generation and the entire ‘clan’. 
Having a good life individually is not enough, we hope the whole ‘clan’ can also 
have this.” (Participant 29). 
 
However, the culture of ‘clan’ appears to cause them dissatisfaction, although their individual life 
is good. They probably think they have responsibilities to ensure the next generation and the other 
members of the ‘clan’ can also have such a good life. Thus, they could be involved in corruption 
because of private benefits, also the benefits of the ‘clan’. 
 
Moreover, participant 05 suggested the potential relationships between corruption and the custom 
of taking care of families and relatives through a Chinese saying: “when a man achieves the Dao, 
his poultry and dogs rise to Heaven”: 
 
“The Chinese say ‘when a man achieves the Dao, his poultry and dogs rise to 
Heaven’. When you get power in the system, everyone close to you wants to share 
the cake. They would send you gifts, and you have to accept, otherwise they may 
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think you are indifferent. However, this brings risks of corruption.” (Participant 
05). 
 
In other words, once a person obtains power in the public sector, it is reasonable for the person to 
do favours to relatives. In turn, the relatives sending gifts to express gratitude is also reasonable. 
Although civil servants who are involved in such activities may do so because of their individual 
responsibilities to families and relatives, or the intention to avoid a negative personal reputation, 
at least the risk of engaging in corruption can be improved. 
 
To sum up, this part shows the ‘clan culture’ in the public sector. Civil servants usually have 
responsibility to take care of relatives and friends, otherwise they could be blamed, which may 
result in the risk of corruption. This is because civil servants may treat the responsibility in a higher 
priority than observing regulations and rules. 
 
 
4.1.7 ‘Renqing’ 
‘Renqing’ was widely discussed by the participants as a determinant influencing civil servants’ 
behaviours in the Chinese public sector. It is normally described as a similar concept to the favours 
interpersonally exchanged, which is unavoidable because it forms the foundation of Guanxi 
relationships. Also, there is an unwritten rule in order to ensure ‘renqing’ repayment, which is that 
people who refuse to repay ‘renqing’ would be shamed and lose Guanxi. Nevertheless, as some 
civil servants may step over the ‘red line’ to fulfil the repayment in order to prevent shame and 
losing Guanxi, such a rule can result in unethical activities. Therefore, ‘renqing’ may be prior than 
the regulation, to some extent, in the public sector. 
 
According to participants 05 and 06, ‘renqing’ refers to the other name of favours provided 
between Guanxi parties, which can be regarded as a kind of invisible currency. In other words, a 
Guanxi party offers a favour (‘renqing’) to another party, then the other party owes a ‘renqing’ to 
the former party: 
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“China is a ‘renqing’ society, ‘renqing’ can be regarded as favours, which is 
the exchange entity of Guanxi. Sometimes you may feel that an ‘acquaintance’ 
can bring much convenience for you to reach a purpose. The ‘acquaintance’ is 
someone having a good personal Guanxi with you, or someone who owes you 
‘renqing’.” (Participant 05). 
 
“‘Renqing’ is the main currency using for the exchange in the public sector, 
because it is not illegal. You can make this currency by offering favours and pay 
this currency by asking favours. (Participant 06). 
 
In this case, the other party is the ‘acquaintance’ to the former party as the ‘renqing’ owed. When 
it is necessary, the former party can ask the ‘acquaintance’ for help, and then the other party has 
to repay the ‘renqing’ as help. 
 
Accordingly, ‘renqing’ is one of the basic components of Guanxi relationship, without ‘renqing’, 
Guanxi parties cannot be related. Depending on the exchange of ‘renqing’, the actors’ Guanxi can 
become closer:  
 
“If you want to have Guanxi, then you must have ‘renqing’ first. Once people 
accept your gifts or favours, they owe you ‘renqing’, and vice versa. Through 
fulfilling these ‘renqing’, your Guanxi becomes closer and closer.” (Participant 
08). 
 
 
“China is a Guanxi society, also it is a ‘renqing’ society. This is because Guanxi 
works on the basis of ‘renqing’, ‘renqing’ links Guanxi parties. It is therefore 
unlikely to avoid the impact of ‘renqing’, whether inside or outside the system.” 
(Participant 27). 
 
In China, such a Guanxi society, civil servants are unlikely to escape ‘renqing’ exchange in the 
public sector, otherwise they may fail to engage in important Guanxi relationships. 
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In addition, participants 06 and 20 considered ‘renqing’ as a kind of etiquette in the public sector 
that the rule of repayment is widely accepted: 
 
“If you owe someone ‘renqing’, you will have to repay it one day. This unwritten 
but widely accepted rule is extremely important in the public sector. A person 
who violates the rule will suffer serious consequence such as losing Guanxi.” 
(Participant 06). 
 
“‘Renqing’ is a part of public etiquette in China. You treat people good if they 
treated you well, you help people if they helped you, which is the way to repay 
‘renqing’. If someone refuses to do it like this in the system, we call it 
‘ungratefulness’.” (Participant 20). 
 
Rejecting repayment of the ‘renqing’ received is unacceptable, and blame could be allocated. The 
actor’s reputation may be seriously affected, and important Guanxi can be broken. Also, ‘renqing’ 
consists of not only favours but also special treatments. 
 
Furthermore, the repayment rule of ‘renqing’ reflects an ethical part of Chinese culture (participant 
27). Providing reasonable favours to the other party in a Guanxi relationship, when it is necessary, 
is a way of maintaining Guanxi: 
 
“This is basically Chinese culture. China is a ‘renqing’ society, and the system 
is the same. If you refuse to provide help when I ask for it, and you have the 
ability to offer that help in fact, then you would offend me. Our Guanxi would be 
broken, and the others would shame you.” (Participant 27). 
 
This could be a kind of responsibility to Guanxi parties, that anyone refusing to fulfil the 
responsibility may be regarded as a violator of ethics which could bring numerous negative 
consequences such as destructive effects to Guanxi and losing face. 
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However, the unwritten rule of repaying ‘renqing’ can result in unethical risks, certain activities 
to repay ‘renqing’ in the public sector may step over the ‘red line’: 
 
 “Reasonable in ‘renqing’, but not acceptable in the law.” (Participant 15). 
 
“There are some people who care about ‘renqing’ more than norms. If the actor 
has no power, the negative impact may be limited. Nevertheless, if the actor is a 
powerful public official, then it is hard to say the person would never violate any 
norms to repay ‘renqing’. In some extreme cases, corruption is resulted by this 
way.” (Participant 25). 
 
If civil servants consider ‘renqing’ repayment is much more important than observing the 
regulations and the rules, they may violate the law in order to fulfil the repayment. Such activities 
are emotionally reasonable but legally unacceptable (participants 15 and 25). 
 
Therefore, ‘renqing’ could be a greater determinant than regulation in the public sector, or even 
the law. Having Guanxi, which means having ‘renqing’, can make things the highest priority, even 
stepping over the ‘red line’ is needed: 
 
“The reason why Guanxi matters in the public sector is because of ‘renqing’. 
This invisible capital can lead you to somewhere that the others have no way to 
reach. You can get legal things done quickly and in good quality, also you may 
get some unethical things done if your ‘renqing’ is valuable enough.” 
(Participant 22). 
 
“‘Renqing’ is above the regulation in some cases, even the law. If you have 
‘renqing’, your Guanxi is good, and then the regulation is the complement.” 
(Participant 31). 
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On the other hand, regulations come after ‘renqing’ that play complementary rules, which probably 
only work when ‘renqing’ is not involved. To sum up, ‘renqing’ is a significant component of 
Guanxi, this part illustrates its compulsory repayment feature and the potential unethical risks of 
its use. 
 
In summary, this section presents a general picture of the Chinese public sector, according to the 
interview participants. There are seven main points which are included here. At first, the superior 
in the public sector has considerable power that can significantly influence the entire organisation, 
which makes the members inside have to follow the top manger’s order unconditionally. Secondly, 
gift sending and receiving for ‘reciprocity’ is common in the public sector, which is adopted as an 
effective way to build and keep Guanxi. However, the majority of the participants think they are 
fatigued to be involved. Then, the anti-corruption authority in many regions of China set a ‘grey 
space’ with a specific amount of gift value to differentiate ‘reciprocity’ and corruption. Afterwards, 
the ‘ambiguity’ custom in the public sector may bring an abnormal focus of Guanxi that could 
result in unethical behaviours. In addition, the traditional culture of Chinese Doctrine of the Mean 
makes people to dislike ‘Hai Rui’, such a kind of ‘extreme’ upright and candid person. Also, the 
Chinese custom of ‘clan culture’ may lead to corruption because those in power may step over the 
‘red line’ to help relatives and friends. Lastly, ‘renqing’ as a foundation of Guanxi is probably 
unavoidable in the public sector. As the widely accepted obligation of ‘renqing’ repayment, public 
officials may treat repaying ‘renqing’ prior than observing norms which could lead to corruption. 
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4.2 Guanxi in the Chinese public sector 
This sector illustrates Guanxi in the Chinese public sector in relation to three parts: characteristics 
of Guanxi, typology of Guanxi and outcomes of Guanxi. The first part indicates Guanxi is a kind 
of long-term investment; Guanxi between civil servants is unlikely to be friendship; and Guanxi 
in the public sector is ‘impure’. The second part displays three Guanxi types: benefits Guanxi, 
working Guanxi and personal Guanxi. The last part shows that Guanxi may be responsible for the 
actor getting favours when asked for; Guanxi affects to what extent the favours can be delivered; 
Guanxi ensures the success of doing things; and Guanxi makes civil servants undertake risks. 
 
 
4.2.1 Characteristics of Guanxi 
The interviews show a number of Guanxi characteristics in the public sector. First of all, Guanxi 
is a kind of long-term investment in the public sector, which means it may not generate significant 
interests immediately but could be of benefit in the future. Also, building and keeping Guanxi in 
the long term can avoid Guanxi partners feeling the owner is purposeful while asking for favours. 
In addition, Guanxi between civil servants is unlikely to be friendship as it is usually based on 
benefits, work or competition but emotions, which means the Guanxi cannot be close, stable and 
durable like friendship. Therefore, Guanxi in the public sector is ‘impure’, personal purposes such 
as the expectation of receiving potential benefits may inevitably be included. 
 
The majority of participants consider Guanxi as a kind of long-term investment in the public sector. 
As illustrated by participants 10 and 23, investing in Guanxi is investing in the future, which could 
be a significant skill of civil servants. Probably the Guanxi is not that useful at present, such as 
bringing the owner improvement by leaps and bounds, but it has potential: 
 
“Just like the investment in stock. When you identify a potential share, you are 
willing to pay for it because of its potential. This investment is as same as 
building and keeping Guanxi, which aims to the future.” (Participant 10). 
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“Guanxi likes an important investment, you have to see the benefits. Maybe the 
current benefits are not great, but in the future, it must have the potential.” 
(Participant 23). 
 
In this Guanxi investment, civil servants are investors. They pay for prospective interests but not 
immediate or direct benefits. Although such investment may certainly include risks, but in the long 
term, it is probably worthwhile. 
 
For instance, the reason why a young and powerless civil servant can get excessive respect and 
favours is that the civil servant probably has certain valuable features such as a decent family 
background that can make the civil servant become powerful and potentially useful in the future: 
 
“People in the public sector are shrewd, they are unlikely to do something 
meaningless. Like Guanxi, if they want to have Guanxi with someone, even this 
person is young and powerless at present, they must be motivated by this 
person’s potential future.” (Participant 12). 
 
“You are young and have no power, but why do people respect you and send you 
gifts? Maybe it is because of your future career, you may have a powerful family 
background, they know you could be useful to them later.” (Participant 19). 
 
Thus, the potential of Guanxi is the potential of the Guanxi partners invested. Through offering 
favours to the partners when they are not in high positions in order to build and keep Guanxi, the 
Guanxi owners may claim the favours back if the partners become powerful one day, which can 
certainly compensate the previous cost of Guanxi. 
 
Participant 29 held a similar perspective: Guanxi is a long-term investment that can be an efficient 
way to prepare advance support for the future. In the public sector, it seems that civil servants 
dislike being used as tools to serve others’ purposes. Instead, they prefer and believe in real 
emotions. If a Guanxi is established temporarily and only aims to exchange favours but not 
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emotions, such Guanxi is too purposeful, civil servants are most likely to refuse offering any 
response to the Guanxi: 
 
“I may not have any requests at the moment, but I may have later. In order to 
get support when I need it, I have to build and keep Guanxi from now on. If I just 
try to build Guanxi when I need it, then people would think I am too purposeful 
instead of paying real emotions.” (Participant 29). 
 
Therefore, an actually useful Guanxi is reliable and stable based on long-term inputs. Depending 
on the Guanxi, Guanxi partners may offer favours to the Guanxi owner willingly rather than 
consider their Guanxi be stained by strong personal purposes. 
 
Nevertheless, although Guanxi in the public sector is a kind of long-term investment, which could 
be similar to a long-term friendship, they are different. According to participants 04 and 17, Guanxi 
is not friendship in the public sector, there is probably no causality between them: 
 
“Two persons have Guanxi at work is far from being friends. That is to say, they 
may have Guanxi, but not necessarily to have friendship.” (Participant 04). 
 
“Guanxi at work is most likely to be transactional, this is because the aims of 
building and keeping Guanxi are purposeful in most cases. People want to get 
something according to the Guanxi, otherwise they are unable to pay so much. 
This is different to friendship that emphasises emotions.” (Participant 17). 
 
Civil servants may keep good Guanxi in the public sector, but normally this Guanxi seems based 
on interests, rather than emotions like friendship. In other words, friendship is not necessarily 
resulted by having Guanxi. 
 
In addition, participants 03 and 09 specified that Guanxi in life could be friendship, but Guanxi at 
work, namely in the public sector is not friendship. At first, Guanxi as an interpersonal relationship 
in life is generated by keeping in touch, which normally depends on emotions. Likewise, such 
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features enable the parties involved to maintain their Guanxi enduringly as long as the emotional 
base exists. Thus, Guanxi in life can be a close and stable friendship: 
 
“The difference between Guanxi in life and at work is the stability and durability. 
Guanxi in the public sector depends on the work and purposes, which is easy to 
be changed. However, Guanxi in life can be much more stable and durable 
because it relies on emotions, such as friendship.” (Participant 03). 
 
“Guanxi in life is different from Guanxi at work. The latter is based on the work, 
but the former is mainly based on certain special emotions, such as friendship, 
which is closer, more stable, and more lasting.” (Participant 09). 
 
Conversely, Guanxi at work is that colleagues work together for a long while then become familiar 
and have Guanxi, this Guanxi probably is mainly based on the work or benefits but not emotions. 
Once the work changes or new benefits emerge, the Guanxi basis may also change. Hence, Guanxi 
in the public sector is unlikely to be friendship. 
Moreover, participants 04 and 09 explained the reason why civil servants may have no Guanxi of 
friendship, which is because the Guanxi between them are usually competitive: 
 
“There are no friends in the working place. All colleagues are competitive, they 
can have certain personal Guanxi, but there is no real friendship.” (Participant 
04). 
 
“The valuable resources are usually limited, hence people have to compete for 
them. In other words, the Guanxi between them is essentially competitive, which 
means it cannot be friendship, it is a relationship of collaboration at best.” 
(Participant 09). 
 
There are many opportunities in the public sector, such as promotion and power. These 
opportunities are limited, people must compete, and not every competitor can obtain even one of 
them. Therefore, Guanxi between civil servants are naturally competitive, one gets promoted 
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means that all the others have failed. Accordingly, civil servants may have Guanxi, but may not 
have friendship. 
 
Furthermore, the illustrations showed above that Guanxi in the public sector is probably ‘impure’, 
personal goals are included to some extent. As participants 05 and 16 said, it is challenging for 
Guanxi between civil servants to be ‘pure’ like Guanxi between ordinary people: 
 
“Of course, there is Guanxi that merely exchanges emotions. However, in the 
system, interpersonal Guanxi is very difficult to be ‘pure’. There are more or 
less personal purposes involved. The difference is some purposes are obvious, 
but some are hidden.” (Participant 05). 
 
“Specific purposes aiming to gain personal benefits are probably unavoidable 
in the Guanxi between civil servants. The point is, some people want to take the 
benefits as soon as possible, but some others are not that impatient. From this 
dimension, Guanxi in the public sector is hard to say ‘pure’.” (Participant 16). 
 
The ‘pure’ means the Guanxi is only emotion-based without other purposes, such as gaining 
benefits or interests. The Guanxi between ordinary people could be ‘pure’ because those people 
have no power thus cannot obtain benefits by exchanging power. However, civil servants have 
public power, they can exchange power for benefits conveniently. Therefore, the Guanxi between 
civil servants is unlikely to be simply emotions-based, intentions for certain benefits could not be 
avoided, which makes their Guanxi ‘impure’.  
 
Additionally, the basis of establishing Guanxi in the public sector is that the engaged parties can 
create value mutually, hence such Guanxi will inevitably be influenced by personal purposes: 
 
“I know you are a ‘potential stock’, so I may consciously make a Guanxi with 
you, because this Guanxi can bring me huge benefits in the future, just like 
investing in stocks. In the system, Guanxi is mainly mutual use between 
‘potential stocks’ like this.” (Participant 20). 
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Participant 20 described civil servants owning Guanxi as ‘potential stocks’ which refers to the 
persons who can generate benefits to relatives at some point in the future. Without such potential, 
it may be difficult for civil servants to be involved in any Guanxi. Accordingly, Guanxi in the 
public sector generally implies the expectation of receiving benefits. In other words, such Guanxi 
is ‘impure’. 
 
In summary, this has shown three characteristics of Guanxi in the public sector, which consists of 
Guanxi as a long-term investment for future benefits; Guanxi between civil servants is unlikely to 
be friendship; thus Guanxi in the public sector is ‘impure’. 
 
 
4.2.2 Typology of Guanxi 
There are a few types of Guanxi in the public sector which were mentioned by participants, they 
can be separated through three dimensions, which are benefits Guanxi (refers to a transactional 
relationship in two exchange forms of power & power and power & money, which is based on 
pure benefits without any emotional exchange); working Guanxi (means a dynamic relationship 
that significantly depends on the work); personal Guanxi (concerns a minority Guanxi type that 
could come from personal links or be generated at work, but is beyond working Guanxi, which is 
much closer privately). 
 
At first, benefits Guanxi is based on interests and is purely transactional. The only purpose that 
this type of Guanxi serves is to gain benefits for the owners: 
 
“A pure benefits Guanxi is a naked exchange of benefits. Other Guanxi types 
may involve emotions but not at all in this type. Such Guanxi can also be called 
exchange Guanxi.” (Participant 26). 
 
Normally, Guanxi as an interpersonal relationship consists of an emotional exchange to some 
extent, because emotions could be cultivated through communication and collaboration in any 
purpose. However, benefits Guanxi has no such an emotional part, there is only a transactional 
part included.  
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Then, benefits Guanxi also comprises two forms which are divided via the different types of 
benefits exchanged within. The first form is power exchange benefits Guanxi, which refers to the 
way one civil servant offers favours to another through power, and the other returns the favour in 
the same way: 
 
“No matter what is exchanged by Guanxi, power or money, it is benefits Guanxi 
as long as the exchange brings benefits to the parties. The only difference is one 
is called power exchange, and the other is called money exchange.” (Participant 
26).  
 
The second form is money exchange benefits Guanxi, which means one civil servant applies power 
to help another, but the other compensates the help through giving money or equivalents. In short, 
if a Guanxi includes any exchanges that lead to benefits for the owners, it is a benefits Guanxi. 
 
In addition, working Guanxi is generated on the base of work, as participant 19 said. Through 
communication and collaboration during work, civil servants may have working Guanxi. Since 
work is the foundation of this Guanxi, once the work changes, Guanxi can be changed at the same 
time: 
 
“Working Guanxi is based on work, which is dynamic. Today your Guanxi is 
good due to working together, tomorrow your Guanxi may be not that good 
because you are not working together anymore.” (Participant19). 
 
For instance, if the Guanxi owner moves to a new department, the old working Guanxi in a former 
department may become weak, but a new working Guanxi in the current department can emerge. 
Hence, working Guanxi as a relatively distinctive Guanxi type is dynamic in the public sector. 
Moreover, although Guanxi in the public sector is unlikely to be friendship (see the previous part), 
a similar Guanxi type could exist, which is called personal Guanxi (participants 07 and 23): 
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“Officials may have a very close Guanxi which is similar to friendship, but it is 
uncommon. I call this personal Guanxi. For example, two officials are in 
different departments, so they have no working Guanxi. However, they knew 
each other for a long while, thus they have personal Guanxi.” (Participant 07). 
 
“An effective way to identify personal Guanxi is to see that if the parties involved 
in this Guanxi have any links after work. People having personal Guanxi in the 
public sector always have certain common activities outside of work, such as 
having dinner together and visiting each other in festivals.” (Participant 23). 
 
Personal Guanxi has no concerns to work. Civil servants can have no working Guanxi because 
they have no opportunities to communicate and collaborate for work, but they may have personal 
Guanxi due to their private links such as kinship and common activities. Therefore, personal 
Guanxi is a minority Guanxi type, which mainly depends on personal relations outside of work. 
 
Moreover, according to a long-term contact in order to finish working tasks, personal Guanxi can 
be generated between colleagues in the same area of work or department. Civil servants working 
in a group or a team may find something personal in common such as hobbies and past experiences 
with some others, which differentiates their Guanxi from pure working Guanxi. Eventually, their 
Guanxi may become much closer than the Guanxi at work: 
 
“Personal Guanxi can be cultivated at work. People are in a group or a team, 
they could find some common points by completing missions, such as common 
interests and common experiences. These common points make them close, make 
them have a different Guanxi that is beyond pure working Guanxi, which is 
personal Guanxi.” (Participant 26). 
 
In other words, the working Guanxi has been sublimated to personal Guanxi, which is no longer 
concentrating on the work but life outside. Therefore, working Guanxi could result in personal 
Guanxi in some cases.  
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In short, this part displays three Guanxi types in the public sector: purely transactional benefits 
Guanxi in order to obtain personal interests, dynamic working Guanxi that is unstable and based 
on the work, and minority personal Guanxi depending on private links outside the work. 
 
 
4.2.3 Outcomes of Guanxi 
The outcomes of Guanxi in the public sector were discussed by numerous participants. The main 
themes include four points. At first, Guanxi may be responsible for deciding if the actor can get 
favours when asked for: Guanxi owners can obtain favours conveniently, but those without Guanxi 
cannot. Then, Guanxi also affects to what extent the favours can be delivered: better Guanxi leads 
to better treatment which means more help. Also, Guanxi ensures the success of doing things: 
Guanxi owners can achieve difficult or even unallowable goals, but those having no Guanxi 
cannot. Lastly, Guanxi makes civil servants undertake risks: some civil servants may step over the 
‘red line’ to respond Guanxi as long as the risks are limited and controlled. 
 
In the public sector, Guanxi is likely to be responsible for deciding if the actor can obtain favours 
when asked for. According to participants 15 and 31, a Guanxi owner can get favours easily in 
comparison with those who have no Guanxi. This is because having Guanxi is probably an 
important criterion for favour-providers to make decisions: 
 
“If you have Guanxi with me, I would do it for you. If we have no Guanxi, then 
I am sorry.” (Participant 15). 
 
“There are things that can only be done through Guanxi, if you have no Guanxi, 
then there is no way for you to do such things because nobody is able to offer 
you favours.” (Participant 31). 
 
The favour-provider may think having Guanxi is their ticket for favour asking, without the ticket, 
it means the favour-provider has no reason or will to offer favours. Then, the favour-asker cannot 
get any favours. 
 
126 
 
Similarly, having Guanxi can be a decisive advantage to the owner to compete for certain limited 
resources, such as favours: 
 
“If a few people are asking me for the same help, I would definitely help the one 
who has Guanxi with me.” (Participant 09). 
 
“You have Guanxi, so you can get favours, the others have no Guanxi, so they 
cannot get the favours. From this aspect, having Guanxi means having a sort of 
competitive advantage.” (Participant 12). 
 
For instance, when a favour-provider considers how to allocate a competitive favour, Guanxi can 
be a significant factor. In other words, having Guanxi enables the actor to obtain favours, but 
having no Guanxi means the actor cannot gain favours. 
 
In addition, Guanxi can not only considerably influence the response of favour asking in the public 
sector, but also can affect the favours that are provided, and to what extent. As participants 02 and 
06 said, better Guanxi leads to a better treatment: 
 
“I help you more because we have a good Guanxi. If we have a common Guanxi, 
I would help you less.” (Participant 02). 
 
“If our Guanxi is so strong just like brotherhood, I can do anything for you as 
long as I have the ability. However, to those having no such strong Guanxi with 
me, I help them much less.” (Participant 06). 
 
That is, there may be a difference of the treatment between having good and common Guanxi: a 
good Guanxi owner can obtain favours in a more positive manner, such as being helped more, 
whereas those having Guanxi which is not that good can merely gain favours in a relatively 
negative manner, such as being helped less. 
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Likewise, Guanxi affects favour-providers’ attitude of offering favours. Whilst dealing with the 
same problem, favour-providers may pay more time and energy to serve those in a better Guanxi 
but less to the others: 
 
“I would deal with the problem more cautiously if our Guanxi is good, but I may 
be more casual when dealing with a same problem if our Guanxi is common.” 
(Participant 08). 
 
“A better Guanxi surely can bring you a better response. While you ask for 
favours, those providing the favours may care more about your feelings and 
concerns. In other words, they want you to be satisfied. However, this is the 
response only for those having good Guanxi with them.” (Participant 19). 
 
This could because better Guanxi makes favour-providers care more about the actor’s satisfaction. 
Therefore, favour-providers probably apply a more positive attitude to the good Guanxi owner’s 
request. Conversely, the actors without good Guanxi cannot gain such a positive attitude, although 
they still can receive favours because of their common Guanxi. 
 
Accordingly, based on the illustrations above, Guanxi can have a decisive impact on the result of 
doing things in the public sector. As pointed out by participants 15 and 26, doing things through 
applying Guanxi can ensure success, whereas applying no Guanxi would probably result in failure: 
 
“The result of using Guanxi and the result of not using Guanxi are completely 
different.” (Participant 15). 
 
“Guanxi leads to special treatments, limited resources and timely helps when 
you need. Therefore, it helps you to achieve goals in a convenient and easy way. 
In contrast, you may have none of these benefits if you have no Guanxi, which 
means your goals would be difficult to achieve.” (Participant 26). 
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Depending on Guanxi, goals can be achieved easily, which is because the actor can get favours 
when challenges emerge. On the contrary, the absence of Guanxi means the goals would not be 
reached if difficulties arise. 
 
Also, Guanxi can realise difficult or even unallowable goals, which leads to a significantly 
different result in comparison to doing things without Guanxi (participants 02 and 30). For 
instance, Guanxi enables the owner to achieve difficult goals. In some cases, if Guanxi is good 
enough, even the goal is unethical, civil servants can do more for the Guanxi owner’s request by 
allowing certain debatable favours. This means difficult things can be done and followed by extra 
bonuses: 
 
“Unallowable goals could be reached if you have enough strong Guanxi, but 
legal and reasonable goals may not be reached if you have no Guanxi.” 
(Participant 02). 
 
“For example, when you have Guanxi with an official, you can even ask the 
official to do something which is not allowed in general. Nevertheless, when you 
have no Guanxi, you cannot ask them to do anything, even if the thing is their 
responsibility.” (Participant 30). 
 
However, if there is no Guanxi with the civil servants, they are not likely to serve in this way. Even 
if the request is reasonable and a part of their responsibility, they could refuse. Thus, Guanxi can 
significantly influence the result of doing things. 
 
Moreover, Guanxi in the public sector means the parties involved undertake risks willingly. As 
participants 07 and 22 said, a good Guanxi can bring the owner numerous benefits, such as asking 
someone to step on the ‘red line’: 
 
“Although the ‘red line’ is the principle which must not be crossed, if you have 
good Guanxi, you can make people step on the ‘red line’. If your Guanxi is not 
good enough, people would not help you so much.” (Participant 07). 
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“We all know the ‘red line’ is the bottom line, crossing it means the violation of 
laws or regulations. However, sometimes slightly stepping on the ‘red line’ is 
fine, I think. If we have a very good Guanxi, I can take the risk for you.” 
(Participant 22). 
 
The ‘red line’ normally refers to regulations and laws, stepping on the ‘red line’ means slightly, 
but not seriously, violating regulations and laws. Based on Guanxi, although some civil servants 
are aware that touching the ‘red line’ could result in negative consequences, they may still be 
willing to take risks in order to satisfy the other Guanxi side’s request. 
 
Concerning this point, a number of participants expressed a similar perspective. According to 
participants 02 and 08, stepping on the ‘red line' is not unacceptable. As civil servants, the 
participants seem to have no problem with only slightly violating regulations or laws in response 
to Guanxi: 
 
“Normally, a little bit stepping on the ‘red line’ is surely fine, but not too much. 
I can take certain risks for you, but the precondition is that the consequence must 
be affordable.” (Participant 02). 
 
“If the Guanxi is particularly good, I would also consider it. There is no problem 
to step on a little ‘red line’, as long as it is not a strict violation of the bottom 
line.” (Participant 08). 
 
However, there is a fine line which exists which cannot be crossed. That is, the civil servant can 
undertake affordable risks for Guanxi, but cannot commit everything for Guanxi. 
 
Then, as long as the action would not lead to excessive negative influences, some civil servants, 
such as participants 20 and 31, can undertake limited risks in order to provide favours to Guanxi 
partners, which is the general principle to them. 
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“Of course, sometimes if the Guanxi is good enough, I can step on a little bit of 
‘red line’. Nevertheless, it cannot be too much, because the basic principle of 
helping people is that the favour would not cause me too much negative impact.” 
(Participant 20). 
 
“If we have a good Guanxi, I can undertake more risks for you. Even so, to me, 
this has a limit that the consequence cannot be too bad. However, to some others, 
they may care Guanxi much more than themselves. While those very close such 
as family members ask for favours, they probably neglect such a limit.” 
(Participant 31). 
 
Depending on Guanxi, the risks of stepping on the ‘red line’ can be compensated. Although it may 
not be worthwhile for civil servants to violate the principle of common Guanxi, in the case of 
better Guanxi, like close Guanxi such as brothers or sisters, means better tolerance of taking risks, 
which would result in violating the principle.   
 
Also, more specifically, an example was provided by participant 23 to indicate that civil servants 
are willing to take risks for Guanxi partners because the risks are controlled. As in the quotation 
below, the supervision mechanism may not perceive a tiny difference concerning a 10% financial 
gap, which means the violation of regulations and laws could be concealed by the financial 
management: 
 
“For instance, the yearly bonus normally cannot exceed 50% of your annual 
income. However, you have a good Guanxi with the management of finance, then 
you can get 60%. The management surely takes risks for you, but the risks are 
tiny, nobody would notice the 10% gap in an individual case.” (Participant 23). 
 
In other words, the risks undertaken can be offset to some extent, which enables civil servants to 
step on the ‘red line’ according to Guanxi by providing such risky favours securely. In contrast, if 
the risks are not controlled or imply serious consequences such as crime, civil servants may not 
offer the favours even the Guanxi is good. 
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In summary, this part has four themes: Guanxi may decide if the actor can get favours when asked 
for; Guanxi affects the favours which can be delivered and to what extent; Guanxi ensures the 
success of doing things in the public sector; and Guanxi makes civil servants undertake risks. 
 
Overall, this section reflects how Guanxi works in the Chinese public sector, which involves 
Guanxi’s characteristics (Guanxi can be treated as a kind of long-term investment because its 
transactional essence, which makes it to be ‘impure’ in the public sector), typology (benefits 
Guanxi, working Guanxi and personal Guanxi) and outcomes (Guanxi may be responsible for the 
actor getting favours when asked for; Guanxi affects to what extent the favours can be delivered; 
Guanxi ensures the success of doing things; and Guanxi makes civil servants undertake risks). 
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4.3 Corruption in the Chinese public sector 
This section illustrates corruption in the Chinese public sector which includes three parts: 
corruption’s definition, typology and antecedents. The definition part shows the perspectives of 
the interview participants concerning how they define corruption in the public sector. They 
generally define corruption according to five dimensions, such as corruption abusing public power; 
corruption privatising public power; corruption creating unfairness; corruption obtaining 
illegitimate incomes; and corruption consisting of indirect benefits. Also, at the end of this part, 
the difference in definitions between the West and China is indicated. In addition, the typology 
part shows main four types of corruption: active & passive corruption, ‘petty’ corruption, ‘non-
traditional’ corruption and corruption classification based on the exchange between power and 
money or power and power. Lastly, three potential elements that may lead to corruption are 
identified in the section of antecedents, which are the absence of supervision mechanisms, a 
corrupt organisational environment and the imbalance between civil servants’ political and 
economic status. 
 
 
4.3.1 Definition of corruption  
The existence of corruption as a feature of public power being abused for private gains is widely 
accepted by the participants. They also identified certain definitions of which there seems to be a 
lack of sufficient discussion in the literature. For example, corruption is about activities which 
generate unfairness to others; corruption is about the involved parties gaining illegitimate but 
legally allowed incomes such as salary, subsidy and bonus; corruption means the actors obtain not 
only immediate and tangible benefits but also long-term, indirect and intangible benefits. 
Additionally, the evidence indicates some different understandings towards corruption between 
the West and China. Firstly, whether taking benefits intentionally by offering favours is probably 
the right way to identify corrupt and upright civil servants, rather than whether to obtain private 
benefits. Then, the Chinese public sector normally considers the financial exchange relationships 
between civil servants and entrepreneurs as being corrupt, but the power-based exchange 
relationships between civil servants are not considered to be corrupt. 
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The majority of the participants agreed with the definition of corruption in the public sector from 
the West, which describes corruption as the behaviours that use public power for private benefits, 
which is public power abuse: 
 
“Corruption means public power services for the benefits of individuals or small 
groups. Namely, corruption abuses public power.” (Participant 01). 
 
Therefore, the existence of public power abuse is a way to judge corruption behaviours (participant 
28): 
 
“The most effective way to judge whether a behaviour is corrupt or not is to see 
if it is linked to public power abuse. No matter what form the behaviour takes, it 
is not corruption as long as there is no public power abuse involved, and vice 
versa.” (Participant 28). 
 
This is because corruption consists of many forms that may confuse the judgement, however the 
essence of corrupt behaviour is applying public power to serve private goals but the public, which 
is abusing the public power, is also privatising the public power. In contrast, the behaviours 
avoiding public power abuse cannot be judged as corruption. 
 
Following this definition, participant 25 proposed further: abusing public power for private gains 
means ‘privatising’ public power: 
 
“The corruption in our country is the ‘privatisation’ of public power, treating 
public power as private property.” (Participant 25). 
 
The public power of civil servants comes from the public, it serves the public and is the property 
of the public. Accordingly, civil servants utilising public power to gain personal benefits is 
misusing public power and is regarding the public property as private, which is corruption. 
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More specifically, participant 26 gave an example about the environment department of the public 
sector, which clarified the ‘privatisation’ of public power: 
 
“The department of the environment in the public sector was an unpopular place 
to work because the positions there had no power. However, now it is popular 
after the government offered more power to the department such as compulsorily 
investigating the pollution of manufacturers. This is because some people think 
the new power can bring them more benefits, this is privatising the public 
power.” (Participant 26). 
 
The department used to be marginal because there was no power for the civil servants’ use to 
obtain personal benefits. However, with the importance of environment protection, the government 
begins to give much more power to the department, it is permitted to carry out compulsory 
investigations to manufacturers if they are under a suspicion of violating pollution limitation rules, 
for example. The result of the investigation could be decisive to the manufacturers, because their 
production may be suspended while they comply with the rules.  Otherwise the production could 
be shut down permanently. This now makes the department popular as it provides those civil 
servants absolute power to have an impact on manufacturers, which generates space for them to 
obtain personal benefits such as asking bribes based on power. Such behaviour is a specific way 
of privatising public power, the civil servants use public power for private goals but not public, 
certainly not to protect the environment.  
 
In addition, participant 07 asserted that another feature of corruption is the unfairness created 
during the activities. In some cases, civil servants may not obtain personal benefits, but if 
unfairness is generated, such cases are probably corruption to some extent: 
 
“Corruption has many types. For instance, the leader of a unit finds a way to 
obtain benefits for the unit through personal relationships. Some people think 
this activity is unable to bring private benefits, so it is not corruption. In my 
opinion, this is corruption, as it brings unfairness.” (Participant 07). 
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For example, the leader of a public sector asks a higher superior for special treatments such as 
specific appropriations and extra quotas to the sector depending on their good relationship. 
Although there are no personal benefits gained by the leader, group benefits for the entire sector 
members are obtained. This behaviour brings unfairness to the other sectors as it may negatively 
influence their interests. Accordingly, it is also a kind of corruption.   
 
Also, the civil servants’ behaviours that consist of getting illegitimate incomes can be classified as 
corruption (participant 02). The legally allowed incomes of a civil servant consist of salary, 
subsidy and bonus. For instance, gifts or ‘red-packets’ sent in the name of ‘reciprocity’, no matter 
the actual intention of sending, is for gratitude or congratulation, they are extra incomes for the 
receiver, which ought to be illegal. If civil servants take such gifts, they are engaging in corruption: 
 
“Sending gifts or ‘red-packets’ to the superior for any purpose is corruption 
because those are not legitimate income sources, such as salary, subsidy and 
bonus for the superior. As a civil servant, you have to repay the gifts or the ‘red-
packets’ if you accept them, most likely you would repay them through the public 
power to hand as it is probably ‘free’ or ‘no matter’ for you to use.” (Participant 
02). 
 
This is because the gifts which have been accepted may generate an impact on the takers’ decisions 
that reflects a way to repay the gifts. Intentionally or unintentionally, civil servants probably apply 
their power to undertake the repayment, which is corruption. 
 
Moreover, according to participant 07, corruption in the public sector does not only comprise the 
activities that bring immediate and tangible benefits but also includes those which bring long-term, 
indirect and intangible benefits. Some corruption may not generate benefits to the parties involved 
immediately, but the parties can obtain a certain kind of benefits depending on the corruption 
activities: 
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“Some behaviours like privately arranging work for family members and 
utilising public power to build personal relationships, may not have direct, 
tangible or immediate benefits to the actor, but are corruption. This is because 
the family members are able to appreciate that, the good relationships can bring 
long-term benefits to the actor eventually in an indirect way.” (Participant 07). 
 
For example, using a corrupt way to build and maintain personal relationships with powerful civil 
servants, the relationships would not produce benefits to the owner temporarily, but in the future 
the owner can ask for favours based on the good relationships. Also, arranging jobs or asking for 
special treatments for relatives would not bring benefits to the civil servant directly, but the 
relatives can obtain the benefits, which means the civil servant gains indirect benefits. In summary, 
all of these activities can be classified as corruption although the benefits brought are long-term, 
indirectly or intangible.  
 
Furthermore, the interview displays some differences in the understanding of corruption between 
the West and China. In general, the participants agreed that civil servants doing favours without 
asking for rewards are upright as no personal benefits are gained, also civil servants asking for 
payback followed by offering favours are corrupt as apparent personal benefits are obtained: 
 
“[This is] what a corrupt official is, you have to give me benefits then I do the 
favour to you, I do not do any favours without benefits. This is abusing public 
power. [This is] what an upright official is, you did not give me benefits, but I 
do you the favour without asking you for rewards.” (Participant 09).  
 
However, participant 09 considered further that whether civil servants take benefits intentionally 
by offering favours is probably the right way to identify corrupt and upright civil servants, which 
probably reflects the difference in defining corruption between the West and China: 
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“I do the favour for you without asking for rewards, if you send gifts to 
appreciate my helps and I take the gifts, then I would be corrupt in Western 
countries but maybe not in China, because I did not mean to have the rewards 
while helping you, so I just violate the principles.” (Participant 09). 
 
Numerous civil servants do favours without intentionally asking for rewards, but also accept 
‘gratitude’ from the favour-takers. In this case, the civil servants are corrupt according to the 
Western definition as they obtained private gains, but also, they are upright in the Chinese context. 
This is because their original purpose is not for personal gains, they just violate the rules by way 
of accepting gratitude.  
 
In addition, Western countries may have a broader definition of corruption (participant 03). The 
typical definition of corruption is abusing public power for private gains, which means the 
activities offering any kinds of benefits for the civil servants can be identified as corruption. 
However, in China, some cases like this are seen as normal but not corrupt:  
 
“The definition in China may not be so broad like the West. Some behaviours 
are normal, such as officials using public power to help each other, and so on. 
You have no way to call this corruption, they are just doing ‘reciprocity’ to 
exchange ‘renqing’, nothing to do with money.” (Participant 03). 
 
For instance, doing favours to exchange ‘renqing’ exists widely in the Chinese public sector. Civil 
servants offer help to others in order to obtain help back when needed. The favours exchanged 
between the parties are a kind of private benefits, but in China, such behaviour is called 
‘reciprocity’, which is not corruption. This is because those benefits obtained are intangible, only 
the activities linked to a certain type of financial benefits are corruption.  
 
Similarly, participant 04 claimed that, if applying the Western definition of corruption in China 
directly, then the majority of Chinese civil servants are engaged in corruption: 
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“Helping each other is common in China’s system. I help you, and you do 
something for me to appreciate. This is ‘reciprocity’, which is about ‘renqing’ 
between you and me, you cannot escape this because it is the culture. If you 
define the most basic courtesy in the system as corruption like the West, then 
every Chinese official is corrupt.” (Participant 04). 
 
‘Reciprocity’ is one of the key contents of China’s Confucian culture, and the essence of 
‘reciprocity’ is favour exchange. It is common that a civil servant uses public power to provide 
favours to another, then gain the repayment later. Also, the relatives of the civil servant may obtain 
benefits from the repayment. Such behaviours are not corruption in China, they are ‘reciprocity’. 
 
In short, Chinese civil servants normally agree with the Western perspective that defines 
corruption as the abuse of public power for private gains, which means corruption ‘privatise’ 
public power. Also, they consider corruption is a sort of activities which generate unfairness, 
obtain illegitimate incomes and involve benefits in short-term and long-term as well as tangible 
and intangible. Moreover, evidence indicates that there are certain differences between the West 
and China in terms of practically defining corruption in the public sector.  
  
 
4.3.2 Typology of corruption 
The interviews show certain valuable perspectives in the Chinese public sector concerning 
corruption typology. There were four main types of corruption mentioned by the participants. 
Firstly, based on the initiative of corruption parties, corruption behaviours include active and 
passive types. Active corruption means civil servants seek bribery actively, and passive corruption 
means civil servants engage in corruption passively, such as the frequent bribing attempt of bribers. 
Then, a type of ‘petty’ corruption usually emerges in the lower-level of the public sector, which 
refers to civil servants looking for petty benefits through limited public power on hands. Also, 
‘non-traditional’ corruption, which is different from the traditional one. Traditional corruption is 
purely transactional normally, but the ‘non-traditional’ corruption consists of not only 
transactional features but also emotional features. Moreover, corruption can be classified more 
specifically by ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ corruption. The former is identified as the exchange between 
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power and money, and the latter is considered as the exchange between power and power, which 
is usually generated between civil servants.   
 
The first type of corruption, which was mentioned by the participants was active and passive 
corruption. According to the intention of corruption engagement, corruption can be either active 
or passive in the Chinese public sector (participant 12): 
 
“In China, because of your position and power, many people take the initiative 
to bribe you, instead of you taking the initiative to ask for bribes via using your 
position and power. Of course, there are many corrupt officials who take the 
initiative, I mean, in general, there are actually more passively corrupt 
officials.” (Participant 12). 
 
Unlike the normal understanding of corruption by people that the parties are usually actively 
seeking corruption, passive corruption is much more common in China, at least in the early stages 
of a corruption case. Due to the power, many bribers probably actively look for opportunities to 
give favours to the superiors to obtain ‘renqing’. In many cases, those with power in the public 
sector do not need to take the initiative of corruption engagement, rather they are passive 
participants of corruption. 
 
The system is quite dangerous and challenging to the incorrupt civil servants as they may confront 
numerous traps of corruption. The powerful civil servants are always surrounded by a large number 
of relatives who are interested in the considerable power: 
 
“You have power, you do not want to be corrupt, but the people around you 
would push you into corruption, by trying best to please you. Then you would 
inevitably engage. This is because the power is so attractive that many people 
want to use it, and nobody would pull you back.” (Participant 04). 
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According to participant 04, if civil servants are all like ‘Hai Rui’ that are upright and try the best 
to avoid anything unethical, this is not to the benefit of their relatives. Therefore, in terms of the 
relatives, they are likely to have a strong motivation to push the powerful civil servants to be 
involved in corruption because then they can use gifts or financial benefits to exchange public 
power from the civil servants. 
 
Unlike the corruption in the past, contemporary corruption is very ‘non-traditional’. Traditional 
corruption in the public sector means an obvious transactional link between public power and 
private benefits. The bribe-takers are like sellers, the bribers are like customers, and public power 
is good. As long as the customers can afford the goods, they can pay and get it: 
 
“Corruption used to be more ‘direct’, which mainly were one-time trades, 
anybody having money can exchange public power directly. In contrast, today’s 
corruption is more ‘indirect’, covert and slow-motion. Bribers use different 
excuses such as ‘reciprocity’ to build stable and mutual trusted relationships 
with civil servants in order to send gifts or money.” (Participant 20). 
 
However, the ‘non-traditional’ corruption is more implicit and becomes a step-by-step process. 
The corrupt activities are now in association with the exchange of emotions to some extent, at least 
on the surface. The bribers would not express their real corrupt intention or even try to hide the 
intention. They use numerous approaches to establish a good relationship with the targeted civil 
servant in a legal way.  
 
Thus, a large number of civil servants are involved in corruption unconsciously like this, as 
participant 20 said below. They think they are merely accepting little gifts from good friends, 
which are not unrelated to corruption: 
 
“Slowly for a long time, the gifts you received are getting bigger and more costly. 
Finally, when you realise how many benefits you have accepted, you are under 
control of the interest group and the bribers, they have a handle on you, and you 
have become a puppet to serve.” (Participant 20). 
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Until they react to the fact that they have obtained a large amount of financial benefits or 
equivalents, they never know they are playing a part as one of the corruption parties. At that time, 
the benefits they received will be the corruption evidence held by the bribers. The bribers can, 
therefore, bring the civil servants into their personal service. 
 
Similarly, participant 06 stated that one of the characteristics of passive corruption is the parties’ 
unwitting situation. Sometimes the bribe-takers may feel that the emotions showed by the bribers 
in the early stage is real, which makes them willing to provide unethical ‘help’: 
 
“Many officials are involved in corruption unwittingly. They usually think the 
bribers are their genuine ‘friends’. In the early stage, the bribers treat the 
officials like friends, to approach them and to establish corrupt connections little 
by little. While the officials react, it is too late, they have engaged.” (Participant 
06). 
 
A typical approach to pull the people in power into corruption is to build ‘friendship’ with them, 
this can establish trust and create an illusion to conceal the bribers’ actual purpose. Afterwards, 
they will be attracted gradually to build corrupt relationships with the bribers until they become 
the bribe-takers. Once civil servants are in this stage, they are engaged and arguably entrapped. 
 
In order to avoid this, those powerful civil servants in the system need to be cautious. They have 
to conceal their hobbies to the others to avert the bribers utilising the hobbies to tempt them 
(participant 30): 
 
“As a civil servant, you must be cautious. If the bribers know what you like, they 
will find a way to satisfy you. If you like art, they send you artwork. If you like 
playing cards, they play with you every day and let you win. Anyway, they will 
make you as happy as possible. This is extremely dangerous for a civil servant.” 
(Participant 30). 
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Once the bribers know the hobbies, they would make the best efforts to satisfy those hobbies so 
that they can build good relationships with the civil servants. Usually, people can refuse the gifts 
they disliked, but it may be difficult to reject the gifts they liked. In some cases, this paves the way 
for incorrupt civil servants to be pulled into a corrupt relationship. 
 
Also, the traditional insight considers the corrupt civil servants take the main responsibility to 
engage in corruption because of their weak will, therefore Chinese anti-corruption regulations and 
laws punish bribe-takers much heavier than bribers: 
 
“Corruption is not only the responsibility of the bribe-takers but also the 
connivance of the bribers. Our country is inconsistent with the standard of 
conviction for briberies. The bribe-takers are heavily punished, but the bribers 
are only lightly punished.” (Participant 30). 
 
However, participant 30 thought both of the corruption parties, the bribers and the bribe-takers, 
bear responsibility. Indeed, the bribe-takers participating in corruption may lack a strong will, but 
their wills are weakening with every bribing attempt. 
 
Accordingly, the punishment has a different impact on bribers and bribe-takers. In terms of the 
bribe-takers, once their corrupt activities are uncovered, their political life is ended. They can lose 
everything, especially their power and social status. Also, they may be sentenced to many years in 
prison: 
 
“Both corruption parties are taking substantially different risks. Once the 
corrupt officials are uncovered, the rest of their lives would be finished. 
Conversely, those disclosed bribers would merely suffer prison for a couple of 
years and be fined, or even hide in foreign countries. This results in the bribers 
having nothing to fear.” (Participant 30). 
 
In contrast, the bribers only need to pay a little if they are uncovered. Even they can find a way to 
escape the punishment. This could explain the generation of passive corruption. 
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In addition to active & passive corruption, ‘petty’ corruption was also mentioned by the 
participants frequently. According to participant 05, corruption does not only exist at the middle 
or higher level of the system but also exists at the lower-level: 
 
“As long as you have resources, you have a certain power, not necessarily at the 
high position, even a street-level civil servant, you can be corrupt. This is 
because even a front-line civil servant can have a power scope, although the 
scope could be limited, they can ask for bribes depending on the little power on 
hand.” (Participant 05). 
 
Civil servants at any level in the system can be involved in corruption, even if at street-level. The 
power of the street-level civil servants is limited and small, but it still can be a weapon for the civil 
servants to gain personal benefits.  
 
This kind of corruption does not come in big suitcases with a large amount of financial benefits, it 
is ‘petty’. The parties involved in this type of corruption merely obtain considerably limited 
benefits, at most a ‘red packet’ which has a value of tens of pounds: 
 
“What is ‘petty’ corruption? You cannot get your new ID card quickly unless 
you send a ‘red packet’ or you know someone powerful. If you do, you may have 
a VIP treatment. In fact, some front-line civil servants neglect their duty of 
providing citizens the service, they regard the authority of approval as a way to 
ask for benefits. Such behaviour is small but corrupt.” (Participant 05). 
 
For example, someone goes to the police office to deal with an identity card transaction. 
Sometimes if the person refuses to give a ‘red packet’ to the police official, the identification card 
may not be approved quickly. If a ‘red packet’ or certain benefits are sent, the transactions could 
be finished immediately. Alternatively, if the person has an acquaintance in the police office or 
knows the superior, then the transactions can also be done quickly. The activity like this is a typical 
pattern of power abusing, although the ‘red packet’ or the benefits sent are small, it is still 
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corruption. The official takes public power as personal property to exchange interests, which can 
be called ‘petty’ corruption. 
 
Similarly, participant 25 mentioned that participants in corruption consist of not only the high-
position civil servants but also street-level ones: 
“Anywhere having power, there is corruption. The corrupt participants are not 
only those so-called senior officials, but even the officials at the street level can 
also be involved in corruption as long as they have a little power on hands.” 
(Participant 25). 
 
Although the power of street-level civil servants is limited, as long as they have the intention to 
seek private benefits, they still can use their power to reach personal goals, which could lead to 
participating in corruption. 
 
In addition, participant 05 warned of the risk of the transformation of ‘petty’ corruption into large 
scale corruption. ‘Petty’ corruption is usually not picked up by the anti-corruption law enforcers, 
because the benefits obtained by the parties involved are small: 
 
“Most of the ‘petty’ corruption is getting things on the cheap, there is no obvious 
violation of the law. For example, the official asks for a small ‘red packet’ or 
asks somebody to treat a meal. These asks are not costly that nobody would 
know. However, the ‘petty’ corruption may become ‘large’ slowly.” (Participant 
05). 
 
However, it is still risky as it may transform from ‘petty’ to ‘large’. At the early stage, a corrupt 
street-level civil servant can only ask for a few benefits such as a ‘red packet’ or a meal as the 
lower position in the system only offers limited power. Nevertheless, the civil servant in the future 
may get promoted to a higher position which offers a stronger power. In that case, the civil servant 
can have the ability to ask for greater benefits. Namely, the higher the position gained, the more 
benefits the civil servant can ask for. In the long term, the ‘petty’ corruption may, therefore, 
become ‘large’. 
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Moreover, ‘non-traditional’ corruption is another type of corruption in the Chinese public sector. 
Traditional corruption has a clear feature of trading: bribers offer financial benefits or equivalents 
in order to exchange public power from civil servants, and the civil servants as briber-takers use 
public power to exchange personal benefits. Like doing business, public power is regarded as 
having a good price. People that can afford the price can obtain the goods. The relationships 
between the parties are therefore purely transactional: 
 
“With the strengthening of supervision, many corrupt behaviours today are more 
obscure. We now have a term called ‘non-traditional’ corruption. There was a 
big case, the corruption parties were all belonging to a ‘circle’, and the ‘circle’ 
had been established for more than 20 years. The parties had no longer just one-
off trading relationships, but some long-term partnerships.” (Participant 16). 
 
Nevertheless, this pattern of corruption is risky in today’s intensive anti-corruption condition. 
Thus, a new pattern of ‘non-traditional’ corruption has emerged. In comparison, the relationships 
between the parties of ‘non-traditional’ corruption are not only transactional but also emotional. 
Unlike the one-off trade characteristic of traditional corruption, ‘non-traditional’ corruption 
includes multiple trades. Namely, stable and closer partnerships could be established. In the long-
term, a ‘circle’ may emerge, the members have corrupt relationships and may also have 
friendships. Accordingly, ‘non-traditional’ corruption is more obscure, which makes it difficult to 
perceive. 
 
Similarly, ‘non-traditional’ corruption is a new and safer way for corrupt civil servants to engage 
in corruption (participant 31). In order to protect themselves, corrupt civil servants now prefer to 
do ‘business’ with those having good relationships: 
 
“‘Non-traditional’ corruption involves the exchange of materials, and the 
exchange of emotions. Some people would not take gifts from you if you have no 
good relationships with them. This is for their safety, they do not trust you. Such 
corruption is not only more effective but also more covert.” (Participant 31). 
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Having good relationships means they have kept a connection for a long time, they have a certain 
amount of emotional exchanges otherwise the relationships would not be good. If so, trust between 
them may be established. Therefore, their relationships are more stable and stronger, also, they are 
safer for conducting corrupt activities. 
Hence, this new pattern of corruption motivates bribers to build personal relationships with civil 
servants in order to obtain trust. The purely transactional feature of traditional corruption has an 
apparent violation of laws and regulations. In order to avoid this point, bribers now send 
inexpensive and ‘reasonable’ gifts to the powerful civil servants over the long term: 
 
“Some people know how to ‘raise’ personal relationships. The powerful civil 
servants would not accept expensive gifts as it is conspicuous, unless the gifts 
are inexpensive, such as fruits or specialities. So, bribers send these over the 
long term to benefit personal relationships. When it is necessary, the 
relationships can be used.” (Participant 19). 
 
At first, this behaviour does not violate laws and regulations because the gifts sent over time are 
relatively small. Fruits and specialities are not common bribes in corruption, which makes them 
inconspicuous. Secondly, keeping for doing the gifts sending behaviours makes the bribees to feel 
that the bribers take care of them, otherwise the bribers would not remember to send the gifts every 
year. Therefore, they may begin to trust the bribers, or at least consider the bribers have no negative 
intention. This is a kind of emotional exchange, the bribers show their sincere emotions to the civil 
servants, in turn, the civil servants offer them trust. After a number of years, such relationships 
could be stable and strong, then the bribers can ask favours of the civil servants depending on this.  
 
More specifically, according to participant 22 and participant 27, corruption in the Chinese public 
sector can also be divided on the basis of the elements exchanged: the exchange between power 
and money, and the exchange between power and power. The former concerns the exchange of 
public power and financial benefits, which is a common kind of corruption: 
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“A county secretary can help a real estate entrepreneur to get the state-owned 
land, the entrepreneur develops real estate on the land to make money and 
reward the secretary. This is the ‘exchange’ between public power and money, 
which is a typical pattern of corruption.” (Participant 22). 
 
In this pattern, civil servants use the power available to them to provide ‘help’ to those having 
demands and then obtain financial benefits or equivalent for reward. In terms of the help-seekers, 
they provide rewards to the civil servants in exchange for public power. 
 
This behaviour can be referred to as ‘direct’ corruption (participant 27). The ‘direct’ means a clear 
exchange between public power and financial benefits or equivalent. In theory, such behaviours 
could be undoubtedly classified as corruption. 
 
“The ‘direct’ form of corruption is what we often call ‘power trading’, using 
money to buy power or using the power to exchange money.” (Participant 27). 
 
Then, the exchange between power and power normally happens between civil servants. Individual 
civil servants’ power is limited in that it may only work in a certain field, but they can find a way 
to link to other civil servants an exchange of new power by providing their own.  
 
“We are the secretaries of two different counties. I have a relative working in 
your county, and you also have one working in my county. Then I can ask you to 
offer some special treatment to my relative in your county, and I will offer the 
same to your relative in mine. This is a normal pattern in the system as it 
concerns no money but ‘renqing’, which is therefore legal.” (Participant 22). 
 
In other words, a civil servant provides a ‘help’ to another civil servant, then the other repays a 
‘help’ in turn. In fact, this could be a legal way to avoid anti-corruption regulations and rules, 
according to participant 22. 
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On account of the fact that this pattern of exchange has no direct link with any pecuniary benefits, 
it thus could be called ‘indirect’ corruption. However, whether it should be classified as corruption 
or not generates numerous debates. Some people consider it is not corruption because nobody 
obtains financial benefits in this case, as one of the immediately recognisable features of corruption 
is that the parties exchange public power with money.  
 
“The ‘indirect’ form of corruption may not concern money, but the exchange 
between powers. Some people judge corruption depending on financial benefits 
obtained, but some do not. In my opinion, any type of benefit gained by civil 
servants through abusing public power is corrupt.” (Participant 27). 
 
Conversely, the others think if the parties gain any kinds of benefit, no matter if the exchange 
involves pecuniary benefits or not, that should be identified as corruption. For example, participant 
27 is of the view that the actions of civil servants in terms of the abuse of public power for any 
kind of private gains are corrupt.  
 
Overall, in terms of the perception of Chinese civil servants, there are four main types of corruption 
in the public sector, which are: active & passive corruption (whether the parties involved are 
intentionally engaged in corruption or not); ‘petty’ corruption (the benefits obtained and the 
influence are petty); ‘non-traditional’ corruption (includes both transactional and emotional 
features); and ‘direct’ & ‘indirect’ corruption (which means the exchange directly between power 
and money or between power and power). 
 
 
4.3.3 Antecedents of corruption 
In terms of the factors that may generate corruption in the Chinese public sector, the participants 
stated three main elements. Firstly, insufficient supervision mechanisms enable superiors with 
power to generate decisive impacts to the organisations and organisational members without 
necessary limitations, which may encourage corruption. Then, unethical organisational 
environments can make pure members get involved in corruption by compulsion or by 
unintentionally changing their perspective to accept corrupt behaviours. Lastly, the imbalance 
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between political and economic status of civil servants is likely to encourage them to seek ways to 
achieve higher economic status by corruption to match their high political status. 
 
According to participant 01, the anti-corruption system in the public sector has significant gaps. 
For instance, the Commission for Discipline Inspection was supposed to be the most important 
anti-corruption department in public organisations, but the leader of this department is normally 
the direct subordinate of the organisation’s top superiors: 
 
“The city’s Commission for Discipline Inspection cannot supervise the mayor 
and the party’s secretary, same in the provincial system. This is because the 
superior of the Commission for Discipline Inspection is normally under the 
supervision of the mayor and the secretary.” (Participant 01). 
 
Namely, the anti-corruption department has no authority to supervise the unethical behaviours of 
the top superiors, which apparently provides opportunities for those corrupt ones.  
 
Similarly, participant 30 considered the main cause of corruption in the public sector is the 
unlimited power of the top superiors. The top superior in a public organisation has considerable 
power, the decision made by the top superior may have a decisive impact on the subordinates, such 
as promotion, retirement welfare and the approval of applications: 
 
“The top superior’s power covers almost everything of yours in the organisation, 
your promotion, retirement and any applications. If the top superior says no, 
then you can do nothing. So, most likely, you would keep silent if you see the top 
superior’s illegal behaviours. Even you have to make a choice in some cases, to 
be involved or to be excluded.” (Participant 30). 
 
Therefore, it is unlikely for the subordinates to violate the top superior’s request or order, which 
means the unethical activities of the top superior may not be reported, and even the subordinates 
could be involved intentionally or unintentionally. This can produce potential risks to the 
generation of corruption in the organisation. 
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Accordingly, due to the absence of the supervision mechanism, corruption could not be stopped 
while it is at the unethical level, petty corrupt behaviours could be escalated, and important corrupt 
behaviours could become much more serious: 
 
“The absence of an efficient supervisory system encourages such corruption in 
the system, this is because corruption is not a one-off process. When corruption 
is small at the beginning, if nobody says no to it, a long time later, the small 
corruption could become big.” (Participant 23). 
 
All of the big corruption cases started from petty unethical activities. If the parties have a 
successful first attempt to gain private benefits through public power, they are likely to continue 
doing the same activities, in the long-term, the corruption would get deeper and bigger.  
 
In addition, the unethical public service environment could be another reason causing civil 
servants’ involvement in corruption. Participant 01 described the impact of such an environment: 
 
“If you want to have achievements in the public sector, it is unlikely to keep 
completely independent from the big environment that everybody is engaged in 
Guanxi or unethical activities. Everyone sends gifts and exchanges favours, you 
would be an outsider if you do not. You would be isolated like ‘Hai Rui’, you are 
unable to have relationships, which means you would not gain any opportunities 
to have achievements.” (Participant 01). 
 
As long as a civil servant has career ambitions, it is very difficult to avoid things like ‘reciprocity’ 
in the public sector. Members in public organisations would be treated like ‘Hai Rui’, such as 
being excluded and isolated, if they refuse to participate in ‘reciprocity’. They would have no good 
relationships with superiors, colleagues and subordinates and there is no way for them to achieve 
their ambitions in the public sector, unless, they embrace ‘reciprocity’, to send gifts or favours in 
order to establish and maintain good personal relationships. Although it is not inevitable that such 
behaviours lead to corruption, they result in a higher risk. 
 
151 
 
Similarly, civil servants are made to participate in the behaviours like ‘reciprocity’ to gain a sort 
of competitive advantage or merely to avoid potential unfairness, which may promote corruption: 
 
“If you are a very upright person, you see the others whose abilities are worse 
but have better relationships with the superior, which makes them promoted fast. 
You must be jealous. Then you are most likely to follow them, because this is the 
institutional rule, if you are not involved, you would not be promoted forever.” 
(Participant 19). 
 
Normally, people in the public sector with better personal relationships have more chances of 
promotion. In other words, having good relationships offers the owner competitive advantages, 
but also generates unfairness to the others. Those having stronger working skills but who are not 
good at managing personal relationships with superiors are treated unfairly, so they may feel 
jealous and unfair, which encourages them to do the same in order to obtain what they deserved. 
Then, more corruption may emerge. 
 
Additionally, a corrupt environment is likely to generate negative influence towards organisational 
members’ perspective unintentionally, as participant 03 said: 
 
“If the organisational environment is corrupt, significantly negative effects 
would be brought to the members as they live in this environment, they are more 
or less affected. The new entrants could be pure and upright, but their 
perspective may be changed unintentionally by the environment later. They may 
start from unethical behaviours, and then move to corruption.” (Participant 03).   
 
Corrupt civil servants are not born to be corrupt, there is a slow process of transformation to change 
them from opposing corruption to accepting and embracing corruption. If the majority of the others 
consider corruption is normal and acceptable, the individual is likely to follow and agree with the 
perspective after a long time. Accepting unethical behaviours usually comes first, then they may 
accept corrupt behaviours sooner or later. 
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Moreover, the imbalance between civil servants’ political and economic status also can produce 
corruption in the public sector. Participant 09 suggested the political status of civil servants is high 
as they have power, especially those having top positions. Nevertheless, the economic status of 
civil servants in comparison with their political status is relatively low: 
 
“Although the political status of officials is high, the economic status is actually 
very low. They can make people rich, but they cannot make themselves rich. This 
has led many officials to the wrong path. If a ‘Hai Rui’ cannot afford even a 
department for children, then to be a ‘Hai Rui’ must be a joke.” (Participant 
09). 
 
The power they hold in their hands can easily make someone rich if they wanted to, but their 
normal incomes can simply ensure they reach the locally average income level. It is therefore 
difficult for powerful civil servants to avoid finding a way to gain extra benefits to reach a higher 
economic status as same as their political status.  
 
Similarly, according to participant 31, Chinese civil servants have a high political status, they have 
power to bring wealth to people, except themselves. Hence, the rapidly increasing cost of family 
life and the limited legal incomes in the public sector lead to high economic pressures for civil 
servants. Although the incomes of civil servants not only consist of basic salaries and bonuses but 
also include extra welfare and subsidies, such as monthly pension; health insurance and even 
allocated departments, these can merely ensure their incomes remain at the level of the local mean 
average:  
 
“Even if you are the provincial governor, your monthly income is around £1000. 
You cannot afford to send your child to study abroad. As a civil servant, although 
you may have numerous extra benefits, those are apparently not enough. Thus, 
some civil servants corrupt for their family, they just want their families to have 
a better life.” (Participant 31). 
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In comparison with the cost of family life, such an income level is not enough. For instance, in 
order to send the next generation to foreign countries for education, unless their children can obtain 
internships, civil servants’ incomes are insufficient to afford the tuition fees. Accordingly, some 
civil servants may apply unethical ways, such as corruption, to gain extra incomes to pay for their 
children and many other family costs. 
 
In short, there are three potential factors that could bring corruption in the public sector. The first 
one is the insufficient supervision mechanism that cannot limit the top mangers’ decisive power. 
The second one is the unethical organisational environment that can force the members to 
participate in unethical activities. The last one is the imbalance between political and economic 
status of civil servants may encourage them to seek financial benefits unethically. 
 
Overall, this section indicates corruption’s definition, typology and antecedents in the Chinese 
public sector. Civil servants generally define corruption as the abuse of public power for private 
gains, which means privatising public power. They also consider corruption as the behaviours that 
generate unfairness, bring illegitimate incomes and indirect benefits. Thus, the evidence shows 
that there seems to have certain differences between the West and China in terms of defining 
corruption in a practical way. In addition, four types of corruption are showed, which are active & 
passive corruption, ‘petty’ corruption, ‘non-traditional’ corruption and ‘direct’ & ‘indirect’ 
corruption. Moreover, there are three antecedents of corruption in the public sector: noneffective 
supervision mechanisms, corrupt public service environment and the imbalance between civil 
servants’ political and economic status. 
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4.4 Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector 
This section illustrates the links between Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector, which 
includes four main sections. The first section covers how Guanxi enables corruption, which 
indicates: the benefits brought by Guanxi which can motivate civil servants to participate in 
corruption; reciprocity as an important part of Guanxi can lead to corruption; and Guanxi as a kind 
of loophole to avoid regulations and laws for parties involved in corruption. The second section 
looks at how Guanxi reduces the risks of corruption. It shows the positive impact of Guanxi to 
minimise corruption’s exposure risks by identifying reliable corruption partners before corruption; 
concealing corrupt behaviours after corruption and saving corruption participants once exposed. 
Afterwards, the third section covers how Guanxi links corruption parties. There is evidence that 
illustrates the bridging role played by Guanxi to tie together corrupt individuals and to form corrupt 
Guanxi networks through uniting the members inside and recruiting new entrants from outside. 
The last section covers the misuse of Guanxi in corruption activities, which points to evidence that 
Guanxi has no corrupt essence that may inevitably result in corruption and its misuse by corrupt 
civil servants to serve corruption purposes. 
 
 
4.4.1 Guanxi enables corruption 
According to the participants, there are two scenarios concerning how Guanxi leads to corruption 
were identified. Firstly, the benefits, such as competitive advantages to receive limited promotion 
opportunities in the public sector followed by Guanxi may strongly motivate civil servants to build 
and keep Guanxi, even by certain unethical ways such as a shortcut. During the process of Guanxi 
establishment and maintenance, corruption could therefore be the result. Notably, numerous 
participants considered that reciprocity, such as sending gifts as the traditional way to establish 
and maintain Guanxi could generate corruption, but not Guanxi itself. In addition, Guanxi is a kind 
of loophole to regulations and laws, that may provide ways of bypassing supervision for unethical 
civil servants to conduct corrupt activities.   
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As reported by participant 11, Guanxi may lead to corruption because its importance in the public 
sector can motivate civil servants to obtain Guanxi unethically as a ‘shortcut’. This indicates that 
the process of Guanxi establishment and maintenance is likely to result in corruption: 
 
“On account of the importance of Guanxi, people may go to the ‘shortcut’. 
Through using corruption, you do not need to spend much time on exchanging 
emotions in order to achieve Guanxi, you can have useful Guanxi simply by 
sending gifts or equivalents.” (Participant 11). 
 
Indeed, Guanxi depends on a long-term contact and emotional exchange, which cannot be gained 
in a short time normally. However, corruption could be a kind of ‘shortcut’ to establish 
interpersonal relationships without long-term emotional cost, but the parties can still get benefits 
accordingly.  
 
Similarly, the potential benefits offered by Guanxi in the public sector enables civil servants to 
have sufficient motivation to own Guanxi: 
 
“People need Guanxi because it brings significant benefits in the system. The 
establishment of Guanxi requires a process, if there are no regulations to 
supervise the process, many people would use gifts or other tricks to build 
Guanxi, which may result in corruption.” (Participant 15). 
 
Yet, corruption may come within the process of establishing and maintaining Guanxi, as many 
probably apply atypical ways, such as sending gifts and other tricks, to build and keep Guanxi. 
 
Furthermore, Guanxi can bring the owner more competitive advantages than others. This is 
because Guanxi means trust has been established, the owner can therefore obtain more 
opportunities from the other side: 
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“When you have a job or an opportunity to allocate, you would definitely prefer 
someone you are familiar with, because you know and can trust the person. This 
feeling comes through the good Guanxi, everyone knows it. So, people try their 
best to build and keep Guanxi because of its importance, their behaviours may 
cause the risk of corruption.” (Participant 09). 
 
The benefits offered by Guanxi can promote those who have no Guanxi to build it and encourage 
those who already have it to maintain it. As a result, corruption could then be generated if someone 
uses illegal approaches during the process. 
 
Therefore, participant 18 indicated that the main reason that Guanxi leads to corruption is the 
behaviours of ‘reciprocity’ which is used to establish and maintain Guanxi, but not Guanxi itself. 
In the public sector, reciprocity usually refers to gift sending in order to show respect: 
 
“Guanxi itself is not corrupt, but building or keeping Guanxi can induce 
corruption. Doing ‘reciprocity’ by sending gifts is necessary but challenging in 
the system. Too cheap gifts could offend the receivers, yet too expensive gifts 
could be rejected, but admittedly, not everyone would reject the expensive ones. 
Then, that is corruption.” (Participant 18). 
 
Also, certain unwritten rules concerning the value of the gift normally apply to gift sending. If the 
value of the gift sent is too low, the receiver may reject and consider the sender has shown no 
respect. In contrast, if the gift value is too high, the receiver may also reject it because of the risk 
of violating regulations and rules. However, these options are all dependent on the receiver’s 
ethics. Some have higher ethics, so they would refuse gifts which are too costly to avoid corruption, 
but those having lower ethics may not. They are likely to accept and even prefer valuable gifts, 
which forms corruption. 
 
In addition, the way of reciprocity makes Guanxi relationships a hotbed of corruption in the public 
sector, as participant 20 considered. Traditionally, reciprocity is used to build and increase Guanxi, 
the parties merely exchange emotions through little gifts and help. However, reciprocity in the 
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public sector is not so pure, personal purposes are almost inevitably involved, expensive gifts and 
unethical help cannot be prohibited completely: 
 
“Guanxi plays the role of a hotbed. It is the prevalence of Guanxi that allows 
the ‘reciprocity’ to have a reasonable space for existence. The ‘reciprocity’ 
could be misused in the system, which creates room for corruption.” (Participant 
20). 
 
Namely, corrupt civil servants may utilise reciprocity to build corrupt Guanxi, although the 
reciprocity is not that traditional. Thus, Guanxi can result in corruption due to the corruption risk 
of reciprocity. 
 
Moreover, the cost of reciprocity also corrupts the process of Guanxi establishment and 
maintenance (participant 18). In order to achieve Guanxi, civil servants have to send gifts to their 
superiors in every festival, year after year. The superiors consist of not only the direct ones who 
are in charge at present but also those indirect ones who could provide potential help. In short, a 
large number of people need to be kept with good Guanxi. Accordingly, the cost of gift sending is 
heavy and probably unaffordable to civil servants’ normal income: 
 
“Sending such gifts usually causes high economic pressures to civil servants, 
because there are many superiors needed to do ‘reciprocity’. Thus, some people 
apply public power to exchange gifts or money and then send them to the higher-
level. In fact, the higher-level, they do the same thing. Hence, a gift can be 
handed over from the lower to the higher, the gift does nothing, but all the 
Guanxi things are done because of it.” (Participant 18).  
 
Predictably, a corrupt hierarchy can emerge. Superiors ask benefits from subordinates or bribers 
through public power, and then send the benefits to their superiors. Their superiors also ask for 
benefits and send to the higher-level. For instance, a gift box of tea was sent from the bottom to 
the top of the hierarchy, each level had the tea but then delivered to the higher level. Finally, the 
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tea was still in the gift box, but a Guanxi chain was established from the bottom to the top. Such a 
process is a typical series of corrupt activities.  
 
Furthermore, some participants considered although Guanxi may not inevitably generate 
corruption, at least corruption could be a result as Guanxi offers a way to bypass regulations and 
rules (participant 06). One of the negative impacts of Guanxi is that the owners are more likely to 
seek acquaintances who have Guanxi with them but to observe regular rules in a legally allowed 
framework to solve problems when they are in trouble. This is because using Guanxi to achieve a 
target is much easier than through regular rules, even the target could be unethical or illegal to 
some extent: 
 
“The existence of Guanxi certainly gives suitable opportunities for corruption. 
As Guanxi can do things much more effectively, even those disputed things, 
people thus seek acquaintances to use Guanxi in whatever they do. If civil 
servants act on the basis of Guanxi but not rules or laws, they may abuse public 
power.” (Participant 06). 
 
Hence, this way of thinking is precarious for those civil servants in the public sector, because if 
civil servants are not able to follow regulations and rules, the public power in their hands is 
probably used to serve unethical purposes, which is corruption. 
 
Similarly, participant 12 regarded Guanxi as a kind of loophole in terms of regulations and laws, 
it shows an approach to escape regulatory and legal supervision, which brings space for corrupt 
civil servants to proceed with unethical activities in the public sector: 
 
“If doing things only based on regulations and laws, there would be no room for 
Guanxi. Guanxi is actually the loophole of regulations and laws, that is, 
purposes that can be achieved through Guanxi are often illegal. This greatly 
increases the risk of corruption.” (Participant 12). 
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For instance, if the target cannot be achieved by regular rules, it means it is most likely to be 
unethical or illegal. Nevertheless, through Guanxi, the target can be achieved. In other words, 
Guanxi is an artificial loophole of regular rules that helps the owner to realise legally unallowed 
purposes. 
 
In short, Guanxi can promote corruption in the Chinese public sector from three aspects: civil 
servants can be encouraged by the benefits brought by Guanxi to engage in corruption; the 
behaviours of reciprocity may result in corruption; and Guanxi offers a way for unethical civil 
servants to bypass regulations and laws in order to reach corrupt targets. 
 
 
4.4.2 Guanxi reduces the risks of corruption 
According to the participants, Guanxi can reduce the risks of corruption via three dimensions for 
civil servants in the public sector. At first, Guanxi can avoid potential exposure before corruption 
takes place. Then, Guanxi can conceal corruption after the activities have happened. Also, Guanxi 
can save the parties when corruption has been uncovered.  
 
Participant 07 pointed out that Guanxi can be an effective indicator for identifying potential 
corruption partners prior to the corruption in order to minimise the possibility of exposure as the 
trust within good Guanxi relationships. The most significant worry for corrupt civil servants is 
being uncovered, they are therefore most likely to seek secure partners to proceed with corruption:  
 
“Corrupt officials look for potential partners depending on Guanxi before they 
conduct corrupt activities. This is because good Guanxi means the partners can 
be fully trusted, that would not betray the officials. Typically, corruption 
participants apply this way to reduce potential risk.” (Participant 07). 
 
Basically, Guanxi can be used for seeking such partners, because establishing Guanxi needs time, 
having good Guanxi thus means a stable trust can be expected between the parties. Hence, corrupt 
civil servants apply Guanxi to judge potential partners, to ensure their reliability, to exclude 
unreliable ones and eventually to reduce the risk of corruption. 
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Similarly, Guanxi can be applied by bribery-takers for self-preservation before they decide to 
accept bribery or not (participant 11), because corruption is a type of high-risk behaviour, so 
avoiding exposure is probably always the top priority for the participants: 
 
“You cannot simply bribe when you want to, you must have Guanxi first. The 
bribe-takers are unable to trust you due to the risk unless you have good Guanxi 
with them. They use Guanxi to investigate if you are trustworthy, corruption 
activities can only be carried out under the premise of mutual trust.” 
(Participant 11).  
 
Indeed, good Guanxi is usually formed on the basis of mutual understanding and confidence, 
which may take a long time. Hence, having Guanxi is an effective signal for potential corrupt civil 
servants to ensure the person they are collaborating with is trustworthy. As a result, corruption risk 
can be prevented, and the parties involved can be protected from the early stage of corruption.   
 
In addition, corruption behaviours can be concealed by Guanxi after it happens. Normally, a good 
Guanxi emerges from the parties’ common hobbies and interests, they usually spend a long time 
getting to know each other and then building Guanxi on the base of mutual trust. The parties 
therefore have closer and more stable relationships, that enables them to help and provide favours 
to the other side, in most cases: 
 
“If we have a good Guanxi, we can always help and take care of each other. If 
our Guanxi is corrupt, the relationship is even closer and more stable. Unethical 
behaviours between us are safe and being concealed as we are all engaged, 
betraying you means betraying myself.” (Participant 25). 
 
Based on this, in a corrupt Guanxi relationship, the parties are more likely to offer mutual support 
to each other because they are a kind of community which supports itself in its engagement with 
corruption. They may not only provide mutual helps and favours but also conceal the other’s 
corruption activities as far as possible when necessary, because they cannot suffer the consequence 
of any party’s exposure. 
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Analogously, as participant 29 said, a Guanxi party’s behaviours would be covered by the others, 
even though unethical activities could be involved, because they are friends: 
 
“I would cover your back unconditionally if there is a good Guanxi between us, 
even though you stepped over ‘red line’. At least, I would not report your 
behaviours. This is because we are friends, I know you would do the same if you 
are in my position.” (Participant 29). 
 
Although some civil servants may hold an ethical bottom line that means they refuse to actively 
conceal the corruption behaviours of those who have Guanxi with them, they probably at least 
keep silent while deciding to report or to neglect the behaviours. In other words, when corruption 
is uncovered, Guanxi can be used to conceal it. 
 
Moreover, Guanxi can preserve the parties when corruption has been uncovered. In terms of the 
civil servants who are involved in corruption, Guanxi is probably the last piece of insurance. If 
they have good Guanxi with the others such as colleagues and superiors, those in power could 
offer help when corrupt civil servants are in trouble: 
 
“For example, a director of the city’s funeral department was arrested for 
corruption. This person certainly gained millions of benefits, but the court only 
judged the penalty of 700K, which is because the director knows someone up 
there.” (Participant 08). 
 
Therefore, after the exposure of corruption, Guanxi can be a protective umbrella to effectively 
reduce the punishment of corruption, that is to preserve the participants. 
 
To sum up, Guanxi is an effective way to reduce the risks of engaging in corruption activities. 
Before corruption, it can identify reliable corruption partners, which may minimise the exposure 
risks of corruption. Then, the close and tight community generated by Guanxi can conceal corrupt 
behaviours after corruption. Lastly, once corruption is exposed, Guanxi can save those participants 
involved. 
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4.4.3 Guanxi connects corruption participants into a community of interest 
A number of participants pointed out that the corruption parties are connected by Guanxi links, 
which can be an alternative way for Guanxi to promote corruption in the public sector. In terms of 
corrupt individuals, Guanxi plays a bridging role to integrate them on the basis of common interests 
and benefits in order for corruption to take place. Also, in relation to a network perspective, Guanxi 
allows corruption participants to form a corrupt network and helps corrupt individuals to be 
involved in the network. 
 
According to participant 08, Guanxi is a bridge to connect corrupt civil servants for personal 
benefits. Bribers use Guanxi to reach those in power, and bribe-takers apply Guanxi to seek bribers, 
Guanxi seems to be a bridge to link both corruption sides: 
 
“Two persons with a good Guanxi have more and more power on hand, the 
Guanxi between them may become a channel to produce a corrupt exchange of 
benefits to satisfy their common interests. It is like the tie between seller and 
buyer, the actors cannot utilise each other’s power without the link of Guanxi.” 
(Participant 08). 
 
Although Guanxi can be pure at the early stage while the parties have no power or common 
interests, it can become corrupt once the parties obtain power or common interests emerge. Hence, 
without Guanxi, the bridge between corruption parties does not exist, so corruption can be avoided.   
 
Similarly, participant 22 pointed out that corruption emerges in the public sector because Guanxi 
acts as a tie to link corrupt civil servants through two dimensions: 
 
“Corruption happens because of Guanxi. Guanxi plays the role of a bridge, if 
there is no Guanxi, corrupt civil servants have no way to do corruption. They 
cannot exchange favours and act collectively against regulations.” (Participant 
22). 
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At first, corrupt civil servants can exchange favours based on Guanxi by applying Guanxi as an 
approach to maintain corrupt interpersonal relationships. They can also stick closely together 
relying on Guanxi against any risks of exposure. In other words, if a Guanxi bridge is absent, 
corruption parties cannot be linked, then corrupt activities cannot take place.  
 
In addition, some participants considered Guanxi links corruption participants in a network 
perspective, that is, Guanxi is a way for corrupt civil servants to form a corruption network in order 
to proceed with corrupt activities (participant 11):  
  
“A powerful leader exists in most corruption cases. Guanxi made a group of 
people gather around the leader, which forms a corrupt network. The members 
inside accordingly collaborate closely for corruption.” (Participant 11).   
 
A typical corruption case in the public sector has a leader, who is normally the most powerful one 
and followed by a number of corrupt followers. The leader and the followers constitute a Guanxi 
network of corruption. Through Guanxi in the network, they can easily allocate corruption tasks, 
utilise mutual power sufficiently and avoid regulations. Namely, the corruption participants are 
linked via Guanxi according to the way of network. 
 
Likewise, Guanxi not only connects the members inside a corrupt network but also is a bridge for 
individual corruption actors to engage in a corrupt network (participant 08). In terms of those who 
are outside the corrupt Guanxi network, having Guanxi with one of the network members can lead 
to them being involved: 
 
“Guanxi can serve as a bridge to help corrupt individuals to integrate into a 
corrupt Guanxi network, the precondition is that you know someone inside 
there.” (Participant 08). 
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This is because Guanxi is the evidence of reliability, owning Guanxi means the person is reliable 
and valuable. Hence, Guanxi links the parties both inside and outside of the corrupt network. 
 
Overall, this part covers how Guanxi links corruption parties. There is evidence that illustrates the 
bridging role played by Guanxi to tie together corrupt individuals and to form corrupt Guanxi 
networks through uniting the members inside and recruiting new entrants from outside. 
 
 
4.4.4 Guanxi as a tool for corruption 
Although there are many ways that Guanxi can promote the generation of corruption in the public 
sector, the majority of participants stated Guanxi itself is not corruption, which means Guanxi has 
no corrupt essence that may inevitably lead to corruption. Instead, Guanxi is applied by corrupt 
civil servants as a tool or a channel to achieve the purpose of corruption. 
 
For instance, participant 01 claimed that Guanxi does not necessarily result in corruption in the 
public sector: 
 
“Guanxi is not the result, but the process. It is a tool of corruption, not 
necessarily the cause of corruption.” (Participant 01). 
 
In other words, corruption may not happen after Guanxi relationships are established. In contrast, 
potential corruption exists before the actors have Guanxi, they just apply Guanxi as an approach 
to proceed with corrupt activities because certain Guanxi features such as renqing and reciprocity 
can provide a convenient excuse for corrupt activities.  
 
Participant 24 held a similar perspective that Guanxi is a tool which is misused by corrupt civil 
servants to realise unethical purposes, it is insufficient to claim that Guanxi itself has an 
unavoidable causality towards corruption: 
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“There is not much connection between corruption and Guanxi itself. If 
necessarily there is a connection, everyone in the system owns Guanxi, so 
everyone is corrupt? Therefore, Guanxi mainly serves as a channel, that is, 
corruption parties utilise Guanxi to achieve their illegal goals.” (Participant 
24). 
 
This is because Guanxi is a kind of interpersonal relationship, which can be established and 
maintained as long as communication or collaboration occurs. Civil servants who are pure merely 
use Guanxi to exchange emotions, then their Guanxi can be pure. Conversely, civil servants who 
are corrupt apply Guanxi to exchange benefits or to serve corrupt desires, so their Guanxi can be 
corrupt. Accordingly, whether Guanxi leads to corruption or not, is not depending on Guanxi itself, 
but Guanxi owners. Guanxi is just a tool that is misused by them. 
 
Also, Guanxi itself is not corrupt, corrupt civil servants misuse Guanxi to serve their corruption 
goals instead (participant 14): 
 
“Guanxi enables people to seek acquaintances rather than to obey rules, which 
certainly brings convenience to the emergence of corruption. Yet, it is not saying 
a necessary connection exists between them. It is better to say corruption makes 
use of Guanxi.” (Participant 14). 
 
As participant 14 said, although Guanxi can promote corruption risks, such as making people 
achieve common goals by asking acquaintances but not observing regulations and rules, there is 
no strong link between Guanxi and corruption. In fact, Guanxi is used negatively by corruption, 
but it is not unavoidable that it may cause corruption. 
 
In addition, Guanxi’s typology must be considered when identifying the inevitableness of Guanxi 
leading to corruption in the public sector. According to participant 10, Guanxi consists of pure and 
corrupt types, which cannot be mixed. Pure Guanxi is based on emotions, but corrupt Guanxi 
depends on benefits: 
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“Emotional-based Guanxi and benefits-based Guanxi certainly exist in the 
system. The former one is pure, but the latter one is corrupt. It can only say that 
corrupt Guanxi brings corruption.” (Participant 10). 
 
Hence, Guanxi may result in corruption but not necessarily, because pure Guanxi is not likely to 
bring corruption before it changes to corrupt, whereas corrupt Guanxi can indeed cause corruption 
unavoidably.  
 
Moreover, a case was provided by participant 22 in order to clarify how corrupt civil servants 
misuse Guanxi to conceal corruption, which starts with transforming pure Guanxi to corrupt: 
 
“Guanxi must be pure when we only have it but not power because it brings 
nothing. After we have power, our Guanxi probably changes. I ask you for 
favours and return in other ways, which is common and normal. When people 
ask, we say it is just simply for our friendship. Even if we are doing something 
corrupt, we have a legitimate excuse.” (Participant 22). 
 
For example, two old friends had a strong and stable Guanxi based on their emotional exchange 
for years. The Guanxi was pure because it was raised when they were not in power, which means 
there were no common interests and benefits between them. Once they become powerful, and 
certain common interests emerged, their Guanxi could no longer be pure. Such an impure 
relationship is still called Guanxi, but this one is totally different from the original. They maintain 
the impure Guanxi as normal, but their purpose probably changes from keeping Guanxi due to 
emotions to maintaining Guanxi as the benefits brought mutually. Relying on their Guanxi, 
unethical reciprocity can be covered as common gift sending to promote friendship, but in fact, 
corruption is in progress. In this case, on account of the Guanxi owners’ corrupt shift, pure Guanxi 
is transformed to corrupt, then the corrupt Guanxi is being utilised to serve corruption. Therefore, 
whether Guanxi leads to corruption or not, is based on the actors, but not on Guanxi itself. 
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In short, this part covers the misuse of Guanxi in corruption activities, which points to evidence 
that Guanxi has no corrupt essence that may inevitably result in corruption and its misuse by 
corrupt civil servants to serve corruption purposes. 
 
To sum up, this section displays four themes about the relationship between Guanxi and corruption 
in the Chinese public sector. The first theme indicates how Guanxi promotes corruption: (1) the 
benefits of having Guanxi may strongly motivate civil servants to be involved in corruption; (2) 
Guanxi’s reciprocity essence can result in corruption; and (3) Guanxi is a way to avoid regulations 
and laws. The second theme shows the way of Guanxi to reduce potential risks for corruption 
parties. Guanxi can minimise exposure risks before corruption by identifying reliable partners. It 
then can conceal corruption activities after corruption happens. Guanxi also can preserve those 
exposed corruption participants. The third theme reflects that Guanxi plays a bridge role to tie 
corrupt individuals together and to form corrupt Guanxi networks through uniting the members 
inside and recruiting new entrants from outside. The last theme shows Guanxi may be not 
essentially corrupt, which means it may not inevitably lead to corruption, corruption parties misuse 
Guanxi to proceed unethical activities. 
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Chapter 5.0 Discussion 
This chapter discusses this study’s findings in the light of the extant literature, with the aim of 
answering the four research questions on the relationship between Guanxi and corruption in the 
Chinese public sector: ‘To what extent is the Chinese civil service a distinctive organisational 
environment?’; ‘How do Chinese civil servants utilise different Guanxi types in their work?’; 
‘How do perceptions of Chinese civil servants push our understanding of the motives and 
circumstances surrounding corrupt organisational behaviour?’; and ‘To what extent do known 
theories explain the complex relationship between Guanxi and corruption and how do Chinese 
civil servants perceive it?’.  The findings first indicate that Guanxi means an invisible capital that 
brings competitive advantage at work, an intangible and safe currency of transactions, and a 
traditional responsibility but also an unbearable burden to Chinese civil servants. Also, the findings 
display that corruption means an illegal behaviour that is clearly identified and an unavoidable 
phenomenon generated by many causes to Chinese civil servants. In terms of the relationship 
between Guanxi and corruption, the findings point no evidence that there are inevitable links 
between them. Indeed, Guanxi may have no corrupt essence, but in some cases, it may be misused 
by unethical civil servants for corrupt purposes.  
 
In addition, the findings show that Guanxi as a Chinese-based concept seems to involve some 
characteristics of both social capital and social exchange concepts, but there are differences that 
can still be identified. For instance, Guanxi involves no the features of ‘linking’ social capital and 
other types of social exchange but ‘reciprocal’ exchange. Likewise, social capital and social 
exchange are probably the ‘choice’ for individuals in organisations to engage in reciprocity within 
social networks in Western organisations, but this research’s findings suggest that Chinese civil 
servants have no such ‘choice’ because of traditional culture and organisational environment. 
Indeed, Guanxi may bring certain positive consequences to the Chinese public sector in the long 
term, such as ‘greasing the organisational wheel’, judging civil servants’ working skills and result 
in ‘harmony’ of the Chinese ‘doctrine of the mean’. 
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5.1 What does Guanxi mean to Chinese civil servants? 
5.1.1 An invisible capital that brings competitive advantage at work 
According to the findings, possessing Guanxi can extract considerable private benefits in the 
public sector. First, Guanxi may be responsible for deciding if the actor can get favours: Guanxi 
owners can obtain favours conveniently, but those without Guanxi cannot. Then, Guanxi also 
affects the extent of those favours: better Guanxi leads to better treatment which means more help. 
Furthermore, Guanxi triggers goal fulfilment: Guanxi holders can achieve difficult or even 
unallowable goals, whereas those without Guanxi cannot. Therefore, such benefits brought by 
Guanxi are generally consistent with the definition of Oxford Dictionary (2019) which described 
Guanxi as “the system of social networks and influential relationships which facilitate business 
and other dealings in China”. In other words, as Pye (1992) said, Guanxi can be seen as a kind of 
friendship comprising the implications of a persistent exchange of favours, such as preferential 
treatment in business, preferential access to limited resources, etc. However, Pye’s study was 
conducted based on the private sector. These findings confirm that the positive consequence of 
having Guanxi in the public sector is the same as in the private sector. 
 
Accordingly, the findings indicate that Guanxi can be regarded as a significant competitive 
advantage for people at work, and civil servants are no exception. For example, while there is a 
promotion opportunity for an important political position, the one who has the strongest Guanxi 
with the superior can have a better chance to get promoted. This is because the supervisor has 
decisive power to allocate this promotion opportunity, thus having good Guanxi with the superior 
means having a considerable competitive advantage in comparison with other candidates. Namely, 
Guanxi means a sort of invisible capital that can bring benefits. This finding seems to be consistent 
with the research conducted by Butterfield (1983) who claimed Guanxi is a form of social 
investment or social capital, an important personal resource while the owner needs help or support.  
 
Moreover, the findings reflect that the reason why Guanxi can bring such a competitive advantage 
to the holder is, arguably, the considerable power of the superior in the public organisation. The 
data shows there is insufficient limitation to restrict the superior’s power, which means this person 
can influence the entire organisation and the members inside decisively. Therefore, the 
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subordinates may be strongly motivated to keep good Guanxi with the superior. Form this aspect, 
this finding of current study is consistent with those of Park & Luo (2001) who claimed Guanxi is 
“utilitarian instead of emotional” and “completely favour exchange based rather than an emotional 
attachment”. The subordinates build a good Guanxi with the superior for personal benefits instead 
of merely keeping a good relationship emotionally. 
 
Also, the custom of ‘ambiguity’ could be another reason. The findings indicate that this custom 
exists not only to be a kind of Chinese communication skill but also appears to be a set of unwritten 
norms that offer loopholes for private use. This result confirms the study of Yang (1989) who 
claim that through emphasising the ‘art of Guanxi’, ambiguity allows the actors to participate in 
unethical activities under ethical names, such as fulfilling obligation and reciprocity. The custom 
of ‘ambiguity’ on the one hand can be treated as a distinctive communication skill in the Chinese 
public sector, which refers to a social etiquette, on the other hand, it is also a loophole of rules and 
regulations. Predictably, this can significantly promote the importance of Guanxi. According to 
good Guanxi with the superior, subordinate civil servants can ensure they are ‘excellent’ while the 
superior judge their performance, which brings them competitive advantages. Accordingly, civil 
servants are strongly motivated to maintain good Guanxi. As Nie & Lämsä said, the difference 
between proper Guanxi and corrupt Guanxi is therefore relatively difficult to identify, which can 
result in a blurred space for transactions (Nie & Lämsä, 2015). 
 
Indeed, the capital feature of Guanxi based on the findings is strongly related to the concept of 
social capital which was reviewed in the previous section (see 2.2.2). At first, according to Portes 
(1998), social capital comprises the usage of three dimensions which are (1) a potential source that 
can be used for social control, (2) beneficial resources among close family relationships, and (3) 
resources depending on non-family networks. The third usage exemplifies private links, 
relationships, connections and networks in social life, which can promote access to limited 
resources such as job opportunities, market tips, or low-interest loans (Portes, 2000). In the 
Chinese public sector, the usage of Guanxi has similar characteristics with the third usage of social 
capital, which can help the holder get access to limited resources. Therefore, from this perspective, 
there is considerable common ground between the concept of Guanxi and that of social capital.  
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In addition, social capital emphasises trust, exchanges, norms and connections (Pretty & Ward, 
2001). Guanxi, as a close interpersonal relationship, likewise emphasises these points. According 
to the findings, Guanxi has three aspects in the public sector, which are investment, friendship and 
transactions. At first, Guanxi is friendship. The Guanxi parties in some cases are friends, which 
means Guanxi is not completely transactional, it can involve a purely emotional part. Therefore, 
trust between friends exists in some Guanxi relationships. Also, Guanxi is a long-term investment. 
Civil servants investing in Guanxi for future use means there are certain norms ensuring Guanxi 
can play a role when necessary. Moreover, Guanxi can also be impure, which is transactional. The 
transactional activity means there is something used for exchange, they can be favours, gifts or 
even money. Lastly, Guanxi is a kind of interpersonal relationship, which means it connects parties. 
Overall, Guanxi has the features of trust, exchange, norms and connections, the same as the 
concept of social capital. 
 
The features of Guanxi and the concept of social capital are similar because they can all bring 
considerable benefits to its holder, such as access to limited resources. Guanxi is probably not 
merely a simple concept that results in corruption in the Chinese context. It is complex and 
comprehensive, which involves an emotional part and a transactional part. The emotional part 
seems to be similar to the bonding social capital concept which exists between parties which are 
‘tightly-knit’, a type of close relationship based on emotion and affection that generally occurs 
between family members and close friends, etc. (Granovetter, 1983). The transactional part could 
be another name for the bridging social capital in the Chinese context. Such social capital is related 
to ‘weak ties’ that can be described as a kind of weak connection between parties, which have the 
ability to provide benefits, such as useful information or new perspectives, but typically are neither 
emotional nor affective support (Granovetter, 1983). 
 
However, there still have a difference can be identified between Guanxi and social capital. Social 
capital concept has a third type which is ‘linking’ social capital. This sort of social capital 
emphasises vertical aspect showing the relationships between individuals and groups belonging to 
different social strata, which is different to the other two types that emphasise horizontal 
relationships (Cote & Healy, 2001). In the concept of Guanxi, there seems to have no such similar 
part as Guanxi generally express interpersonal relationships instead of the relationship between 
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individuals and groups. Therefore, according to the analysis, it is reasonable to claim that Guanxi 
has two different components: the bonding social capital part and the bridging social capital. 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that Guanxi and social capital are the same. The concept of social 
capital is probably more complex in comparison with the concept of Guanxi because it consists of 
not only the bonding and bridging parts which Guanxi also has, but also involves the linking type 
that focuses on vertical relationships. In other words, Guanxi merely indicates the relationship 
between individuals but not the relationship between individuals and objects such as groups.  
 
Moreover, social capital speaks of a ‘choice’ for individuals in organisations to engage in 
reciprocity within social networks, but this research’s findings suggest that Chinese civil servants 
have no such ‘choice’ - tradition and culture impose Guanxi on them and they have no latitude to 
decide whether or not to engage in it. Work in Chinese public organisations entails reciprocity and 
social capital and cannot be disentangled from it - in contrast with work in Western organisations, 
whether public and private. In summary, for Chinese civil servants, Guanxi means a type of 
invisible capital, in other words, a kind of bridging social capital. Such capital leads to many 
benefits, gaining access to limited resources is one of the examples. 
 
 
5.1.2 An intangible and safe currency of transactions 
The findings reflect that Guanxi is treated as a type of safe but intangible currency that is used for 
favour exchange in the public sector, which is because of ‘renqing’, Guanxi’s important 
component. The transactional activities are usually called ‘reciprocity’ by participants. According 
to the participants’, ‘reciprocity’ is a kind of interpersonal activity on the basis of the exchange of 
favours coming from Chinese traditional culture, which is normally used for establishing and 
maintaining Guanxi. In a word, ‘reciprocity’ reflects a social norm or social etiquette, that the 
parties involved need to make a balance between paying and receiving. If someone refused to 
observe this etiquette, those people would be blamed, and the Guanxi would be broken. 
 
Therefore, in order to gain Guanxi, ‘reciprocity’ is a necessary pathway to be engaged with for 
civil servants. In the case of promotion mentioned previously, in addition to being compliant, those 
subordinates may have to undertake ‘reciprocity’ in order to obtain good Guanxi with the superior: 
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to send favours for exchanging other favours. In other words, the subordinates send gifts or helps 
to the superior, and the superior repays by the priority of competition when the opportunity comes. 
Conversely, if the subordinates have sent no favours, then repayment from the superior cannot be 
expected. 
 
Here, Guanxi is associated with the theory of social exchange. This theory entails the exchange 
between actors with some forms of agreement such as an unspecified obligation of reciprocation 
(Blau, 1964; Adler & Kwon, 2002; Chen & Choi, 2005). A common example is that when a very 
precious gift is accepted, it is extremely difficult for the person who has resource allocation power 
to refuse any payback of a resource in the future (Hwang, 1987). There are six types of resources 
which can be exchanged during the process: love, status, information, money, goods and services 
(Foa & Foa, 1974; Gergen et al., 1980). In other words, the theory of social exchange reflects two 
main themes: norms and favour exchange. The norms concern the obligation of reciprocation, the 
same as with Guanxi, the rejection of any side is unacceptable. Also, the favours exchange in 
Guanxi can be limited resources such as information and services, or love, which is the emotional 
part. Therefore, Guanxi seems to be a kind of reflection of social exchange theory in the particular 
Chinese context. 
 
However, there are certain differences between Guanxi and the theory of social exchange. Social 
exchange mainly comprises of four kinds of structure (Berger et al., 1972; Ekeh, 1974; Rosenberg 
& Turner, 1981; Cook et al., 1995; Molm et al., 1999): (a) negotiated exchange (based on explicitly 
contractual agreements or terms); (b) reciprocal exchange (sequential offering of favours across 
time); (c) generalised exchange (providing favours to a group or network member while obtaining 
favours from the other members); and (d) co-productive exchange (combining efforts or resources 
in order to produce a joint good). From this dimension, Guanxi is not similar to all the types of 
social exchange, according to the findings. At first, there are no written rules for the ‘reciprocity’ 
in Guanxi, all of the compulsory payment and repayment is based on tacit agreement. Therefore, 
Guanxi is not negotiated exchange. Then, Guanxi is typically used for generating private benefits 
in the Chinese public sector, which is not for collaboration. Hence, Guanxi is not co-production 
exchange. Nevertheless, Guanxi is built and kept via ‘reciprocity’ which is a continuing exchange 
process over time, thus it corresponds with the definition of reciprocal exchange. Likewise, Guanxi 
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is transferable (Park & Luo, 2001), which means the favours paid to a Guanxi party may get repaid 
through another party in the same Guanxi network. Therefore, Guanxi is generalised exchange.  
 
In short, the findings indicate that Guanxi is not a completely same concept to the theory of social 
exchange, but it involves both reciprocal exchange and generalised exchange features. This result 
is likely to display Guanxi’s infrastructure of exchange (reciprocal exchange) and the parties’ 
intent to engage in exchange (generalised exchange). Specifically, Guanxi works on the base of 
reciprocal exchange, favours are exchanged fairly during the process. Also, Guanxi parities 
participate in Guanxi because they know their favours offered will be repaid in the future, which 
is generalised exchange. 
 
Moreover, the findings display that a specific concept to represent the favours exchanged in 
‘reciprocity’ activities is ‘renqing’. The findings indicate that ‘renqing’ is unavoidable in the public 
sector because it forms the foundation of Guanxi relationships. Indeed, ‘renqing’ is the balance 
which needs to be made in ‘reciprocity’ activities. For instance, a person who has rejected repaying 
a favour received, which means this person refuses to repay a ‘renqing’. Here, ‘renqing’ can be 
regarded as another name for the favours exchanged, if the repayment of ‘renqing’ is rejected, 
negative consequences can follow, such as a negative reputation and the loss of Guanxi. This 
finding is consistent with the study of Wang et al. (2008) who claimed the process of ‘renqing’ 
exchange is a type of obligation-based favour exchange that seems to be the determinant of 
Guanxi’s maintenance, which is similar to a typical business relationship where a seller provides 
goods and a buyer provides currency. Those unable to fulfil such business rule will be treated as 
violators (ibid). 
  
Therefore, ‘renqing’ to some extent, plays the role of currency to fulfil the transactional part of 
Guanxi relationships. When a person offers a gift or a favour to a friend, which means there is a 
‘renqing’ being sent, then the friend owes this person a ‘renqing’. This is a typical transactional 
process, the gifts or favours are the goods, the ‘renqing’ is the money. The seller offers goods, and 
the buyer uses ‘renqing’ to buy. The difference is that such a transaction seems not to have to be 
completed immediately, the payment can be delayed. In other words, the buyer uses credits to buy 
the goods but does not need to pay immediately. In the future, the goods seller can ask the buyer 
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to repay the credits in order to make a balance in finance, which means to ask the ‘renqing’ receiver 
to provide similar or the same helps and favours to compensate those offered previously.  
 
This result also proves the previous studies. A favour seeker has two choices while asking for 
specific help from those having the ability to offer help, to ask a favour provider for repaying a 
‘renqing’ if the favour provider owes one, or to ask an intermediary that the favour seeker knows, 
who has ‘renqing’ owned by someone else who has the same ability (Su & Littlefield, 2001). When 
the exchange process is complete, that means the help has been provided, which would result in 
two consequences. If the favour seeker asks for a ‘renqing’ back directly without an intermediary, 
then the ‘renqing’ debt between the favour seeker and the favour provider is compensated (Chen 
& Chen, 2004). If the favour seeker asks for a ‘renqing’ through an intermediary, then the favour 
seeker owes a ‘renqing’ to the intermediary, also the ‘renqing’ debt between the intermediary and 
the favour provider is compensated (ibid). Hence, ‘renqing’ here is probably a currency 
representing credits based on Guanxi. Because of the Guanxi, both parties can confirm one 
another’s reliability, accordingly the transaction can be processed successfully.  
 
Also, ‘renqing’ is important because it is not illegal. If the civil servants use money or its equivalent 
to pay or repay, there are risks of violating laws, because such behaviours could be identified as 
corruption. However, in the name of ‘reciprocity’, applying ‘renqing’ to do the job of money is 
probably safe, because the findings show that ‘reciprocity’ is the tradition, and ‘renqing’ is the 
foundation of this tradition. Although ‘renqing’ is intangible, it reflects an unwritten norm, just 
like a real currency. As Guanxi’s basic component is ‘renqing’ which is used for establishment 
and maintenance, having Guanxi means having ‘renqing’ and having ‘renqing’ means an expected 
repayment. Thus, ‘renqing’ makes Guanxi an intangible, but safe, currency for transactions in the 
public sector. 
 
Nevertheless, this argument has insufficient consideration of the different types of Guanxi. 
According to the findings, there are three main types of Guanxi in the public sector, which are 
‘benefits’ Guanxi (purely transactional), ‘working’ Guanxi (work-based) and ‘personal’ Guanxi 
(involving the emotional part). The ‘reciprocity’ normally happens in the ‘benefits’ Guanxi as this 
Guanxi is purely transactional. It also happens in ‘working’ Guanxi, because the work-based 
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relationship can also be transactional to some extent, such as the good Guanxi kept with the 
superior. In the last type of Guanxi, ‘reciprocity’ may not happen because it is not based on 
transactions.  
 
Here, the three types of Guanxi can be related to the Guanxi typology reviewed in the literature 
(see section 2.2.1). A new Guanxi typology was argued by the author depending on the literature 
(Hwang, 1987; Yang, 1993; Fan, 2002a; Luo, 2008; and Chen et al., 2013), which are ‘relative’ 
Guanxi (between family members and intimate friends), ‘benefits’ Guanxi (purely transactional) 
and ‘mixed’ Guanxi (beneficial and transactional). In comparison with the new Guanxi typology, 
based on the summary of the literature, the Guanxi types mentioned by the participants can confirm 
the former rationality. At first, the ‘personal’ Guanxi at work means there is an emotional part 
which is friendship involved between the parties. The ‘relative’ Guanxi also comprises friendships, 
in addition to the Guanxi between family members. Hence, in the workplace, the ‘personal’ Guanxi 
means the ‘relative’ Guanxi. Then, the ‘benefits’ Guanxi according to the participants and the 
‘benefits’ Guanxi based on the literature are the same because they are all purely transactional. 
Finally, the ‘working’ Guanxi is work-based. Namely, it could include personal aspects such as 
the friendship arising during collaboration at work, and the benefits part, such as the good Guanxi 
kept with the superior. In other words, this Guanxi type is both emotional and transactional, which 
is same as the ‘mixed’ Guanxi summaries based on the literature. Therefore, the three Guanxi types 
mentioned in the findings confirm the reorganisation of Guanxi typology through summarising the 
five Guanxi typologies in the literature (Hwang, 1987; Yang, 1993; Fan, 2002a; Luo, 2008; and 
Chen et al., 2013), is reasonable and practical. 
 
To sum up, Guanxi is a reflection of reciprocal exchange and generalised exchange in the specific 
context of China. ‘Reciprocity’ is applied to establish and maintain Guanxi in the public sector. 
The gifts or favours used for exchange in ‘reciprocity’ is ‘renqing’. A person having Guanxi means 
having ‘renqing’, which means an expected repayment. Thus, to the Chinese public civil servants, 
these features make Guanxi an intangible but safe currency for exchange in the public sector. 
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5.1.3 A traditional responsibility but also an unbearable burden 
The findings display that there is a ‘clan culture’ existing among civil servants. This culture refers 
to a kind of collectively accepted action pattern that makes power-owners, either intentionally or 
forcedly, fulfil the responsibility of providing help to families and relatives. Otherwise, the power-
owners can be blamed by their families or be excluded from Guanxi networks by relatives. In terms 
of those having power in the public sector, there seem to be two different perspectives towards 
providing help to relatives. The first kind is those helping relatives consciously, they may think 
the individual’s good life or high social status is not enough, they seek a common prosperity of the 
family or their Guanxi networks. A typical example can be found according to the participants, 
many civil servants participate in unethical activities for their second generation because of this. 
The reason that there is such a custom which exists could be due to the culture of collectivism. 
The civil servants probably treat themselves as dependent individuals of the collection of the clan. 
They think they have responsibility to take care of the other members to ensure the entire clan can 
have a good life. Therefore, when someone in the family or their Guanxi networks needs help, they 
would provide. 
 
Conversely, the findings also show that some civil servants may not have the same perspective. 
They may only care about themselves instead of the entire clan. Alternatively, they may think the 
‘clan culture’ to them, is a kind of burden. So, while the other family members or relatives ask for 
help, they may refuse. Apparently, such behaviours probably lead to blame and other negative 
consequences, based on the findings. This is similar to some participants’ perspectives in terms of 
‘reciprocity’.  Some of them argued that the majority of civil servants are too tired to be forced to 
engage in ‘reciprocity’. This is because ‘reciprocity’ costs time, money and energy. However, there 
is no way to escape because ‘reciprocity’ is the way to build and keep Guanxi, without Guanxi 
they can do and gain nothing in the public sector. There seem to be no similar findings in the 
literature about this point. Although there are many studies which prove the importance of Guanxi 
in China, researchers appear to have neglected the forced involvement of numerous Guanxi 
participants, especially in the public sector. Therefore, future research could pay more attention to 
this point. 
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In summary, concerning the civil servants in the Chinese public sector, Guanxi is a pathway in 
response to the traditional culture of clan and also, because of the Guanxi’s component, 
‘reciprocity’ costs time, money and energy, making Guanxi a heavy burden. Therefore, to Chinese 
servants, Guanxi means a way of fulfilling traditional responsibility but is also an unbearable 
burden.  
 
This negative aspect of Guanxi seems to be neglected in the literature. The existent relative studies 
normally concentrate on if and how Guanxi works in corruption. For example, the process of 
building and keeping Guanxi is synonymous with corruption as gift-sending, a typical way of 
establishing and maintaining Guanxi (Smeltzer & Jennings, 1998; Lovett et al., 1999; Yao, 1999), 
and as Guanxi is mainly cultivated by the exchange of favours, such as help or gifts (Su & 
Littlefield, 2001), individual government officials thus tend to charge ‘economic rent’ when using 
their Guanxi networks, which results in widespread bureaucratic corruption (Hwang & Staley, 
2005; Pederson & Wu, 2006). Also, the literature widely believes that Guanxi has fuelled the 
rampant corruption in China (Bedford, 2011; Zhan, 2012; Qi, 2013; Nie & Lämsä, 2015; Barbalet, 
2017; Karhunen et al., 2018), but in contrast, some studies claim that “Guanxi is no more 
equivalent to corruption than social drinking is to drunkenness” (Tsang, 1998), Guanxi serves to 
corruption can only be argued that those participants achieve corrupt targets through Guanxi (
Barbalet, 2017). However, there seems no studies pay attention to the parties themselves in Guanxi 
relationships. Question like, ‘how do they perceive Guanxi’, is far less than addressed.  
 
Therefore, this study may provide a new research direction to attract further study, to carry out 
more details about how, why, and what questions in terms of the Guanxi parties in both the public 
sector and the private sector. Also, from the aspect of Guanxi participants, this can be a new way 
to explore why and how corruption happens in the Chinese public sector. In addition to those 
external factors such as organisational environment and insufficient supervision mechanism, the 
internal factors such as civil servants’ personal perception concerning Guanxi and corruption could 
be the other significant factors to decide if they engage in corruption.  
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5.2 What does Corruption mean to Chinese civil servants? 
5.2.1 An illegal behaviour that is clearly identified 
The findings indicate that the civil servants in the Chinese public sector seem to have a clear 
understanding of corruption. They all know corrupt activities are illegal and unethical and should 
be avoided completely. In terms of the definition of corruption, this study’s interviewees 
mentioned several points that are similar with studies reviewed in the literature, also they offered 
some new perspectives that have probably been neglected by previous studies. Indeed, corruption 
is the abuse of public power for private gains. This point confirms the main definition of corruption 
in the public sector in the literature (Nye, 1967; Wederman, 2004; Palmer & Maher, 2006; 
Agbiboa, 2012; Teachout, 2016). Similarly, corruption is the privatisation of public power, which 
means the actors treat public power as a private power for personal benefits. As the majority of 
studies in the field of corruption were conducted in a Western context, their findings may differ 
from others extracted from a totally different cultural context, such as in the Chinese public sector. 
This point indicates that the widely accepted definition of corruption in the Western context is also 
applicable in the Chinese context.  
 
However, although the Western and Chinese context have a common view about what corruption 
is in general, the findings also display that they are likely to have a different understanding towards 
what kind of activities can be defined as corruption. According to (Nye, 1967), “corruption is the 
behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the 
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence”. Namely, Nye takes the perspective that 
corruption is those in power refusing to fulfil their positional responsibilities or violating 
regulations and rules, depending on private interpersonal links for obtaining personal benefits. 
However, if using this perspective to identify corruption, then ‘everyone in the Chinese public 
sector is corrupt’. 
 
According to the interviewees, as there seem to be no solutions for this dilemma, the Chinese 
public sector sets a ‘grey space’ to differentiate normal Guanxi and unethical Guanxi that is used 
for private gains, which is corruption. For example, if the value of the gift of ‘reciprocity’ in 
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Guanxi is under a certain amount, the Guanxi would be regarded as regular. Conversely, if the 
value is over the amount set, then the Guanxi could be identified as corruption. The grey space is 
probably an area fertile for considerably more research in the future. It is likely to be a reflection 
of the Chinese Doctrine of the Mean: to stay in the middle. They create a balance between 
allowance and disallowance. To some extent, this is a good solution to deal with a dilemma, but 
there is a limitation about the promotion of more corruption which follows. Civil servants now can 
legally do transactional ‘reciprocity’ in the public sector for private gains only if they know the 
limit. This can only deal with those exchange by gifts but those by favours, because there is no 
way to value a favour, therefore this kind of ‘reciprocity’ is hard to standardise. 
 
Overall, although there is a common view which defines corruption in the Western and Chinese 
context, it is only in a general sense. Both contexts assume corruption is the misuse of public power 
for private benefits, although there some nicknames to describe corruption in China, such as the 
privatisation of public power, the essence of the description is same. However, if we look at the 
details of, for example, the kind of activities which constitute corruption, the two contexts seem to 
offer different perspectives. The Western context probably tends to define any behaviours that 
satisfy the two features: misusing public power and gaining private benefits, as corruption. In 
contrast, the standard in the Chinese context is likely to be less black and white, according to this 
study’s interviewees. 
 
My findings reflect some points that remind of Luo’s (2005) understanding of corruption. 
According to Luo (2005), corruption can be ‘context-based’, ‘norm-deviated’, ‘power-related’, 
‘virtually covert’, ‘intentional’, ‘ex-post opportunistic’, and ‘perceptional’. At first, the findings 
reflect that corrupt activities are different in the Western and Chinese contexts. In China, some 
behaviours are regarded as normal social etiquette, but taken out of context and interpreted through 
lenses developed through Western cultural standards, they may not. This confirms the nature of 
‘context-based’ (Luo, 2005). Then, the interviewees mentioned Chinese civil servants mainly 
agree that corruption is the abuse of public power, which is the violation of regulations and laws. 
This confirms the nature of ‘norm-deviated’ (ibid). Next, the findings display that corruption in 
the Chinese public sector may have resulted from insufficient supervision, such as the considerable 
power of the superior discussed in the last section, which is associated with the ‘power-related’ 
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nature. In addition, according to the interviewees, there are no written norms for the payment and 
repayment of ‘reciprocity’ which is used for building and keeping Guanxi. In corruption activities, 
therefore, the corrupt exchange of ‘reciprocity’ is covert, which is related to the nature of ‘virtually 
covert’. Moreover, the findings show that corruption in the Chinese public sector is intentional, 
these corrupt civil servants intend to build corrupt connections. This point confirms that corruption 
has the nature of ‘intentional’ (Luo, 2005). Furthermore, the findings indicate that the ‘ex-post 
opportunistic’ is also reflected through the findings. Like the process of ‘reciprocity’, although 
there is tacit agreement about the payment and repayment, such an agreement is not compulsory. 
In other words, the corruption process can be interrupted artificially, such as those superiors who 
accept gifts but refuse to offer help. 
 
Finally, according to the study’s interviewees, corruption has a ‘perceptional’ nature. Luo (2005) 
considered the perceived corruption practices can be further distinguished by moral implications 
as ‘white’, ‘black’ or ‘grey’. The ‘white’ corruption can be tolerated by the public in some cases, 
such as a certain type of misconduct, the ‘black’ corruption is definitely condemned, and the ‘grey’ 
corruption is often ambiguous. This seems to be the only study that mentions a similar concept of 
the ‘grey space’ in the literature, which is proved by the findings. However, the difference can still 
be found. In the Chinese public sector, the ‘grey space’ sets a certain amount of gift value, which 
means it has a specific standard, clearly identifying ambiguous behaviours can apply to this 
standard. In contrast, Luo’s (2005) ‘grey’ corruption merely emphasises ‘ambiguous’, which is 
probably too general. Accordingly, Luo’s (2005) perspective is likely to be limited in terms of this 
point, or at least in the Chinese context. The ‘grey space’ finding may be a valuable complement 
to Luo’s (2005) perspective, which refers the ‘grey’ corruption to ‘restricted’ corruption in addition 
to the ‘black’ and the ‘white’ corruption. Specifically, corruption in the Chinese public sector 
indeed can be ‘black’ (definitely condemned), ‘white’ (could be tolerated by the public) and ‘grey’ 
(ambiguous). However, the ‘grey’ corruption can not only involve those ambiguous corruption, 
but also those ‘restricted’ corruption, such as the ‘grey space’ according to the study’s interviewees. 
In other words, such corruption is allowed to some extent in the Chinese public sector, or a least it 
is not illegal. Therefore, this point can be a further development of Luo’s (2005) study. 
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In summary, the findings reflect that Chinese civil servants have a clear understanding of 
corruption. They agree that corruption is a kind of illegal and unethical behaviour which is 
reflected in the misuse of public power for private gains, which is consistent with the definition by 
most Western scholars (Andvig et al., 2001; Anand et al., 2005; Seleim & Bontis, 2009). However, 
the findings also show the ‘grey space’ in the public sector, which challenge the perspective of 
Luo (2005). Therefore, civil servants in the Chinese public sector probably have a different 
perspective in comparison with those in the Western context. To Chinese civil servants, corruption 
means an illegal behaviour that is clearly identified.  
 
This project at first confirms a number of representative studies of corruption field in the Chinese 
public sector, such as how scholars generally define corruption in the Western context. Then this 
project offers a new perspective about corruption in the public sector that not every public sector 
treat corruption as a kind of unallowed and unethical behaviours. At least in the Chinese public 
sector, ‘restricted’ corruption is officially allowed and is not illegal. In other words, this could be 
a balanced solution to deal with the relationship between the requirement of anti-corruption and 
the unavoidable Guanxi, which could be a reflection of the Chinese doctrine of the mean. 
Additionally, the ‘grey space’ also reflects the difference in terms of understanding corruption in 
the Chinese and the Western context. Western understanding may be applicable in the Chinese 
context to some extent, but Chinese civil servants still have their distinct understanding. The 
interesting question is, if a behaviour is legal and allowed in the Chinese public sector but is 
defined as corruption based on the Western context, if this behaviour is still corruption. Indeed, 
the Chinese answer could be negative. Therefore, to the academic field, understanding corruption 
may need to consider local factors such as culture and environment sufficiently. 
 
 
5.2.2 An unavoidable phenomenon 
The findings indicate a number of potential causes that may bring corruption to the public sector, 
these causes are probably difficult to escape. Therefore, to Chinese civil servants, corruption could 
be an unavoidable phenomenon which has occurred for many reasons. According to the 
participants, there are three main antecedents of corruption, which are: the absence of an effective 
supervision mechanism, the corrupt environment and the imbalance between civil servants’ 
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political and economic status.  
 
Firstly, corruption in the Chinese public sector is probably because of an insufficient supervision 
mechanism. A typical example was discussed previously about the considerable power of the 
superior of the public organisation. If there is a sufficient supervision mechanism, those superiors 
cannot have such power, which means they have no ability to allocate the opportunity of promotion 
to someone with whom they have good Guanxi with. This point shows consistent with the 
arguments of ‘discretionary power’ and ‘weak institutions’ which were stated by Aidt (2003) as 
two of three necessary requirements to result in corruption. The unlimited authority of public 
officials towards the institution and administration of regulations and policies (ibid). The 
incentives embodied in institutions such as the absence of authority supervision systems and the 
deficiency of regulation enforcement capacity which encourages public officials to exploit their 
unlimited power for private benefits extraction or creation (ibid). Secondly, Aidt’s (2003) another 
argument, ‘economic rents’, is also confirmed by the findings. This is because having Guanxi can 
give the owner considerable benefits such as promotion opportunities and special treatment. As 
Aidt (2003) said, private financial benefits which can be extracted or created by public officials 
via misusing the unlimited public power. Here, the findings add to Aidt’s (2003) argument that in 
addition to economic rents, other kinds of rents such as special treatment can also encourage civil 
servants to misuse public power. Overall, the three necessary requirements to bring corruption 
claimed by Aidt (2003) were sufficiently proved by the findings. The Chinese public sector seems 
to have all of the three requirements. In other words, these points can be the reasons to explain 
why corruption in the Chinese public sector is hard to avoid. 
 
Then, the findings also indicate that a corrupt public service environment may force the individual 
member to be involved in corruption. That is to say, if the individual members try to escape, they 
could be treated like ‘Hai Rui’, which would mean exclusion by their colleagues and superiors, or 
even subordinates. Therefore, the only way to serve in this organisation is to participate in it. Also, 
the findings reflect that innocent new entrants may be transformed into accomplices of corruption 
unconsciously. In the organisation, all the new entrants can do is to follow the superior’s order. If 
the superior is corrupt, then they are involved slowly, from slight misconduct to corruption. 
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The first and second points are strongly related to the perspective of first-order and second-order 
corruption (Zyglidopoulos, 2015), which was reviewed in the literature. This perspective classifies 
corruption into first-order (where corrupt actors misuse their power or authority for illegal gains 
in a normal system of existing regulations or norms) and second-order (where corrupt actors 
misuse power for personal benefits via transforming existing regulations or norms). Namely, first-
order means individual corruption, and second-order refers to the corruption of individuals in 
power. The key is whether the corrupt individuals have power or not, which is because corrupt 
individuals without power generate much less influence to the entire organisation in comparison 
with those in power as they cannot dominate the entire organisation.  
 
In the Chinese public sector, second-order corruption could be a possible scenario to explain cases 
of organisational corruption. Initially, there is an absence of an effective supervision mechanism 
to corrupt superiors, which enables them to have considerable power to dominate the entire 
organisation. Then the corrupt superiors allocate unethical tasks to the subordinates, as the corrupt 
superiors can significantly influence their personal interests, hence the subordinates are unlikely 
to refuse the tasks, although they may know these tasks are unethical. Eventually, they become a 
part of corruption, and the entire organisation can become corrupt. Therefore, according to the 
participants’ quotes, Zyglidopoulos’s first-order and second-order corruption is confirmed in the 
Chinese context. Indeed, a slight difference can be found that there is probably no need for corrupt 
superiors in the Chinese public organisation to change the regulations or norms for serving corrupt 
goals because their hands on power may be strong enough to force the subordinates to follow 
unethical orders. Therefore, Zyglidopoulos’s notion can be developed in the Chinese context. 
 
Moreover, the findings display that the potential cause of corruption in the public sector is likely 
to be the imbalance between civil servants’ political status and economic status, according to the 
participants. In other words, although the civil servants may have considerable public power, their 
wages are relatively low. For example, the superior’s power can make someone rich if they want 
because they have the authority to allocate limited resources, which are monopolised by the public 
sector. However, their legal incomes, such as wages and bonuses, are much lower than the financial 
benefits that they can bring to the others through their power. This virtually creates an imbalance 
between civil servants’ political status and economic status. Accordingly, this could be an 
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important antecedent of corruption in the public sector. 
 
Indeed, this result agrees with the findings of other studies, in which about low government wages 
may bring more corruption in the public sector (Rijckeghem & Weder, 1997; Rijckeghem & 
Weder, 2001; Azfar & Nelson, 2007; Dimant & Tosato, 2018). These studies likewise considered 
increasing government wages can effectively mitigate corruption, but lower wages may encourage 
civil servants to engage in corruption for extra financial benefits. This point typically challenges 
the opposite perspective argued by Navot et al. (2016), they thought higher wages may advance 
civil servants’ self-interests, then eventually stimulate them to accept bribes. The reason that why 
the findings of this project tend to support the former perspective could be the wages of Chinese 
civil servants are relatively low, which means there are rooms for the increment. As it was analysed 
by Chen & Liu (2018), wages and regulations are described as ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, giving more 
‘carrots’ is effective in reducing corruption while government wages remain low. However, once 
enough ‘carrots’ have been given ‘sticks’ are needed to deter corruption (ibid). 
 
Furthermore, the findings confirm the study of Gerring & Thacker (2004), who claimed the 
absence of three institutional features that can bring corruption, which are ‘openness and 
transparency’, ‘decision rules’, ‘public administration’. Again, the Chinese public sector has an 
absence of such features according to the study’s interviewees. Initially, because there is a lack of 
decision-making transparency in the public organisation, the superior can therefore allocate limited 
resources to those they have good Guanxi with, instead of observing official rules and regulations. 
This is the first absence of the feature of ‘openness and transparency’. Then, the decision-making 
process of the superior in the Chinese public sector is a reflection of the centralisation of power, 
which means eventually the superior always plays a decisive role. Therefore, this is another 
absence of the feature of ‘decision rules’. Finally, the interviewees mentioned there seems to have 
an insufficient public administration in terms of the decision-making in the public sector. This 
again satisfies the absence of the feature of ‘public administration’. 
 
To sum up, the evidence of this project confirmed the arguments of Aidt (2003) and Gerring & 
Thacker (2004). However, the imbalance between civil servants’ political and economic status 
seems not to be included in their concepts. This could be because their research was conducted in 
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those developed countries where the civil servants’ legal incomes are relatively high, or at least 
there is no such gap between their public power and wages. Therefore, the findings complement 
the research of Aidt, Gerring & Thacker in the context of developing or undeveloped countries. 
 
Additionally, the findings display more causes of corruption in the Chinese public sector. These 
points are probably neglected in the literature, thereby these can be complementary to the literature 
in the same field. First of all, the custom of ‘ambiguity’ may lead to corruption. this is because it 
enables the superior of a public organisation to allocate organisational resources depending on 
personal preference, instead of official rules or regulations. This apparently can promote 
corruption, because those having good Guanxi with the superior can exchange resources by 
sending gifts or even money. Indeed, there are studies which, as previously discussed, considered 
the relationships between ‘ambiguity’ and corruption (Yang, 1989, Verhezen 2008), they consider 
‘ambiguity’ is a way to generate corruption. However, the understanding of how ‘ambiguity’ leads 
to corruption according to this project is probably different from previous studies. Yang and 
Verhezen claimed that ‘ambiguity’ resembles a kind of moral vaccine that means the holder is 
more likely to accept unethical moral standards, as well as to cover their corrupt behaviours as a 
disguise. In other words, ‘ambiguity’ emphasising the ‘art of Guanxi’, allows the actors to 
participate in unethical activities under ethical names, such as fulfilling obligation and reciprocity 
(Yang, 1989). In contrast, the function of ‘ambiguity’ towards corruption based on the findings in 
this project is different, ‘ambiguity’ here means the superior of a public organisation has the 
authority to define unclear regulations in order to achieve private benefits. Therefore, the two 
‘ambiguities’ seem to focus on different dimensions. The ‘ambiguity’ finding in this project could 
be a new complement to the literature. 
 
Then, the findings show that the ‘clan culture’ in the Chinese public can also generate corruption. 
This is because it reflects the civil servants’ traditional responsibility to their family and relatives. 
In order to fulfil the responsibility, they may use unethical ways, such as the example mentioned 
above, which is about corrupt civil servants participating in corruption for the generations 
following them. This point seems to be neglected in the literature, which could be because previous 
studies have been mainly based on the private sector. Participants in the private sector may also 
have such a culture, but they have no public power, hence their ability to participate in corruption 
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for this reason is limited because they cannot use public power for family or relatives. Therefore, 
this culture attracted no attention from scholars in the field of the private sector. However, those 
in the public sector have authority, especially those in power. They have the ability to offer favours 
to their family and relatives, even by corrupt ways. Accordingly, this point can be another 
complement to the literature. 
 
However, this finding seems to be similar to those previous studies about collectivism in the field 
of culture. As Mazar & Aggarwal (2001) said, people in a high degree collectivist national culture 
have more propensity to bribe. Also, different rules and rights are applied in different groups of 
collectivist societies (Hofstede, 1991), which usually explains why collectivism probably results 
in more corruption. In addition, as group loyalty is valued significantly in collectivist cultures, 
people tend to violate written laws or regulations without any hesitation if those laws or regulations 
conflict with their group norms, whether in the public or private sector (LaPalombara, 1994). 
Among these studies, a significant point is that people in collectivism probably perceive group 
interests in a higher priority than to observe regulations and laws. This point is similar to the 
findings of this project that Chinese civil servants seriously care about their family and relatives 
because of the ‘clan’ culture. Just like it was argued by Getz & Volkema (2001), people within 
collectivist cultures are more oriented to create strong interpersonal relationships, thus in order to 
exchange favours with other members of public officials’ own social group, they are more likely 
to act corruptly. 
 
Thirdly, this project finds that ‘renqing’ as the favours applied for ‘reciprocity’ can indeed promote 
corruption in the public sector due to the tacit agreement concerning its payment and repayment. 
In some cases, civil servants may use public power to repay personal ‘renqing’, which is 
corruption. Also, if civil servants treat ‘renqing’ more significantly than regulations, or even the 
laws, then corruption can be expected. There are studies which previously mentioned ‘renqing’ as 
arguably leading to corruption because of the nature of ‘currency’ for the use of corrupt exchange 
(Yang, 1994; Yan, 1996; Wang et al., 2008). However, the findings about the tacit agreement 
concerning the payment and repayment of ‘renqing’ and its higher priority than regulations or even 
laws for some civil servants found in this project are probably neglected in the literature. 
Accordingly, they could also be the complement. 
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In summary, according to the findings, a number of potential antecedents of corruption are 
indicated. Some of the antecedents are related to those reviewed in the literature, also some of 
them are not reflected in previous studies, which could be attractive for future researchers. As these 
antecedents seem to be distinct features of the Chinese public sector, thus to civil servants, 
corruption is an unavoidable phenomenon generated by many causes. 
 
 
 
5.3 How is Guanxi related to corruption in the Chinese public sector? 
The evidence from the findings shows that the majority of the participants consider that there are 
certain links between Guanxi and corruption. These links are associated with some previous 
studies. Initially, the findings are consistent with the three pathways of Guanxi at work in 
corruption which was argued by Wang (2016), who claimed the roles played by Guanxi: 
‘communication’ (a bridge to connect corrupt actors), ‘exchange’ (a way to exchange benefits) and 
‘neutralisation’ (an excuse to overcome moral and cognitive difficulties). At first, the result shows 
that Guanxi links corrupt individuals, which means Guanxi in the Chinese public sector plays a 
role of ‘communication’. Then, the findings indicate that corrupt civil servants apply Guanxi to 
exchange gifts and benefits, which displays the role of ‘exchange’. Finally, the findings point out 
that corrupt civil servants apply Guanxi as an excuse to legalise corruption. For instance, the gift 
sending or favour exchange for corruption can be under the name of ‘promoting friendship’. 
Therefore, the last pathway of ‘neutralisation’ is reflected. Overall, the findings confirmed Wang’s 
arguments about the three pathways of Guanxi which serve corruption. 
 
However, Wang’s arguments do not go far enough, as there are more pathways of Guanxi that 
could serve corruption according to the findings of this project, which are ‘motivation’, ‘norm 
avoidance’ and ‘risk reduction’. As mentioned above, the importance of Guanxi can strongly 
motivate civil servants to gain Guanxi, and sometimes they may do so via unethical ways, such as 
sending gifts and favours. Therefore, in relation to corruption activities, Guanxi plays the role of 
motivation. In these circumstances, Guanxi is a kind of loophole of regulations or even laws. 
Depending on Guanxi, the holder can achieve the goals that may not normally be permitted. 
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Therefore, Guanxi works in corrupt behaviours as ‘norm avoidance’. Lastly, Guanxi can reduce 
the risks of engaging in corruption, such as identifying a reliable partner before corruption, 
ensuring the parties remain secret as a group after corruption has taken place and looking for help 
once corruption is exposed. Thus, Guanxi also has the pathway of ‘risk reduction’ to serve 
corruption. To sum up, the three new pathways discussed above can be a further development of 
Wang’s notion. 
 
In addition, the result indicates that the nature of ‘reciprocity’ which is the basic component of 
Guanxi could be a prelude to corruption, because it is comprised of transactional exchange, in 
some cases. This point is consistent with the previous studies. Reciprocity is one of the 
determinants of a Guanxi relationship because it concerns Guanxi’s maintenance and development 
(Su & Littlefield, 2001). If the reciprocity tie is broken, which means a favour receiver refuses to 
repay a similar one or an equivalent to the favour provider, then the favour receiver would be 
blamed and labelled as untrustworthy, as this person has violated the unwritten principle of 
reciprocity (Alston, 1989; Wang, 2014). Hence, reciprocity probably means a Guanxi relationship 
has a kind of mandatory feature that forces the parties involved to observe a principle of equal 
exchange. 
 
Also, using Guanxi is a short cut to reach difficult goals, such as getting access to limited research, 
which seems to be a loophole of norms and regulation. This can attract those who are unethical to 
utilise such loopholes to gain private benefits. This point agrees with the study of Qi (2013) who 
argued as Guanxi owner can gain exclusive access to resources, such as special treatment or limited 
information, as well as working on the basis of private relations instead of formal rules and 
regulations, it seems to have an inevitable link with corrupt activities. Similarly, the study of 
Barbalet (2017) likewise confimred that Guanxi is particularly used by people in order to avoid 
formal rules and regulations or even, occasionally, laws, which is linked with potential corruption. 
 
All of these findings are consistent with the study of Park & Luo (2001). They argued there are 
four characteristics of Guanxi that can induce corruption, which are ‘reciprocity’, ‘utilitarianism’, 
‘transferability’ and ‘intangibility’. At first, the ‘reciprocity’ of Guanxi can promote corruption. 
Indeed, this point has been discussed previously. Then, Guanxi’s utilitarianism may lead to 
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corruption. This point is also related to the findings about the transactional part of Guanxi 
relationships. Then, Guanxi’s ‘transferability’ is probably not reflected in the findings, which 
could be a potential research direction for the future. Lastly, the findings indicate that there are 
unwritten rules and regulations concerning Guanxi, such as the tacit agreement of payment and 
repayment about the ‘reciprocity’ in Guanxi relationships. This is the characteristic of 
‘intangibility’. Therefore, this project provides evidence showing that the concept of Park & Luo 
is also applicable in the Chinese public sector. 
 
Nevertheless, Park & Luo (2001) considered that Guanxi is mainly ‘utilitarianism’. According to 
the participants, however, there is more to Guanxi. According to my own synthesis of the previous 
findings (see the literature review section), Guanxi can be differentiated into three types: ‘benefits’, 
‘relative’ and ‘mixed’. The ‘benefits’ Guanxi refers to a purely transactional Guanxi relationship 
in order to gain private benefits. In contrast, the ‘relative’ Guanxi means a kind of stable and close 
Guanxi relationships which is based on emotions, such as friendship and kinship. Moreover, the 
last type, ‘mixed’ Guanxi, can be described as a mixed Guanxi relationship of the former two, such 
as the ‘benefits’ Guanxi which exists between family members. Therefore, the study of Park & 
Luo seems to have an absence of sufficient consideration about these Guanxi types. According to 
their argument, the Guanxi mentioned in their study is only the types of ‘benefits’ and ‘mixed’ 
instead of ‘relative’, which is because the last Guanxi type is purely emotional-based. This problem 
is likely to exist not only in the study of Park & Luo, but also in the majority of studies concerning 
the field of Guanxi. 
 
Moreover, the finding reflects that Guanxi can reduce the risk of engaging in corruption before the 
corruption happens (to identify reliable partners), after the corruption (to cover corrupt activities) 
and while the corruption is being exposed (to save the parties by asking those in power by Guanxi). 
This point seems to have no similar studies in the literature, which means it could be neglected by 
previous research. A further study may be conducted, which focus on specific corruption cases, to 
investigate how Guanxi works as these functions in more details. Also, how effective that Guanxi 
do these works. 
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Based on the discussion in the last section (5.1.1), this project could be a development about the 
debate in the literature concerning whether or not it is inevitable that Guanxi generates corruption 
(Yang, 1994; Tsang, 1998; Braendle et al., 2005; Qi, 2013). This is because Guanxi has two 
significant components which are a bonding social capital part and a bridging social capital part. 
Most of the studies concentrated on investigating the difference between Guanxi and corruption, 
like the study of Luo (2002), which argued nine differences between Guanxi and corruption. 
However, they neglected the essential reason that differentiates Guanxi from corruption, which is 
the bonding social capital part of Guanxi. For example, Luo argued Guanxi to be “an ingredient of 
social norm”, and corruption as deviating from social norm. Indeed, the bridging social capital part 
of Guanxi used for bypassing the regulations and rules is also the violation of social norms. Also, 
Luo argued Guanxi to be legal, whereas corruption is not. Indeed, the bridging social capital part 
of Guanxi in order to gain private benefits is also illegal. Moreover, Luo claimed, “Guanxi 
essentially builds on favour exchange, whereas corruption mostly involves monetary exchange”. 
Again, the bridging social capital part of Guanxi for corruption likewise uses monetary exchange. 
Therefore, all the differences between Guanxi and corruption argued by Luo are because Luo’s 
focus is on the bridging social capital part of Guanxi. In contrast, if investigating Guanxi from the 
perspective of bonding social capital, the research result may be completely different, as discussed 
above.  
 
Overall, the existing studies concerning Guanxi mainly have this problem. Those arguing that 
Guanxi does not inevitably lead to corruption focus on the bonding social capital part of Guanxi. 
Then, those arguing that Guanxi inevitably results in corruption focus on the bridging social capital 
part of Guanxi. In terms of an undivided Guanxi concept, Guanxi is unable to necessarily promote 
corruption, because the bonding social capital part is based on emotion and affection that generally 
occurs between family members and close friends, which may have no corrupt essence here. 
However, Guanxi can bring corruption due to its bridging social capital part. In this event, 
corruption may be the consequence because of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘renqing’. This point could be 
significant for future studies and needs to be sufficiently considered. For instance, further research 
may consider both Guanxi parts which are the bonding social capital part and the bridging social 
capital part. Alternatively, further research may clarify which part of Guanxi it focuses. 
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In summary, in terms of the question of how Guanxi is related to corruption in the Chinese public 
sector, there are two parts to this answer. At first, concerning the aspect of Guanxi’s bonding social 
capital part, Guanxi probably has no relationship with corruption. This is because such Guanxi 
only serves the expression of emotions instead of obtaining private benefits. Secondly, concerning 
the bridging social capital aspect, there is sufficient evidence based on the findings arguing that 
Guanxi may have a significant link with corruption. It serves to corruption activities by various 
pathways such as playing the roles of ‘communication’, ‘exchange’ and ‘neutralisation’’, as well 
as working as ‘motivation’, ‘norm avoidance’ and ‘risk reduction’. In other words, Guanxi is an 
important conceptual component of Chinese traditional culture that may be innocent in itself, 
because it is just a concept representing the interpersonal relationships in Chinese daily life. 
However, in certain cases, Guanxi’s bridging social capital feature could be applied as a tool or 
cha by unethical actors for achieving corrupt goals in the Chinese public sector. 
 
Furthermore, form these findings, this project offers a new perspective of Guanxi to the Chinese 
public sector that Guanxi works in both positive and negative dimensions. Form the negative side, 
the findings indicate that Guanxi, to some extent, can bring corruption because of its bridging 
social capital component. However, from the positive side, interviewees recalled instances in 
which Guanxi could generate welcome flexibility to the Chinese public sector. As Guanxi can 
bring benefits to the owners, such as the access to limited resources and special treatment. 
Therefore, although Guanxi can be a kind of loophole for unethical civil servants to bypass 
regulations and laws to reach corrupt targets, it can be an effective way for ethical civil servants 
to bypass burdensome political barriers and limitations. This point is similar to those studies which 
claimed corruption may ‘grease the economic wheel’ (Nye, 1967; Huntington, 1968; Méon & 
Weill, 2010; Dreher & Gassebner, 2013). Guanxi could be a factor to grease the operation of the 
public sector system. Likewise, as Guanxi is a burden to civil servants. Therefore, if the civil 
servants can undertake such burden and deal with it sufficient could be a criterion to judge a civil 
servant’s working ability. This is because Guanxi is not only beneficial to private benefits but also 
is beneficial to the work., according to the findings. Overall, Guanxi may reflect two completely 
different aspects to influence the Chinese public organisation in positive and negative. 
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Chapter 6.0 Conclusion 
This project investigated the relationship between Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public 
sector based on a social capital perspective by addressing four questions: ‘To what extent is the 
Chinese civil service a distinctive organisational environment?’, ‘How do Chinese civil servants 
utilise different Guanxi types in their work?’, ‘How do perceptions of Chinese civil servants push 
our understanding of the motives and circumstances surrounding corrupt organisational 
behaviour?’, and ‘To what extent do known theories explain the complex relationship between 
Guanxi and corruption and how do Chinese civil servants perceive it?’. This project tackled these 
questions through an inductive research approach and a qualitative research strategy. In order to 
gain an in-depth understanding of the research target, semi-structured interviews were carried out. 
There were 31 participants taking part in the interviews and they contributed their perspectives on 
the three research questions. The sampling of participants was balanced according to job status 
(in-service and retired), gender and regions (three provinces representing three different economic 
development levels in China). All the interview data was recorded in audio format, with the 
participants’ consent. The data was then transcribed on paper in Chinese. Then it was translated 
into English as the original version of quotes. Afterwards, the data was analysed inductively 
following a thematic analysis approach.  
 
The findings sufficiently answered the questions addressing the main research target, to investigate 
the relationships between Guanxi and corruption in the Chinese public sector. Firstly, the Chinese 
civil service displays distinctive features in comparison to Western countries, such as the power 
of the superior of public organisations is considerable that makes them to be the ‘king’ of the 
organisation; there is a kind of officially allowed corruption behaviour which names ‘grey space’;  
the ‘clan culture’ of civil servants that regard relatives’ interest at a high priority and the 
Confucianist ‘doctrine of the mean’.  
 
Secondly, to Chinese civil servants, Guanxi means ‘an invisible capital that brings significant 
competitive advantage at work’, ‘an intangible and safe currency of transactions’ and ‘a way to 
fulfil traditional responsibility, but also an unbearable burden’. Three new Guanxi types emerged 
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from the study: benefits Guanxi (purely benefit-oriented), relative Guanxi (purely emotion-
oriented) and mixed Guanxi (mixes the other two).  
 
Thirdly, to Chinese civil servants, corruption means ‘an illegal behaviour that is clearly identified’ 
but which also finds its roots in distinctive cultural and organisational issues specific to the Chinese 
civil service. In other words, the corrupt organisational behaviours happened in the Chinese civil 
service environment displayed some antecedents such as the absence of public power limitation. 
Likewise, some civil servants engage in corruption not for private interests, but to engage with ‘the 
doctrine of the mean’, to avoid being set apart from their peers. The findings also indicated there 
is a different understanding of corruption between China and the West.  
 
Finally, the Chinese civil servants’ perception of the relationship between Guanxi and corruption 
can be clarified through two aspects. At an emotional level, Guanxi is merely a part of the Chinese 
traditional culture in order to express emotions and common interpersonal relationships, therefore 
Guanxi has no necessary relationship with corruption. However, from a social capital perspective, 
Guanxi may result in corruption in the Chinese public sector as its transactional essence may be 
misused by unethical actors. Indeed, the main theoretical contribution of the study is the conceptual 
juxtaposition of Guanxi, social capital and social exchange theories, with Guanxi showing 
common elements with both, but also important differences, overall recommending Guanxi as the 
appropriate theoretical framing for Chinese organisational settings (rather than social capital or 
social exchange theories). 
 
In addition to answering the questions addressed, the findings confirmed a number of existing 
research findings relevant to the Chinese context. For instance, the first-order and second-order 
corruption (Zyglidopoulos, 2015) is confirmed by the findings. The Chinese public sector has a 
similar feature that the powerful superior has power to turn the entire organisation into corruption. 
Then, the findings prove the nature of corruption (Luo, 2005). The evidence shows similar features 
with Luo’s seven points: ‘context-based’, ‘norm-deviated’, ‘power-related’, ‘virtually covert’, 
‘intentional’, ‘ex-post opportunistic’, and ‘perceptional’. Also, the general requirements of 
corruption (Aidt, 2003) is confirmed, the environment of the Chinese public sector satisfy all the 
Adit’s requirements which are ‘discretionary power’, ‘economic rents’ and ‘weak institutions’. 
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This could be a reason to explain why corruption happens. In addition, the Chinese public sector 
displays more characteristics which are consistent with the study of Gerring & Thacker (2004) 
who claimed the absence of ‘openness and transparency’, ‘decision rules’, ‘public administration’ 
may bring corruption. Moreover, the three pathways of Guanxi serving to corruption (Wang, 
2016), is likewise proved by the findings. Guanxi indeed serves to corruption in the Chinese public 
sector by the roles of ‘communication’, ‘exchange’ and ‘neutralisation’. Furthermore, the findings 
show evidence which agrees with the four characteristics of Guanxi that can promote corruption 
(Park & Luo, 2001). Guanxi has the features of ‘reciprocity’, ‘utilitarianism’, ‘transferability’ and 
‘intangibility’ that may lead to corruption in the Chinese public sector. Lastly, the nine differences 
between Guanxi and corruption (Luo, 2002) are confirmed by the findings to argue that Guanxi is 
not necessarily equal to corruption.  
 
Yet my findings also added some novel factors to these studies, which seemed to be neglected in 
the extant literature. One novel finding is to do with three new pathways (‘motivation’, ‘norm 
avoidance’ and ‘risk reduction’) added to the pathways of Wang (2016) between Guanxi and 
corruption. In addition to Wang’s three pathways: ‘communication’, ‘exchange’ and 
‘neutralisation’, Guanxi also has the pathway of ‘risk reduction’ to serve corruption in the Chinese 
public sector before corruption, after corruption and while corruption exposes. Then, in addition, 
the first-order and second-order corruption argued by Zyglidopoulos (2015) can be developed 
according the findings. The second-order of corruption means where corrupt actors misuse power 
for personal benefits via transforming existing regulations or norms. However, the evidence from 
the Chinese public sector shows that there is probably no need for corrupt superiors in the public 
organisation to change the regulations or norms for serving corrupt goals because their hands on 
power may be strong enough to force the subordinates to follow unethical orders. Therefore, this 
point could be new complement of Zyglidopoulos’s concept.  
 
Moreover, Aidt (2003) claimed three requirements concerning the promotion of corruption, which 
are ‘discretionary power’, ‘economic rents’ and ‘weak institutions’. However, the findings of this 
project show that the imbalance between civil servants’ political and economic can also generate 
corruption, which is a new complement to Aidt’s concept. This result also challenges those 
previous studies considering higher wages may advance civil servants’ self-interests, then 
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eventually stimulate them  to accept bribes (Navot et al., 2016). Furthermore, there are certain 
completely new findings that are not related to any existing studies. For example, ‘the ‘grey space’ 
between ‘reciprocity’ and ‘corruption’, the custom of ‘clan culture’, and the majority of Chinese 
civil servants treat Guanxi as a traditional responsibility but also an unbearable burden. 
 
Furthermore, according to the findings, Guanxi as a Chinese-based concept seems to involve some 
characteristics of both social capital and social exchange concepts. Indeed, ‘family Guanxi’ is 
similar to ‘bonding social capital’ which depends on emotions and affections. Similarly, ‘benefits 
Guanxi’ is similar to ‘bridging social capital’ which relies on benefits exchange. Then, the findings 
suggest that the ‘reciprocity’ feature of Guanxi is similar to reciprocal exchange and generalised 
exchange which are involved in the theory of social exchange. Hence, Guanxi could be a concept 
that encompasses features of both social capital and social exchange concepts. Nevertheless, 
Guanxi merely comprises only certain features of these two concepts, which means they are not 
entirely interchangeable.  
 
On the contrary, there are clear distinctions between Guanxi and both social capital and social 
exchange theories: the latter two speak of a ‘choice’ for individuals in organisations to engage in 
reciprocity within social networks, but this research’s findings suggest that Chinese civil servants 
have no such ‘choice’ - tradition and culture impose Guanxi on them and they have no latitude to 
decide whether or not to engage in it. Work in Chinese public organisations entails reciprocity and 
social capital and cannot be disentangled from it - in contrast with work in Western organisations, 
whether public and private. 
 
Additionally, Guanxi does not only bring negative consequences to work in Chinese public sector; 
positive aspects can also be identified. For example, Guanxi may bring flexibility for civil servants 
to bypass burdensome political barriers and limitations - ‘greasing the economic wheel’. Likewise, 
Guanxi can be a criterion to judge civil servants’ working skills, because having good Guanxi 
means knowing how to collaborate with superiors, colleagues and subordinates. Indeed, these 
positive aspects of Guanxi bring not only to individual members but also to the organisation. 
Keeping good Guanxi with all of other organisational members arguably brings harmony to the 
organisation, which may result in positive consequence to the organisation’s interests more or less, 
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sooner or later. This point is probably a typical reflection of the Chinese ‘doctrine of the mean’ 
which is a very different aim than preferential private outcomes, as is the case with organisational 
use of social capital in Western contexts. 
 
In short, according to the findings, Guanxi is a more appropriate theoretical lens for corruption 
occurrence and perpetuation in Chinese organisations, as it offers culturally appropriate nuances 
over and above its Western theoretical counterparts. The concept of social capital points at the 
infrastructure for corrupt behaviours, whereas social exchange theory can explain the intention 
behind corrupt activities through that infrastructure. Guanxi can help explain both the 
infrastructure and the intention of corruption. Based on Luo’s (2002) study, Guanxi is “an 
ingredient of social norm”, and corruption as deviating from social norm. The findings indicate 
further that there seems to have two social norms in China, which are general public social norm 
(i.e. do not corrupt) and social norm in the public sector (i.e. if you do not build up Guanxi, you 
are out). Namely, in China, the social norm existed in the general society and in the public sector 
is different. 
 
Concerning Luo’s (2008) study who categorised Guanxi into ‘weak form’ and ‘strong form’, it 
presented a figure with four cells which are ‘normal’, ‘cancer’, ‘virus’ and ‘moth’ depending on 
the risk of engaging public power abuse, in order to explain how Guanxi and corruption are 
intertwined (see section 2.4.2, Figure 9). The findings of this project indeed investigated the 
question that was neglected in Luo’s (2008) study: why Guanxi is intertwined with corruption. 
Also, this project studied further in terms of how Guanxi serves to corruption. These questions 
were answered from the perspective of social capital, and the theory of social exchange is likewise 
related. The findings display Guanxi could be a concept that encompasses features of both social 
capital and social exchange concepts, but they are not entirely interchangeable. Concerning 
corruption, Guanxi may not be essentially corrupt, it is misused by corrupt civil servants for 
unethical purposes. In other words, Guanxi is a necessary but insufficient condition for corruption. 
Therefore, this project could be a development of Luo’s (2008) study. 
 
 
198 
 
Overall, this project pushes knowledge in this field at four different levels. The first level concerns 
business ethics. The studies investigated the topic of corruption in the public sector. The majority 
of the existing studies in the literature are based on the Western context. This project conducted 
research of corruption in the Chinese context, to fill this gap. In doing so, it has confirmed a number 
of studies in the literature and providing some new findings and perspectives.  
 
Secondly, at the organisational level, the Chinese civil service environment was investigated. Most 
of the studies in this direction in the literature focused on the private sector, this project also filled 
this gap. According to this project, how civil servants in the Chinese public sector behave 
concerning Guanxi and corruption was clarified. This point could be a big contribution to extend 
the study of organisational behaviour, which is because Chinese civil servants and the Chinese 
public sector are specific and unique. This project confirmed that a number of organisational 
theories conducted in the Western context or the private sector of China also work in Chinese 
public organisations, as well as among the members inside. At the same time, the differences and 
any inapplicable points were indicated. 
 
Thirdly, this project also contributes to theory. At first, some typical theories and concepts 
reviewed in the literature were demonstrated, and new components were added, depending on the 
research findings. Then, this project provides a new perspective concerning social capital to 
research Guanxi and corruption. The two parts of Guanxi were identified, which are the emotional 
part and the transactional part. The findings have proved that the transactional part of Guanxi plays 
the same role for Chinese civil servants in the public sector, in the same way as the role played by 
social capital in the Western context. Therefore, Chinese Guanxi, as a kind of interpersonal 
relationship, is a combined concept of social exchange theory and social capital but going further 
to encompass cultural nuances of ‘clan’ and ‘doctrine of the mean’. 
 
Methodologically, the research benefitted from unprecedented access to Chinese civil servants, 
including some in top positions. This is normally extremely difficult to secure, which explains why 
most corruption research is done through secondary quantitative data (based on, for example, 
Transparency International corruption perception index) or synthesises theoretical perspectives 
from numerous disciplines. Qualitative studies on corruption, addressing ‘why’ and ‘how’ research 
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questions, are very rare in the corruption research ecosystem. Respondents were able and willing 
to engage meaningfully with the researcher and speak frankly about both corruption and Guanxi. 
This researcher was even able to record each interview in audio format, which is normally even 
more difficult than securing the interviews in the first place, and it improves the credibility of this 
project. The takeaway for future research is the importance of initial access to well-connected 
individuals and the importance of addressing sensitive topics such as corruption through questions 
which do not put the interviewee on the spot. 
 
In terms of future research and practice, this study posed some clear implications. In addition, this 
project found certain new directions that may not have been fully focused on in previous studies, 
which could be new areas for future research. For instance, the existent relative studies normally 
concentrate on if and how Guanxi works in corruption and what benefits can be brought by Guanxi. 
However, there seems no studies pay attention to the parties themselves in Guanxi relationships. 
The findings of this project indicate that Guanxi an unbearable burden to civil servants. Question 
like, ‘how do Guanxi parities perceive Guanxi’, is far less than addressed. Hence, future study may 
focus on this direction, to carry out more details about how, why, and what questions in terms of 
the Guanxi parties in both the public sector and the private sector. In addition, Guanxi’s 
‘transferability’ feature is probably not reflected in the findings, future research about Guanxi can 
pay more attention to this direction, to investigate if Guanxi is transferable, how do Guanxi being 
transferred, and if there are any differences after Guanxi being transferred.  
 
Moreover, the industry can also gain benefits from this project. As the Chinese public service 
environment is investigated, how civil servants treat Guanxi and corruption is clarified. Therefore, 
for those unfamiliar with the Chinese organisational environment, they can find effective ways to 
collaborate with the civil servants in China, to get to know the ‘grey space’, to know the tacit 
agreement concerning payment and repayment of ‘reciprocity’, and to avoid unethical behaviours. 
For example, with the increasing level of the openness of China in its economic fields, incoming 
foreign investors may get helps from this project. As China’s specific political system, it could be 
a challenge and also an opportunity to do business in China for them. Through reflecting the 
findings of this project, the foreign investors may learn how to deal with China’s local civil 
servants in terms of obtaining permission and governmental level support. They may apply gift-
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sending or favour exchange approaches to establish and keep good Guanxi with local civil 
servants, but they could notice where the ‘bottom line’ is in order to avoid violating any regulations 
and laws. Moreover, the findings of this project are not only useful in the Chinese context but also 
are applicable in the Western context. This is because although Guanxi is not completely same as 
the concept of social capital, their bridging parts are similar. In other words, the use of bridging 
social capital in the Western context can also be reflected through this project. Those doing 
business in the Western contest may also find the way and the importance to build and keep 
bridging social capital to benefit their business. 
 
Furthermore, this research offers an example for future studies conducting a sensitive topic like 
Guanxi & corruption. This research provided sufficient details from how to select qualified 
potential interviewees and how to use snowball sampling technique to maximise the quantity of 
qualified interviewees, to use a thematic data analysis approach to analyse a big amount of data. 
Additionally, this research also showed the techniques that how to ensure the participants to tell 
the “truth” in sensitive topic. Future studies focusing on similar research context such as China or 
the public sector may benefit from this research, they may learn how to conduct a sensitive topic 
in different countries, even in China, such a sensitive place. 
 
There are a number of limitations that can be identified in this project. First of all, the number of 
interview participants could have been increased. However, this point could be unavoidable 
because the research topic is extremely sensitive for Chinese civil servants, therefore seeking 
potential interview participants with the consent of audio record was difficult, even with the 
generous access the researcher was able to get. Then, the raw data was initially recorded by audio 
in Chinese, afterwards were transcribed on paper and translated to English as quotes. During this 
process, language problems could happen, such as any misunderstanding between Chinese and 
English. This problem was unavoidable, but it has been mitigated through parallel analysis of the 
data by the researcher and the two supervisors independently and then jointly. Several iterations 
have been produced to reach the two coding stages explained in the Methodology chapter. A third 
limitation is that, given the sensitivity of the research topic, the interview participants may have 
withheld some information. Mitigation tools included the researcher asking the participants to talk 
about more the stories of the people they know but not themselves in order to help the participants 
201 
 
to present their own ideas. Likewise, the author made some hypothesises, to elicit participants’ 
ideas and to avoid the sensitivity. Furthermore, the anonymous feature of this research was 
repeatedly emphasised to dispel the participants’ worry.  In summary, although there are certain 
limitations that can be found in this project, they are unavoidable to some extent, and the author 
has paid effort to minimise their negative effects. 
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Appendix 
Interview Questions 
Guanxi 
• What is Guanxi in the workplace for you? 
• How do you differentiate between private Guanxi and working Guanxi? 
• Do you use Guanxi in the workplace? How frequently? Why? Would you be able to offer 
an example? 
• Can Guanxi help with your personal goals, such as promotion or special treatment in the 
workplace? Why? Would you be able to offer an example? 
• Can you avoid using Guanxi in the workplace? If you can, how? If you cannot, why not? 
• Do you think Guanxi can promote any ethical dilemmas to you in the workplace? Why? 
Would you be able to offer an example? 
• Do you establish Guanxi with people such as supervisors, subordinates, or colleagues in 
the workplace? Why? 
• How do you establish Guanxi with them? 
• How do you maintain Guanxi with them? 
• How do you fix Guanxi with them? 
• Are you willing to share your Guanxi with the people in the workplace? Why? 
• Is there any difference between the Guanxi established in the workplace and out of the 
workplace? Why? Would you be able to offer an example? 
• Do you think using Guanxi is an unavoidable part of daily life in China? Why? 
 
Corruption 
• What do you think corruption is? What kind of activities are involved? Would you be able 
to offer an example? 
• The academic definition of corruption normally refers to “the abuse of public office for 
private gain”. To what extent do you agree with this definition? Why? 
• If you know about someone’s unethical activities, to what extent do you think you would 
report them? Why? 
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• To what extent do you believe in a “Hai Rui” style of a civil servant? Why? 
• To what extent do you think corruption is culturally determined in the Chinese public 
sector? (Power distance and collectivism) 
 
Guanxi & Corruption 
• Do you think there is any relationship between Guanxi and corrupt activities? Why? 
• How do you differentiate between “normal” Guanxi and “corrupt” Guanxi? What is the 
key difference? Would you be able to offer an example? 
• Some scholars consider Guanxi is normatively negative, what do you think about this 
perspective? Why? 
• Can you imagine, in which circumstances could “normal” Guanxi turn into “corrupt” 
Guanxi? 
 
 
 
